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Summary
This dissertation consists of three chapters, each developing one of the three elements of
the  subtitle.  The first,  ‘Aristotle  against  Eleatic  monism’,  analyses  Aristotle’s  refutation of
Eleatic  monism  in  Physics 1.2-3  in  parallel  with  Plato’s  parricide  of  Parmenides  (Sophist
242b6-5e5)  and  then  compares  the  Physics’  refutation  with  Aristotle’s  treatment  of  the
Eleatics  in  Metaphysics A.3-5.  It  concludes  that  from  this  background  Aristotle  draws  a
necessary requirement for his own metaphysical investigation, namely that we regard being
as not univocal.
The second chapter, ‘Aristotle’s parricide of Plato’, completes the parallelism between the
Sophist and  the Metaphysics by  examining  Aristotle’s  formulation  and  discussion  of  the
eleventh aporia in Metaphysics Beta: ‘Are being (τὸ ὄν) and the one (τὸ ἕν) the substance(s) of
all  things  or  are  they  just  attributes  of  some  other  underlying  thing?’.  It  focuses  on  a
particular  characteristic  of  aporia 11,  namely  its  allocation of  the two alternatives of  the
dilemma  to  Plato  and  the  Pythagoreans  on  the  one  hand  and  to  Empedocles  and  the
physicists on the other. Crucially, it shows that Aristotle not only borrows from the Sophist
the arguments which he levels against the pluralists, but also turns the Platonic critique of
Parmenides against Plato himself.
The third chapter, ‘Aristotle’s last word on aporia 11’, explains how Aristotle resolves this
metaphysical dilemma in Metaphysics I.2. It shows that he does not return to it until he has
developed new weapons against Plato and against the Pythagoreans: these are a criterion for
what counts and does not count as a substance (provided in  Metaphysics Z.13-16) and the
definition of unity in terms of indivisibility (formulated in I.1). On this basis, Aristotle claims
not  only  that  the  one  is  not  itself  a  substance,  but  also  that  it  is  not  the  substance  of
anything.
This  dissertation  has  the  following  three  main  results.  First,  it  demonstrates  that
Aristotle’s dialectic cannot be regarded as monolithic but needs to be explored on a case-by-
case basis. Second, it re-evaluates Aristotle’s engagement with his predecessors, in particular
the Eleatics.  Third,  it  presents  an argument which strongly tells  in  favour  of  a  unitarian
reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
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Introduction
If Metaphysics Zeta is the Mount Everest of ancient philosophy,1 Iota could be aptly
described as its K2. However, though no less challenging, it has been considerably less
explored than its cousin. This dissertation traces a path to the point of Metaphysics Iota
where Aristotle explicitly resolves aporia 11 (Met., 996a4-9), which he regards as the hardest
aporia of those listed in Beta and which concerns the metaphysical status of being (τὸ ὄν)
and the one (τὸ ἕν).2 That resolution is the result of a journey that can be traced back through
Aristotle's explicit references from the solution of aporia 11 (I.2) to its first formulation and
discussion (B.1, B.4) and on to its background in Aristotle's engagement both inside and
outside the Metaphysics with a particular and peculiar earlier attempt to relate being and the
one: Eleatic monism (A.3-5, Physics 1.2-3, Plato's Sophist). I shall retrace those steps in my
ascent.
Aristotle's aporia about being and the one has been studied in a number of articles and
books, which I shall discuss in chapter 2.3 However, it has not yet been the object of a
dedicated monograph. Accordingly, the primary aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap in
the scholarship. Given its prominence in Aristotle's metaphysical inquiry, the examination of
the eleventh aporia will touch upon central parts of Aristotle's investigation and will have
important ramifications for our overall understanding of his metaphysical project.
1 Burnyeat 2001, 1.
2 I shall be using the expression ‘the one’—instead of ‘unity’—as a calque for τὸ ἕν, so as to preserve the
ambiguities of the Greek expression. Depending on context, τὸ ἕν can refer not only to the property of being
one but also to a given thing described as ‘one’ or even to the single thing that, on a specific metaphysical view,
is posited as being. We shall see that, in his arguments, Aristotle takes great pains to disambiguate precisely
what is meant by ‘the one’.
3 Lowe 1977; Madigan 1999, 107–18; Bell 2000; Berti 2003; Halper 2009, 261–2; Cavini 2009; Castelli 2010, 37–48;
Castelli 2018a, 94–5.
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Although both being and the one are mentioned in its formulation, the aporia's special
focus is on the metaphysical status of the one. Hence, the first question which this
dissertation addresses is: why is Aristotle interested in τὸ ἕν in the first place? Much of the
answer will depend on the background of the eleventh aporia, which I shall explore in
chapter 1; for Aristotle thinks that the one plays an important role in the metaphysical
doctrines of his predecessors. Furthermore, we shall see that monism also acquires a pivotal
role in the arguments against the two alternative views at stake in the aporia, to which
chapter 2 is devoted. As a result, Aristotle's own solution will settle the question by providing
a satisfactory metaphysical account of the one, which will be reconstructed in chapter 3. 4
This is the point in which the eleventh aporia meets Iota, to which I now shall turn.
The tenth book is by far one of the least studied of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The first
modern commentary was published by Leo Elders in 1961 with the title Aristotle's Theory of
the One.5 This commentary is useful insofar as it indicates Aristotelian parallel passages and
suggests interesting references to Academic doctrines. However, Elders relies heavily on
controversial assumptions regarding the development of Aristotle's thought, which lead him
to doubt the authenticity of many lines of Iota. As a result, Elders' commentary offers a
fragmented picture of the book, making it hard to read Iota as a whole. As we shall see,
things appear in a significantly different light when we instead suppose that—despite its
obscurity—most of the text of Iota (or at least I.1-2) should be read as it stands.
The second modern commentary on Iota was edited in Italian by Bruno Centrone almost
45 years later.6 It consists of eight contributions by different scholars focusing on single
chapters or problems in Iota, preceded by an annotated translation and an introduction by
the editor. Centrone's introduction contains a thorough discussion of scholarly opinions on
Iota7 as well as a general overview of its main tenets. 8 However, while the individual
4 Aristotle's own reflections on the one have been thoroughly studied in Laura Castelli's Problems and Paradigms
of Unity, which also offers a review of secondary literature on this topic: Castelli 2010, 11–3.
5 Elders 1961.
6 Centrone 2005.
7 Centrone 2005, 37–49.
8 Centrone 2005, 49–64.
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contributions are certainly helpful in making good sense of Iota's arguments, a
comprehensive perspective on Iota as a whole falls outside the scope of the volume.
Such a perspective was finally offered by Laura Castelli's 2018 volume for the Clarendon
Series.9 Castelli not only provides a detailed running commentary on Iota, but also devotes
some crucial pages to its role within Aristotle's science of being qua being and to its place in
the economy of the Metaphysics as a whole.10 In tracing a path to I.2, this dissertation has
made use of Castelli's commentary as a map of Metaphysics Iota. While, however, most of my
analysis will follow the lines traced by this commentary, the major point on which it departs
from it concerns precisely the eleventh aporia. In fact, chapter 3 will argue that, despite
drawing heavily upon Zeta's study of substance, it is Iota, rather than Zeta, which resolves it.
This reading will shed new light on Iota itself as well as on its role within the Metaphysics.
The tenth book of the Metaphysics has a curious status in Aristotelian scholarship, which
can be summarised in the following three common views. (1) Iota is a sort of spin-off of the
story Aristotle tells in the Metaphysics, insofar as it deals with topics which are included in
but not central to his main line of inquiry—such as unity, sameness, equality, similarity and
contrariety.11 (2) Iota is also a liminal book, in that it is not well connected to the rest of the
Metaphysics.12 Lastly, (3) Iota offers only a negative contribution to Aristotle's investigation,
because it reveals a merely polemic aim in discussing unity and issues of contrariety. 13 With
respect to these points, this dissertation will suggest that Iota is much better integrated
within the Metaphysics than is usually acknowledged. To begin with, (1) relocating the
resolution of the hardest and most necessary aporia of the Metaphysics to I.2 makes Iota an
9 Castelli 2018a.
10 In particular, Castelli 2018a, xi–xxiv.
11 Both Ravaisson 1837–1845 and Bonitz 1842 (referred to in Centrone 2005, 39) regard Iota as an independent
treatise which Aristotle intended (but did not have time) to connect to the rest of the Metaphysics. Düring 1966,
279–81, instead, goes as far as to consider Iota an old treatise which was linked to other books by means of later
additions.
12 Besides Ravaisson, Düring and Bonitz, Brandis 1834 and Schwegler 1847–1848 too think that Iota interrupts the
continuity between Theta and Lambda. Ross 1924 also expresses dissatisfaction with Iota's little relation to the
rest of the Metaphysics. Finally, Jaeger 1934 believes that Iota's references to other books witness that it is a late
treatise and that the books on substance (ΕΖΘ) originally constituted an autonomous treatise.
13 This view is championed by Elders 1961 and, more recently, Menn in progress, Iα5.
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essential chapter in Aristotle's story.14 Further, (2) once we study the details of Aristotle's
arguments, many references to previous books of the Metaphysics can be substantiated, thus
making Iota integral to rather than liminal vis-à-vis the rest of the work.15 Finally, (3) the very
solution to the eleventh aporia presupposes a good deal of Aristotle's own tenets, one of
which is represented by I.1's metaphysical account of τὸ ἕν; this suggests that Iota also
contributes positively to Aristotle's investigation.16
One broader question which needs consideration in this introduction is the vexata
quæstio of the unity of the Metaphysics. Scholarly opinions span a spectrum of positions
which connect either all of the 14 books of the Metaphysics or (almost) none or only some of
them. Following Stephen Menn, the scholarly debate can be reduced to 5 positions.17 (a) At
the lower end of the spectrum there is the view that the Metaphysics is purely the result of an
editorial operation, which patched together treatises produced in different chronological
and doctrinal phases of Aristotle's activity.18 (b) On a more nuanced view, ΑΒΓΕΖΗΘ
represents a continuous series, to which Ι, Μ-Ν and possibly Λ have a looser connection. 19 (c)
On another interpretation, the Metaphysics consists of two treatises, i.e. ΑΒΓΕΙΜΝ and a
series which was added only later: ΖΗΘ.20 (d) The dominant view, however, is that
ΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΜΝ is intended as a single treatise, with or without Λ.21 Finally, (e) at the upper
end of the spectrum, there is the view that all the books of the Metaphysics form one single
treatise, with the sole exception of α.22 As a consequence of my reconstruction of the
eleventh aporia, this dissertation will suggest a different picture, in a way close to Menn's
14 This perspective is not entirely new, but goes back at least to Jaeger 1912. However, I shall stress how Zeta solves
the aporia only in part, whereas Iota provides the full answer—as suggested in Centrone 2005, 49.
15 A list of all the back references present in Iota is found in Centrone 2005, 38. However, a complete discussion
will not be developed until the end of this dissertation.
16 As emphasised by Castelli 2018a.
17 Menn in progress, Iα1, n. 5, here presented in a different order.
18 Christ 1895, XVII–XX; Düring 1966, 189–94, 202–24, 254–90, esp. 586–622.
19 Brandis 1834 and Bonitz 1842, quoted in Menn in progress, Iα1, n. 5.
20 Jaeger 1912.
21 Natorp 1888 and perhaps Frede 1987, 82 include Lambda in the main series Ross 1924, Jaeger 1934 and Frede &
Patzig 1988 exclude it.
22 Reale 1994.
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view. Menn restores Delta and Lambda as parts of one single treatise (ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘΙΜΝΛ)—
although he regards IMN as forming a cluster difficult to locate precisely.23 Indeed, my
analysis will provide some confirmation of the inclusion of Delta and Lambda in the
Metaphysics; however, the chief difference with Menn will concern precisely where to situate
Iota in this story. On the one hand, while Iota has more than one connection to M and N, I
shall suggest that these two books are not some sort of appendix to Iota, but rather that Iota
distils and readapts views expressed in M and N to a more specific context. On the other, I
shall show that there are solid reasons to believe that Iota is part of a single project
introduced by A and B. As such, aporia 11 will offer a fil rouge which tells in favour of a
unitary reading of the Metaphysics.
Finally, as I shall argue in chapter 2, the salient characteristic of the eleventh aporia is that
it ascribes the two alternatives of the dilemma to some predecessors, whom it mentions by
name. Its ‘endoxic’ nature places this aporia at the intersection of two further broad issues
within Aristotelian scholarship, namely Aristotle's dialectical method and his engagement
with the doctrines of his predecessors.
The role of reputable opinions (ἔνδοξα) in Aristotle's thought has been widely explored;24
however, how exactly dialectic is applied to Aristotle's metaphysical investigation is still a
matter of controversy. In particular, the scholarship is divided between those who defend a
dialectical interpretation of the Metaphysics25 and those who instead regard it as a
demonstrative science.26 Although this dissertation will not engage with this debate
explicitly, the picture it offers suggests an alternative to these positions by showing how
Aristotle deploys different dialectical strategies to serve specific purposes within his inquiry.
23 Menn in progress, Iα5.
24 See Owen 1960; Owen 1961; Berti 1975; Irwin 1977; Barnes 1980; Nussbaum 1986, 237–63; Barnes 1991. For a survey
of the different interpretations, see Frede 2012.
25 See in particular Berti 1975 and Irwin 1988. Irwin distinguishes between ‘strong’ and ‘pure’ (or ‘weak’) dialectic,
assigning the former to the inquiry into metaphysical principles and the latter to a general investigation that is
not concerned with truth. Against the distinction of two kinds of dialectic within a dialectical interpretation,
see also Berti 1996.
26 See in particular Bell 2004.
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The landmark contribution to the study of Aristotle's engagement with his predecessors is
the work of Harold Cherniss.27 On his interpretation, which has become traditional,
Aristotle's testimonies can hardly be trusted on account of seven sources of mistake.28 (1)
Typically, Aristotle wilfully misrepresents the views of his predecessors for the particular
purposes of his own arguments. However, (2) he sometimes reinterprets their doctrines
incorrectly either due to his own misunderstanding or because he is following a Platonic
antecedent; more specifically, (3) he may fail to grasp the very fundamentals of a doctrine or
(4) be misled by his translation of earlier theories into current terminology. Similarly, (5) he
supposes that current ideas must have been present in the words of past thinkers even when
their words do not suggest so. Moreover, (6) he displays a tendency to find necessary
antecedents of his own doctrines in earlier theories. Finally, (7) he has an inadequate
conception of the historical relationships between his early predecessors. There are good
reasons to resist many of these claims. Timothy Clarke's newly published book on Aristotle
and the Eleatic One, for example, convincingly shows that Aristotle based his arguments
against the Eleatics upon a close reading of the primary sources at his disposal, thus
rehabilitating Aristotle's views as plausible interpretations of Melissus and Parmenides.29
This dissertation will take this contention a step further, clarifying the key role played by
Plato in the picture.
A final consideration concerns the method I have followed. I have often made use of the
late antique and medieval commentators on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics: Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Syrianus, Simplicius, John Philoponus, Asclepius of Tralles,
Averroes and Thomas Aquinas. In passages where the extant Greek manuscripts are
problematic, particular attention has been devoted to the Arabic translations which are
reproduced in Averroes' Long Commentary or Tafsīr. Comparing the Greek and the Arabic
texts involves a number of difficulties. Averroes' commentary is organised in the traditional
fashion, in which sections of the Metaphysics are followed by comments on the individual
lemmata. However, the translations of Aristotelian passages in the textus are sometimes
different from the quotations found in the lemmata; moreover, in the single commenta
27 Cherniss 1935 and Cherniss 1944.
28 Cherniss 1935, 352–6.
29 Clarke 2019.
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Averroes often paraphrases the lemma in question and even quotes an alternative translation
from a different source.30 Furthermore, the Arabic version of the Metaphysics appears as a
collection of translations by different scholars.31 However, on the whole, these translations
are extremely literal, to the point that they often sacrifice fluency—if not intelligibility—to
literality; this facilitates the task of guessing the original even in cases where the overall
rendering is hazy. Furthermore, the Arabic translators worked on manuscripts which are
different and most probably older than those currently extant in Greek.32 Thus, the Arabic
will be used as a precious testimony for reconstructing the text of the Metaphysics,33 with the
proviso that the textual evidence provided by the Arabic will never be the sole proof for a
specific reading.
⁎
This dissertation consists of three chapters, each developing one of the three elements of
the subtitle. The first, entitled ‘Aristotle against Eleatic monism’, analyses Metaphysics A.3-5
in conjunction with Physics 1.2-3, to which A.3 refers explicitly. It begins by showing that
Aristotle regards both Melissus and Parmenides as proponents of an extreme form of
monism: one which, Aristotle argues, precludes the very possibility of a physical or
metaphysical investigation. It then analyses Aristotle’s refutation of Eleatic monism in
Physics 1.2-3 in parallel with Plato’s parricide of Parmenides (Sophist 242b6-5e5). Finally, it
returns to Metaphysics A and compares the Physics’ refutation with Aristotle’s treatment of
the Eleatics in his survey of previous metaphysical theories. It concludes that from this
background Aristotle draws a necessary requirement for his own metaphysical investigation,
namely that we regard being as not univocal and that we posit more than one single
principle.
30 On the general structure of Averroes' commentary, see Bouyges 1938, XIII–XXIII. Pierre Bouyges' Notice is surely
the pioneering work in the comparison between the Greek and the Arabic.
31 Bouyges 1938, CXXVII–XXXII. The identity of these translators has been confirmed by Bertolacci 2005, revised
in Bertolacci 2006, 5–35. Alpha Meizon (which, in Arabic, starts at 987a6) was translated by Naẓīf ibn Yumn;
Beta and Iota, by Usṭāṯ. Finally, the different translation reported in some passages of Iota is most probably by
Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn.
32 This point was made in Bouyges 1938, CXXXIV–VI, CLXXV–XXX.
33 The practice of considering the Arabic as a useful, albeit ‘capricieux’, witness of the Greek manuscript tradition
was initiated by Bouyges 1948.
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The second chapter, ‘Aristotle’s parricide of Plato’, completes the parallelism between the
Sophist and the Metaphysics by considering Aristotle’s formulation and discussion of the
eleventh aporia in Metaphysics Beta: ‘Are being (τὸ ὄν) and the one (τὸ ἕν) the substance(s) of
all things or are they just attributes of some other underlying thing?’. First, it pins down the
characteristics of Aristotle’s aporetic method of inquiry, elucidating how Beta carries out the
metaphysical investigation introduced in Alpha Meizon. Second, it examines a particular
characteristic of aporia 11, namely its allocation of the two alternatives of the dilemma to
Plato and the Pythagoreans on the one hand and to Empedocles and the physicists on the
other. Crucially, it shows that Aristotle not only borrows from the Sophist the arguments
which he levels against the pluralists, but he also turns the Platonic critique of Parmenides
against Plato himself. As a result, Aristotle’s discussion provides a solid grounding for a fresh
start.
The third and final chapter, entitled ‘Aristotle’s last word on aporia 11’, attends to this new
beginning and explains how Aristotle resolves this metaphysical dilemma in Metaphysics I.2.
It shows that he does not return to it until he has developed new weapons against Plato and
against the Pythagoreans: these are a criterion for what counts and does not count as a
substance (provided in Metaphysics Z.13-16) and the definition of unity in terms of
indivisibility (formulated in I.1). On this basis, Aristotle claims not only that the one is not
itself a substance, but also that it is not the substance of anything, thus depriving unity of
the prominence it had enjoyed in previous metaphysical theories. Accordingly, the chapter
ends by shedding new light on Aristotle’s own account of the one and on the so-called
convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’.
Overall, this dissertation offers a comprehensive reconstruction of the most pressing of
the aporiai formulated in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.34 It clarifies why Aristotle is interested in
being and the one in the first place and how he works through this metaphysical dilemma to
put forward his solution. It has the following three main results. First, it demonstrates that
Aristotle’s dialectic cannot be regarded as monolithic but needs to be explored on a case-by-
case basis. Second, it re-evaluates Aristotle’s engagement with his predecessors, placing
particular emphasis on his debt to the Eleatics. Third, it has ramifications for our general
34 Although Beta defines as extremely hard more than one difficulty (cf. Met., 999a24-25 and 1000a5), I shall clarify
the singularity of the eleventh aporia in 2.2.1.
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interpretation of the Metaphysics as a single work, in that it presents an argument which tells
in favour of a unitarian reading of Aristotle’s magnum opus.
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1. Aristotle Against Eleatic Monism
Introduction
In the opening book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle presents the doctrines of his
predecessors and engages in a dialectical confrontation with them. Within this discussion,
the Eleatics receive a special treatment on account of their peculiar monistic claim,
according to which there is only one being and nothing else is. Although these theories are
not the main focus of the eleventh aporia, we shall see that Aristotle's rejection of Eleatic
monism lies at the core of this metaphysical dilemma. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to
analyse the way in which Aristotle criticises Melissus' and Parmenides' theses and how this
criticism is an important preliminary to his own engagement with the question of the
relationship between being and the one. In particular, in Metaphysics A, Aristotle refers his
readers to the refutation of Eleaticism that he has set out in the first book of the Physics.
These two books will thus constitute the focus of the present chapter, which is divided into
five sections.
In sections 1-4, I shall start by defining the kind of monism that Aristotle ascribes to the
Eleatics, which can be appreciated when compared with alternative ways of postulating one
single principle of being. I shall then move on to some considerations concerning the place
that a discussion of Eleatic monism should occupy within Aristotle's own investigation into
principles. This will then allow me to tackle his confrontation with the Eleatics in Physics 1.2-
3. In particular, I shall try to make sense of Aristotle's arguments by evaluating his debt to the
refutation of Parmenides' monistic claims presented in Plato's Sophist. This first part of the
analysis will enable me to build the background for a thorough examination of Aristotle's
discussion of Eleaticism in Metaphysics A.
In section 5, I therefore explore the counterpart of Aristotle's treatment of the Eleatics in
the Metaphysics, illustrating his discussion of Melissus and Parmenides within his broader
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treatment of monism. Finally, I develop a comparison between Metaphysics A.3-5 and
Physics 1.2-3 in order to evaluate how their respective discussions of Eleaticism fit with each
other and to draw some more general conclusions about the nature and purpose of
Aristotle's confrontation with Eleatic monism. This comparison will involve some
considerations regarding Aristotle's use of dialectic and, more importantly, how a
confrontation with Eleaticism is meant to contribute to his inquiry into principles.
1.1. Parmenidean monism
In the first book of the Physics, Aristotle undertakes an inquiry into the number and
character of the principles of nature. After outlining the scope and method of the book,
Physics 1.2 starts off with a crisp division of the possible number and characteristics of first
principles. They must necessarily either be (a) one or (b) more than one. If there is only one
principle, then it can either be (a.1) unchangeable or (a.2) changeable. If, on the contrary,
there are many, they can either be (b.1) limited in number or (b.2) unlimited. Finally, if they
are finite in number, they can be two, three, four or more, while, if they are infinite, they can
be one in kind but different in form or also opposites.35
35 Philoponus emphasises that Aristotle's division is at once scientific and lucid: it is ἐπιστημονική because it is
based on contradiction (ἀντίφασις), which leaves no escape; ἐναργής, because it is based on common knowledge
(Philop., In Phys., 20.22-21.1). However, it is worth noting that Aristotle does not consider the case of multiple
unchanging principles, for he seems to assume that only in case (a) can the one principle be seen as either
changeable or unchangeable. According to Simplicius' report, Alexander justifies the neglected item by
emphasising that, since Aristotle demonstrates that, if one posits a single principle, this cannot be
unchangeable, a fortiori many principles cannot be unchangeable either (42.20-22). Although this line of
thought may clarify why Aristotle would not be interested in this option, it does not justify why he does not list
it as an option at all. Simplicius' own (somewhat puzzling) explanation is that principles must have something
in common (κοινωνεῖν) in order to function as such, so, if one posits multiple principles, they cannot possibly be
unchangeable. This is why (he thinks) this tenet has no exponent among the first philosophers and does not
therefore appear in Aristotle's list (42.7-10). The thought behind Simplicius' explanation may be that, if
principles are many, they must interact and, by acting on each other, they are not at rest; however, such a train
of thought can hardly be Aristotelian. Finally, while Averroes limits himself to supposing that either none of
Aristotle's predecessors had posited multiple principles ‘at rest’ (quiescentia) or—simply enough—Aristotle
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The discussion of the position of the Eleatics is set up within this framework. Specifically,
(a.1) is the position attributed to Parmenides and Melissus, whose tenets will be analysed in
detail in the rest of Physics 1.2 and in 1.3. In contrast, (a.2) is attributed to a group of
philosophers generally referred to as the physicists (οἱ φυσικοί) and whose doctrines will be
dealt with only in Physics 1.4. The opposition between the Eleatics and the physicists suggests
that we should not regard the former as properly concerned with physical problems. This is
confirmed immediately in the text, when Aristotle points out that the discussion of the
Eleatic theses does not belong to physics.36 In fact, by denying any form of change
whatsoever, the Eleatics preclude the possibility of talking about principles, let alone of
physical principles.37 On the other hand, this opposition is applied within different kinds of
monism, so what Parmenides and Melissus are propounding is an extreme form of it. Against
this background, 1.2-3 constitutes Aristotle's expanded discussion of what can be referred to
as strict monism.38
With respect to the attribution of this label, scholars have expressed contrasting opinions:
in particular, it is debated whether and to what extent it does justice to Parmenides'
doctrine.39 A more important question for our purposes, though, is whether Aristotle really
interpreted Parmenides as a strict monist. As John Palmer points out, there are at least two
reasons for believing that he ultimately did not. First, Aristotle emphasises a difference
between the two exponents of Eleatic monism, describing Parmenides as a more
was content with this division (Aver., In Phys., 9B14-C3), Aquinas elaborates on this point. No pluralist could
have posited his or her principles to be ‘unmovable’ (immobilia), because all philosophers postulated a
contrariety between principles, and contrary things are specifically intended to change each other ( se alterare,
Thom., In Phys., 9). Overall, the problem remains open. Although we shall see that Aristotle states that a
principle is always a principle of something else (ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν,  185a4-5), prima facie plurality seems
compatible with the view that at least one of the many principles is unchangeable.
36 Phys., 18a255ff. I shall dwell on this point in the next section.
37 Throughout this thesis I shall limit myself to reconstructing Aristotle's general worry with the consequences of
strict monism, leaving aside what led Parmenides himself to reject change.
38 Strict monism has been recently defined in terms of entity monism (there is just one entity) and essence
monism (reality is all of the same essence): Clarke 2019, 4–5.
39 For a detailed account of the different interpretations of Parmenides, ancient as well as modern, see Palmer
2009, 1–45. 
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sophisticated thinker than Melissus. This gives room for ascribing strict monism only to
Melissus, i.e. a monism in which only one continuous and indivisible extension is posited.
Second, Aristotle's comment on Parmenides' theory in Metaphysics A.5 speaks in favour of an
interpretation whereby Parmenides posited a single substance (or kind of substance), yet
allowed for a plurality of phenomenal qualities. In the first book of the Physics itself,
Aristotle mentions Parmenides among the thinkers who posited the opposites as principles
—thus allowing for a pluralism of some sort.40 How are we to account for these conflicting
representations of Parmenides' thought? In order to discuss this issue, it is useful to sketch
an overview of the places in which Aristotle mentions Parmenides, as displayed in the
following table:
Παρμενίδης Παρμενίδου Παρμενίδῃ Παρμενίδην
De cael. 298b17 (3.1)
De gen. et corr. 318b6 (1.3)
330b14 (2.3)
Metaph.
984b25 (A.3)
986b18 (A.5)
986b22 (A.5)
986b27 (A.5)
1009b21 (Γ.5)
1001a32 (B.4)
1089a3 (N.2)
984b3 (A.3)
De part. anim. 648a29 (2.2)
Phys. 184b16 (1.2)
185b18 (1.2)
186a7 (1.3)
186a32 (1.3)
188a20 (1.5)
185a9 (1.2)
186a22 (1.3)
192a1 (1.9)
207a15 (3.6)
Soph. el. 182b26 (ch. 33)
40 Cf. Phys., 188a20.
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The hypothesis that Aristotle might have changed his mind after writing Physics 1.1 is not
satisfactory.41 Although we might imagine that the quick remark in chapter 5 is a later
addition, other passages from works commonly considered to be at least as early as the
Physics speak of opposite principles in Parmenides' thought. In particular, in The Parts of
Animals, Aristotle attributes to Parmenides the view that women are hotter than men—
which suggests that Parmenides spoke of hot and cold as principles. On the other hand, in
the two different places of his On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle affirms that
Parmenides spoke of fire and earth in terms of respectively being and not being, while
positing air and water as mixtures of fire and earth (hence, supposedly of being and not
being, too). This passage is particularly telling when compared with the lines of Metaphysics
Α.5 where Aristotle devotes a particular attention to Parmenides.
Met., 986b25-987a2 (trans. Schofield 2012, slightly modified)
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἀφετέοι
πρὸς τὴν νῦν ζήτησιν, οἱ μὲν δύο καὶ
πάμπαν ὡς ὄντες μικρὸν ἀγροικότεροι,
Ξενοφάνης καὶ Μέλισσος· Παρμενίδης δὲ
μᾶ•ον βλέπων ἔοικέ που λέγειν· παρὰ γὰρ
τὸ ὂν τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐθὲν ἀξιῶν εἶναι, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἓν οἴεται εἶναι, τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἄ•ο οὐθέν (περὶ
οὗ σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως
εἰρήκαμεν), ἀναγκαζόμενος δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν
τοῖς φαινομένοις, καὶ τὸ ἓν μὲν κατὰ τὸν
λόγον πλείω δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν
ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι, δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο
τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλιν τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν,
οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν
κατὰ τὸ ὂν [τὸ θερμὸν] τάττει θάτερον δὲ
κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν.
Now these thinkers, as we said, must be set aside
for the purposes of the present inquiry—two of
them altogether, since they are a bit too crude,
Xenophanes and Melissus; but Parmenides seems
perhaps to speak with more insight. For by claiming
that besides being there is no such thing as not
being, he necessarily thinks that being is one, and
that there is nothing else (on this topic we have
spoken more clearly in our writings on nature). But
finding himself forced to go along with things as
they evidently are, he makes the hypothesis that
there is one thing in reason but a plurality in
sensation, and posits after all two causes and two
principles, hot and cold, that is by speaking of fire
and earth; and of these he ranges the one with
being, the other with not being.
41 This suggestion is found in Mansfeld 1986, 15.
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This passage plays a key role in understanding Aristotle's confrontation with the Eleatics.
For the time being, I confine myself to drawing attention to the terms in which Parmenides'
theories are presented. Aristotle not only describes him as more insightful than Melissus, but
also attributes to him two principles after classifying him as a monist. To solve this contrast,
Palmer draws attention to the fact that Aristotle reports a Parmenidean distinction between
unity in account and multiplicity in perception, which implies the view that Parmenides did
not deny all kinds of plurality.42 In the light of his own understanding of the claim that what
is is one, Parmenides was hence portrayed by Aristotle as an advocate of a more ‘generous’
monism: what is is one because (1) everything that is is substance and because (2) the
account of everything is identical. Such a theory is compatible with a plurality in perception
and can be labelled as ‘aspectual interpretation’ in that it recognises two Parmenidean
perspectives on one and the same thing (i.e. τὸ ὄν).
Although this suggestion is grounded in some textual evidence, I think this evidence
yields less than is hoped. First of all, even if Aristotle undoubtedly acknowledges a difference
between Melissus and Parmenides, he does group them in the same class of thinkers, i.e.
those who posit one unchangeable being.43 In Physics 1.2, it is therefore difficult to claim that
Aristotle views Parmenides as a ‘generous’ monist. As for Metaphysics A.5, its reference back
to the Physics implies not only that the two texts present compatible accounts of
Parmenides' thought, but also that Aristotle confirms the analysis he has provided in the
Physics. As a result, if what he claims in the Physics is that Parmenides is a strict monist, we
must expect him to hold the same view in the Metaphysics passage. As we shall see, even
though—to use Aristotle's metaphor—Parmenides saw further (μᾶ•ον βλέπων, Met., 986b28)
than his fellow Eleatics, he could not yet see (οὔπω συνεώρα, Phys., 186a32) that there are
different (kinds of) beings, and not only one.
In our passage from A.5, Parmenides is introduced as a supporter of the view that there is
only one thing, so his distinctiveness still falls within the boundaries of strict monism.
Aristotle even emphasises the grounds for such a tenet, namely, the claim that only being is.
Because of this assumption, Parmenides necessarily (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) commits himself to the
42 Palmer 2009, 222–3, 37–8.
43 At 986b17 he says that these thinkers said that being is unchangeable (unlike ‘the physicists’): οὗτοι δὲ ἀκίνητον
εἶναί φασιν.
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thesis that being is one. However, Aristotle also emphasises that Parmenides was obliged to
posit some principles of change in order to follow appearances (τοῖς φαινομένοις). In the text,
this constraint (marked by the participle ἀναγκαζόμενος) is on a par with that of accepting
the consequence of postulating that only being is and that not-being is not (marked by the
phrase ἐξ ἀνάγκης).44 In other words, on this reading, Parmenides' view on being and not-
being necessarily commits him to his extreme form of monism, which is expressed by the
claim that there is only one being. On the other hand, he is also forced to come to terms with
τὰ φαινόμενα and hence account for our experiencing change through sense perception.
However, he acknowledges this, as it were, because of an external compulsion and despite
his denial of multiplicity.45 To phrase it in terms of the Alētheia/Doxa distinction, we can thus
agree with Clarke's reconstruction of Aristotle's take on the relationship between the two
parts of Parmenides' poem. For Aristotle, Parmenides' official theory seems confined to the
Alētheia.46
In connection with this, it should be noted that to express the contrast between unity and
multiplicity, Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides a distinction between unity κατὰ τὸν λόγον and
multiplicity κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. On the grounds of this attribution, Asclepius interprets this
passage as suggesting that Parmenides had an intuition of what Aristotle will call the formal
cause—which corresponds to the definition (λόγος) of being.47 Although this view is
undermined by the very fact that Aristotle explicitly attributes the discovery of the formal
cause to the Pythagoreans and not to Parmenides,48 this point raises an important problem
for our discussion: what is the force of λόγος in the expression ἓν κατὰ τὸν λόγον?
It might be tempting to follow Asclepius in viewing Aristotle as being content with this
distinction. However, a parallel description of monism in the first book of the Physics tells
against this possibility:
44 Thus, I diverge from Schofield's translation in taking ἐξ ἀνάγκης to depend on οἴεται and not on εἶναι.
45 Cf. Clarke 2019, 177–8.
46 Clarke 2019, 41–47.
47 Ascl., In Met., 40.29–30; 41.13–15, probably following Alex., In Met., 44.4–6. More recently, Clarke 2019, 173–5.
48 Met., 987a20.
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Phys., 188b26-189a10 (trans. Charlton 1970, slightly modified)
μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον σχεδὸν
συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄ•ων οἱ πλεῖστοι,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον· πάντες γὰρ τὰ
στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχάς,
καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία
λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας
ἀναγκασθέντες. διαφέρουσι δ’ ἀ•ήλων τῷ
τοὺς μὲν πρότερα τοὺς δ’ ὕστερα λαμβάνειν,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοὺς
δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ
ψυχρόν, οἱ δ’ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἕτεροι δὲ
περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἢ νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν αἰτίας
τίθενται τῆς γενέσεως· ταῦτα δ’ ἀ•ήλων
διαφέρει κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον) (…).
So far most thinkers are prepared to go along
with us, as I said above. For they all represent
their elements and what they call their principles
as opposites, even if they give no reason for doing
so, as though the truth itself were forcing them
on. They differ among themselves in that some
take pairs which are prior and some take pairs
which are posterior, and some choose pairs
which are more readily known by reason, and
some choose pairs which are more readily known
by perception: for some put forward hot and cold
as the causes of coming to be, and others wet and
dry, and others odd and even or strife and love,
and these differ in the manner just stated.
This passage is important for two reasons: first, it helps us to understand how much
emphasis we can place on Parmenides' alleged distinction κατὰ τὸν λόγον/κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν;
second, it provides some important hints as to the search for truth (ἀλήθεια) more generally.
Regarding the first point, it should be noted that the two passages we are taking into
consideration both deal with the principle of movement. In the context of Physics 1, Aristotle
is drawing our attention to the fact that all thinkers who attempted to explain change
introduced some opposite principles. On the other hand, in Metaphysics A.5, the Eleatics are
mentioned after Aristotle has outlined the Pythagorean table of opposites. What we find in
Physics 1.5 is a clarification of his predecessors' attitude towards these principles: in
Aristotle's view, their disagreement over what the opposites are depends on the different
criteria by which their principles can be known. The key expression here is γνωριμώτερα κατὰ
τὸν λόγον, as opposed to γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. These terms seem to describe
through which faculty opposites are (taken to be) known; considering, in particular, that
λόγος is contrasted with αἴσθησις, they should most likely be understood as respectively
‘reason’ and ‘perception’. Although in the Metaphysics passage Aristotle is not explicitly
relating the expression κατὰ τὸν λόγον to γνωριμώτερα, the object of reference seems to be the
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same. In fact, in the Physics passage, it is reasonable to assume that thinkers who posited
principles ‘more knowable according to perception’ posited hot and cold, which are the very
same principles attributed to Parmenides both at the beginning of 1.5 and in Metaphysics A.5.
Accordingly, we should conclude that the kind of unity Parmenides postulated is a unity
according to reason, which contrasts with the phenomenal plurality experienced through
sense perception. Although the more specific meaning of ‘definition’ is still compatible with
this reconstruction, it is more likely that in this instance λόγος carries the broader meaning
of ‘reason’.
The mention of necessity is prominent in the passage from the Physics, too. In fact,
although—in Aristotle's opinion—all predecessors failed to analyse φύσις correctly, they still
somehow contributed to this research. In both passages Aristotle refers to a constraint that
forced the Eleatics (in the case of the Metaphysics) or some other predecessors (in the
passage from the Physics) to proceed in the right direction. In the Physics, however, the terms
in which Aristotle describes his predecessors can shed light on his overall study of earlier
thinkers. In fact, while trying to show that all his predecessors posited the opposites as
principles, he not only accuses them of not accounting for their principles ( ἄνευ λόγου
τιθέντες), but he also says that, this notwithstanding, they nonetheless contributed to our
investigation, as if compelled by truth itself (ὥσπερ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες).
Even if truth is not mentioned in the  Metaphysics passage and although the assertion in the
Physics is qualified by a ὥσπερ, the very starting point of the investigation that Aristotle
undertakes in the Metaphysics seems to be grounded in the attempt to inherit the fruit of
previous philosophical activity precisely to progress on the path that leads to truth. Before
turning to that investigation, I shall clarify my reconstruction of Aristotle's interpretation of
Parmenides.
There is a further point that can corroborate this interpretation. In the final lines of the
passage quoted above, Aristotle associates being and not being with hot and cold
respectively. This attribution plays an important role in our reconstruction of Aristotle's
reading of Parmenides' philosophy. In fact, if he thinks that Parmenides exclusively posited
being (τὸ ὄν), these lines cannot possibly be referring to one and the same doctrine, because
they would introduce not being (τὸ μὴ ὄν). Accordingly, we should either suppose that
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Parmenides is intentionally conflating two contrasting perspectives or we must take them as
incompatible in such a way that only one can truly be attributed to him. In other words, the
contradiction between Parmenides' strict monism on the one hand and his ‘generous’
monism on the other can be explained by ascribing a contradiction either to Aristotle or to
Parmenides himself (seen through Aristotle's eyes). I propose that the latter is the case.
Hence, if my reconstruction of Aristotle's reading of Parmenides' philosophy is correct, then
Aristotle here is not only pointing at an undesired consequence of Parmenides' theories, but
is also providing us with a proof that we cannot attribute to him an aspectual interpretation
of Parmenides. In fact, by itself, the aspectual reading is compatible with some degree of
plurality, provided that the Way of Truth and that of Belief are two descriptions of one and
the same entity. However, Aristotle explicitly presents the two parts of Parmenides'
philosophy as incompatible. In other words, Palmer's ‘aspectual reading’ ultimately requires
both perspectives on the one being to be legitimate descriptions of it. However, what can be
inferred from my reconstruction is rather that, on Aristotle's reading, Parmenides maintains
that there is only one thing, although he must concede, despite himself, that we perceive a
plurality of objects. Furthermore, as will become clear in the next section, Aristotle firmly
believes that Eleaticism can be traced back to the claim that there is only one thing and is
equally clear that it does not deal with nature except ‘by accident’.49 Accordingly, contrary to
Palmer's suggestion, two basic theses of the traditional interpretation of Parmenides seem to
be espoused by Aristotle: Parmenides was a proponent of strict monism and believed that
the world of our ordinary experience is but an illusion.50
The last passage in which Parmenides is mentioned (alongside Melissus) that is worth
quoting is found in the De Caelo. Here not only does Aristotle confirm the reading defended
above, but he also introduces the next point that will need to be considered. In chapter 3,
before turning to his analysis of the sublunary elements, he mentions that some of his
predecessors denied the existence of generation:
49 The ancient Greek commentators noticed a potential clash within Aristotle's presentation of Parmenides'
doctrines. They substantially agree in regarding Parmenides' two ways to imply that, while dealing with
plurality in the Way of Belief, only in the Way of Truth did he treat what really is (i.e. τὸ νοητὸν ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τὸ
κυρίως ὄν in Alexander; τὸ ὄντως ὄν in Simplicius; τὰ ὄντως ὄντα in Philoponus).
50 These correspond to (T1) and (T2) in Palmer's summary of Guthrie's interpretation, see Palmer 2009, 17.
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DC, 298b11-24 (trans. Guthrie 1939)
Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως ἀνεῖλον
γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν· οὐθὲν γὰρ οὔτε
γίγνεσθαί φασιν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν
ὄντων, ἀ•ὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν, οἷον οἱ
περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην, οὕς,
εἰ καὶ τἆ•α λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀ•’ οὐ
φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίσαι λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ
εἶναι ἄττα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως
ἀκίνητα μᾶ•όν ἐστιν ἑτέρας καὶ
προτέρας ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς σκέψεως.
Ἐκεῖνοι δὲ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν μὲν ἄ•ο παρὰ
τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν
εἶναι, τοιαύτας δέ τινας νοῆσαι πρῶτοι
φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνῶσις ἢ
φρόνησις, οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα
τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους.
Some of them flatly denied generation and
destruction, maintaining that nothing which is either
comes into being or perishes; it only seems to us as if
they do. Such were the followers of Melissus and
Parmenides. Of them we must hold that, though some
of what they say may be right, yet they do not speak as
students of nature, since the existence of certain
substances subject neither to generation nor to any
other kind of motion is not a matter for natural science
but rather for another and higher study. They, however,
being unaware of the existence of anything beyond the
substance of sensible objects, and perceiving for the
first time that unchangeable entities were demanded if
knowledge and wisdom were to be possible, naturally
transferred to sensible objects the description of the
higher.
In this passage Aristotle clearly ascribes to the Eleatics a denial of change (in particular, of
generation and corruption), which only appears to us as real (μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν). Moreover, as
remarked by Palmer, he seems to be propounding a substantial interpretation of Parmenides'
(and Melissus') thought, according to which the Eleatics, while studying being, were,
unawares, describing what he would call οὐσία.51 More importantly, Aristotle assigns the
study of the Eleatic doctrines not to physics, but to a different investigation or to one prior to
physics. With respect to this point, I would like to emphasise that the terms in which
Aristotle describes the particular form of monism propounded by the Eleatics has to do with
the lack of any form of change whatsoever. As such, I prefer to call their doctrine change-free
monism. The advantage of such a label is that it focuses on the very obstacle which, in
51 Alexander seems to go in this very direction when he glosses Parmenides' true being as the principle and cause
of all things that are in whatsoever way (ὅπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία πάντων τῶν ὁπωσδηποτοῦν ὄντων ἐστί, 45,32). In so
doing, he also construes Parmenides' philosophy as an inquiry into causes, which is not a position shared by all
commentators.
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Aristotle's opinion, undermines any physical investigation. This point will become pivotal in
the next section.
1.2. An inquiry that does not belong to physics
In Physics 1.1, Aristotle had pointed out that knowledge of anything involves knowledge of
its first principles. In accordance with this tenet, his inquiry will provide a causal explanation
of change. By contrast, not all the physical investigations of his predecessors can legitimately
be considered to be causal. In particular, Eleaticism undermines the very foundation of any
inquiry into principles.52 As such, Aristotle's critique requires a preliminary discussion:
Phys., 184b25-185a20 (trans. Clarke 2019)
τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὂν
σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν·
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι
λόγος ἔστι πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς,
ἀ•’ ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν
κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ
γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἔστιν, εἰ ἓν μόνον καὶ οὕτως
ἓν ἔστιν. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν.
ὅμοιον δὴ τὸ σκοπεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἓν καὶ
πρὸς ἄ•ην θέσιν ὁποιανοῦν διαλέγεσθαι
τῶν λόγου ἕνεκα λεγομένων (οἷον τὴν
Ἡρακλείτειον, ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄνθρωπον
ἕνα τὸ ὂν εἶναι), ἢ λύειν λόγον ἐριστικόν,
ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ
ὁ Μελίσσου καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδου· καὶ γὰρ
ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυ•όγιστοί
εἰσιν· μᾶ•ον δ’ ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ
οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀ•’ ἑνὸς ἀτόπου
Now, to investigate whether what is is one and
unchanging is not to investigate into nature. For, just as
for the geometer too there is no longer any argument to
give against an opponent who destroys the principles,
but this is instead something either for another science
or for one common to all, so too for the person
[investigating] principles. For there is no longer any
principle if it is only one, and one in this way; for a
principle is a principle of some thing or things.
So, to investigate whether it is one in this way is like
arguing dialectically against any other thesis put
forward for the sake of argument (like the Heraclitean
thesis, or if someone should say that what is is one
human being), or like solving eristical arguments
which is just what both arguments contain, both
Melissus' and Parmenides'. For they assume falsehoods,
and are not deductive. Or rather, the argument of
Melissus is crude and contains no difficulty—grant
52 I shall be using ‘principles’ and ‘causes’ as roughly interchangeable; cf. Met., 1013a16–20.
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δοθέντος τὰ ἄ•α συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δὲ
οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.
ἡμῖν δ’ ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα
ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῆς
ἐπαγωγῆς. ἅμα δ’ οὐδὲ λύειν ἅπαντα
προσήκει, ἀ•’ ἢ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τις
ἐπιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ, οἷον
τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν
τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλῦσαι, τὸν δὲ
Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ· οὐ μὴν ἀ•’
ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ
ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως
ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ
αὐτῶν· ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις.
him one absurdity and the others follow: this is not
very hard.
But, for our part, let it be assumed that natural
things, either all or some of them, undergo change.
This is clear from induction, and at the same time nor
does it belong [to us] to solve everything, but only
those things which someone falsely proves from the
principles, but not others, just as it is the task of the
geometer to solve the quadrature by way of segments,
but not the quadrature of Antiphon. However,
although [the Eleatics] do not speak about nature, they
nonetheless happen to state physical difficulties. So it
is presumably a good idea to have a little dialectical
discussion about them. For the investigation does
contain some philosophy. 
In the initial lines of this passage we find what could be regarded as a general argument
against change-free monism. Since any principle, as such, needs a thing of which it is a
principle, positing a principle implies positing at least two beings. If the only thing there is is
the one being of the strict monist, then there will be no principle of this one thing, because
the principle would be a second thing. As a consequence, change-free monism is untenable
as an account of principles from the very outset, for any account of principles must admit of
some form of plurality. However, the paragraph seems to have a more specific purpose, that
is, to explain why Eleatic monism does not fall within the boundaries of physical inquiry. In
fact, as other sciences, physics starts from principles which are specific to it. Because of the
general argument against change-free monism, the being posited by the Eleatics cannot
function as a principle—for, if it did, it would be the principle of nothing at all. Moreover,
the Eleatic one being is described as unchanging, which contrasts with the basic assumption
that physics deals with being insofar as it undergoes change (cf. ἡμῖν δ’ ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ
πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι). As such, inquiring whether there is one unchangeable being
exceeds the domain of physics.
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This point has three fundamental consequences. With regard to Aristotle's interpretation
of Parmenides, it is again clear that his monism is considered to be change-free. If this were
not the case, then Aristotle could not formulate his argument in the terms in which he does,
but should at least qualify it or limit its relevance to the case of Melissus. Since, however, he
does not, we are entitled to assume that he thinks Parmenides' theory is such that it is
undermined by his argument.
The second consequence we can draw is pinpointed by Averroes in his Long Commentary,
of which a Latin translation is extant. There, Averroes explains that Melissus and Parmenides
did not say that there is one unchangeable principle (principium esse unum immobile), but
rather one unchangeable being (ens unum immobile).53 Averroes sharply distinguishes
between those thinkers who use the term ‘being’ instead of ‘principle’ (utuntur hoc nomine
ens pro principio, i.e. they speak about being but really describe a principle) and those who,
on the contrary, use the term ‘being’ to signify being itself ( utuntur hoc nomine ens pro ipso
ente, i.e. they speak about and refer to being). So, what Aristotle claims is that only
discussion of the former has a place within natural investigation. In view of this, when
Averroes comments on Aristotle's general argument against change-free monism, he adds an
implicit premise, namely, that we should imagine that Parmenides and Melissus use the term
‘being’ to mean ‘principle’ (si imaginati fuerimus quod Parmenides et Melissus utantur hoc
nomine ens pro principio, p. 8). Although we do not need to go as far as to understand ὄν as
literally meaning ‘principle’, this way of presenting the matter clarifies an important step in
the exposition of Eleatic monism. In fact, at 184b22-25, Aristotle had observed that ‘all those
who inquire into the number of beings (τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα) inquire in a similar fashion’
to those who inquire into the number of principles or elements. 54 In the light of the present
argument, Averroes' distinction makes it explicit that this passage is fundamental for
justifying the inclusion of the Eleatics in Aristotle's initial list, although they do not inquire
explicitly into principles, but study being as such.
53 This point was also made by Philoponus and Simplicius, who however do not develop it into a twofold
classification.
54 Crubellier 2019, 58 remarks a parallel passage at Soph., 242b–250d. The Platonic dialogue will play a
fundamental role in section 1.3.
24
In connection with this, the third and fundamental consequence of Aristotle's general
argument is that discussing Eleaticism is not the business of physics, but belongs to either
another science or one common to all sciences. This is explained by means of an analogy
with geometry. As refusing to accept its principles prevents the geometer from applying his
or her knowledge, so too, if we deny change, we can undertake no physical inquiry. Aristotle
defines this denial on the part of Parmenides and Melissus as eristic and contrasts their form
of sophistry with his own assumption that things by nature (τὰ φύσει) are changeable.55
Immediately afterwards, he repeats the analogy with geometry so as to confirm that this part
of the inquiry into principles does not pertain to natural science. Crucially, though, he also
says that, in their inquiries into being, Parmenides and Melissus happen to raise some
natural puzzles, which renders the discussion of their position of some philosophical
interest (ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν).56
But what, then, is the science appropriate to dealing with the Eleatic claims? The ancient
commentators have interpreted the disjunctive phrase ‘ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς’
in different ways.57 In his paraphrase, Themistius reads the phrase in question in a sort of
progressive order: if there is a science prior to physics, then physics will take its principles
from it; otherwise, it will use ‘the procedure common to all the arts that is rooted through
reputable opinions’ (τῇ κοινῇ πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν μεθόδῳ τῇ δι᾽ ἐνδόξων). Either way—he
concludes—Aristotle is not going to proceed as a physicist, but ‘as a dialectician or as a
philosopher’.58 The problem with this view is highlighted by Ross, who reminds us that
Aristotle does not consider dialectic to be a science.59 Upon closer inspection, though,
Themistius' text is open to an alternative interpretation, whereby the discussion of such
eristic claims must be led by the philosopher, who will be using dialectic as his or her
55 Note that it can hardly be by chance that Aristotle criticises Melissus' argument for strict monism in the
Sophistical Refutations, see SE, 167b13–20; 168b35–40; 181a27–30.
56 It is not clear whether Aristotle is referring to the fact that dealing with these theories can contribute to our
study of nature via negativa or whether he has in mind a more precise way in which the Eleatics made some
positive contribution. On this point see Clarke 2019, 17–8.
57 The particle τοι seems to emphasise the force of the disjunction. See Denniston 1966/1934, 553, (7).
58 Them., In Phys., 108.16-109.1. Here the disjunction can either be intended as exclusive or inclusive.
59 Ross 1979, 461.
25
method. Note that, on this reading, Aristotle's discussion of monism is at once dialectical
and metaphysical. If this is correct, Themistius seems to agree with Alexander, in whose view
Aristotle is going to speak not as a physicist, but as a philosopher—he then indicates
dialectic as the method that the philosopher is supposed to adopt. Contrary to this line of
interpretation, Simplicius and Philoponus merge Platonic dialectic and Aristotelian first
philosophy. They assert that the science which is supposed to demonstrate the principles of
all others is hence what Plato would call ‘dialectic’, i.e. what Aristotle calls ‘first philosophy’.
Philoponus even seems to conflate ‘first and unhypothetical philosophy’ with Aristotelian
dialectic, as, in his view, both of them demonstrate the principles of all sciences.
The main divergence between these groups of thinkers ultimately seems to be based on
different views of dialectic. On Alexander's and (possibly) Themistius' interpretations,
dialectic is not regarded as a science, but as a method of inquiry. As a result, the choice with
which we are faced is between a science superior to physics or a science common to all. In
other words, Themistius and Alexander take it that Aristotle is referring to only two sciences,
i.e. ‘another science’ and the one ‘common to all’. While dialectic is not a viable option seeing
as it lacks its proper object of inquiry, first philosophy seems to comply with both criteria.
This could explain why Alexander immediately identifies the science that should deal with
the Eleatic theories as first philosophy. On the other hand, the Platonic commentators
consider dialectic to be a good candidate for this purpose alongside first philosophy. They
assume that the sciences at stake are three, i.e. the ‘other science’ and two disciplines that
can be described as πασῶν κοιναί (i.e. dialectic and first philosophy). As a consequence, they
conflate either Platonic dialectic and Aristotelian first philosophy or, as in Philoponus' case,
Aristotle's dialectic and metaphysics. This conflation is also found in Averroes' and Aquinas'
commentaries, where the scientia communis is opposed to other particular sciences and said
to be respectively ‘first philosophy or dialectic (primam philosophiam aut artem disputandi)’
and ‘logic or metaphysics (logicam vel metaphysicam)’. In fact, Averroes then maintains that
Parmenides' and Melissus' theses are to be discussed dialectically (disputative), for, even if
speaking with them (loqui cum eis) is not the task of the natural philosopher, it is indeed the
task of the first philosopher. In this interpretation he is followed by Aquinas, who points out
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that no other science is required to argue against opinions that are overtly false and
improbable (opiniones manifeste falsas et improbabiles).
In order to evaluate these construals, a passage from the Sophistical Refutations is
particularly helpful:
SE, 171b34-172a9 (trans. Forster 1955)
ὁ δ’ ἐριστικός ἐστί πως οὕτως
ἔχων πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν ὡς ὁ
ψευδογράφος πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικόν·
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ διαλεκτικῷ
παραλογίζεται, καὶ ὁ ψευδογράφος
τῷ γεωμέτρῃ. ἀ•’ ὁ μὲν οὐκ
ἐριστικός, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ
συμπερασμάτων τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην
ψευδογραφεῖ· ὁ δ’ ὑπὸ τὴν δια-
λεκτικὴν περὶ τἆ•α ὅτι ἐριστικὸς
ἔσται δῆλον. οἷον ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ
μὲν διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων οὐκ ἐριστικός,
ὁ δὲ Βρύσωνος ἐριστικός· καὶ τὸν μὲν
οὐκ ἔστι μετενεγκεῖν ἀ•’ ἢ πρὸς
γεωμετρίαν μόνον, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν
ἰδίων εἶναι ἀρχῶν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς
πο•ούς, ὅσοι μὴ ἴσασι τὸ δυνατὸν ἐν
ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον· ἁρμόσει
γάρ. ἢ ὡς Ἀντιφῶν ἐτετραγώνιζεν. ἢ
εἴ τις μὴ φαίη βέλτιον εἶναι ἀπὸ
δείπνου περιπατεῖν διὰ τὸν Ζήνωνος
λόγον, οὐκ ἰατρικός· κοινὸς γάρ.
The contentious arguer bears much the same relation
to the dialectician as the drawer of false geometrical
figures bears to the geometrician; for he reasons falsely on
the same basis as the dialectician, while the drawer of false
figures argues on the same basis as the true geometrician.
But the latter is not a contentious reasoner, because he
constructs his false figure on the principles and
conclusions which come under the art of geometry,
whereas the former, arguing on principles which come
under dialectic, will clearly be contentious on the other
subjects. For example, the squaring of the circle by means
of lunules is not contentious, whereas Bryson's method is
contentious. It is impossible to transfer the former outside
the sphere of geometry because it is based on principles
which are peculiar to geometry, whereas the latter can be
used against many disputants, namely, all those who do
not know what is possible and what impossible in any
particular case; for it will always be applicable. And the
same is true of the way in which Antiphon used to square
the circle. Or, again, if someone were to deny that it is
better to take a walk after dinner because of Zeno's
argument; for it is of a general application.
In the lines immediately preceding this passage, Aristotle had differentiated eristic from
sophistry in view of the different goals they aim to achieve, i.e. respectively victory over one's
adversary and semblance of knowledge. In the lines quoted, he mentions Antiphon's
squaring of the circle—alongside Bryson's—and draws an analogy with geometry as in
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Physics 1.2. The first reason this passage is relevant to our discussion of the Physics is that it
helps us to understand the force of ἐριστικός, which Aristotle predicates of the Eleatics. 60 To
this end, it is useful to draw a comparison between the two analogies. In the Sophistical
Refutations, the relation that eristic talk bears to dialectic is the same as the one a drawer of
false geometrical figures bears to a geometer. Crucially, though, Aristotle points out that a
drawer of false geometrical figures is not eristic, because he or she makes use of principles
and consequences that fall within the art (ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην). By contrast, it is eristic to discuss
problems specific to a particular science or discipline without using the principles of that
science or discipline. To clarify, dialectic can surely start from the endoxa of a particular
science; however, it discusses those endoxa by using very general principles which apply to
any discipline.61 If we take a look at the Physics again, in 1.2 the analogy involved the
following four terms: as rejecting a demonstration that does not start from geometrical
premises is not the business of the geometer, so a demonstration that does not accept the
principles of physics should not be rejected by the physicist. Now, in the light of the parallel
passage above, if Melissus' and Parmenides' claims are eristic, we can infer an additional
point of the argument. Indeed, the comparison seems to confirm that such theses ought to
be dealt with dialectically. But there is a further point that emerges from the Sophistical
Refutations. Aristotle emphasises at once that dialectic is a very general τέχνη and that,
because it concerns no particular genus, it cannot serve the purpose of demonstrating the
nature of something. This implies that there is a fundamental difference between dialectic
and geometry, which is worth stressing. A few lines after the previous quotation, Aristotle
says:
60 Melissus' theses are defined as paradoxical also at Top., 104b22.
61 Dialectic, like rhetoric, remains at a very general level and never resorts to the principles of some specific
science. Cf. Rhet. 1.2, 1355b25-34, where Aristotle specifies that, if one hits on the principles of some particular
science, the argument is not rhetorical or dialectical anymore.
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SE, 172a1-32 (trans. Forster 1955)
ἡ δ’ αὐτὴ καὶ πειραστική· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ
πειραστικὴ τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ γεω-
μετρία, ἀ•’ ἣν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μὴ εἰδώς τις.
ἔξεστι γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν καὶ τὸν μὴ
εἰδότα τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦ μὴ εἰδότος, εἴπερ
καὶ δίδωσιν, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν οἶδεν οὐδ’ ἐκ τῶν
ἰδίων ἀ•’ ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων, ὅσα τοιαῦτά
ἐστιν ἃ εἰδότα μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ
εἰδέναι τὴν τέχνην, μὴ εἰδότα δ’ ἀνάγκη
ἀγνοεῖν. (ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ὡρισμένου ἡ πειραστικὴ ἐπιστήμη
ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐστί· πᾶσαι
γὰρ αἱ τέχναι χρῶνται καὶ κοινοῖς τισιν.
διὸ πάντες καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται τρόπον τινὰ
χρῶνται τῇ διαλεκτικῇ καὶ πειραστικῇ·
πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς ἐπιχειροῦσιν
ἀνακρίνειν τοὺς ἐπαÕε•ομένους.)
Dialectic is at the same time an art of examination;
for neither is the art of examination of the same nature
as geometry but it is an art which a man could possess
even without any scientific knowledge, if the latter
makes concessions based not on what he knows nor on
the special principles of the subject but on the
consequential facts, which are such that, though to
know them does not prevent him from being ignorant
of the art in question, yet not to know them necessarily
involves ignorance of it. Clearly, therefore, the art of
examination is not knowledge of any definite subject,
and it therefore follows that it deals with every subject;
for all the arts employ also certain common principles.
Accordingly, everyone, including the unscientific,
makes some kind of use of dialectic and the art of
examination; for all, up to a certain point, attempt to
test those who profess knowledge.
The relevance of this passage for the general matter of this section is that it defines
dialectic as a discipline that is neither suitable for demonstrating the nature of things nor
confined to a particular subject. As a consequence, what we can safely assume, in line with
the interpretation of the Peripatetic commentators, is that Aristotle is going to use dialectic
to discuss the Eleatic theses. Its very general nature makes dialectic compatible with the
particular use for which any science might want to exploit it. Since, however, Aristotle states
that a discussion of change-free monism falls outside the domain of physics, we are left with
the option of assigning such a discussion to metaphysics. In fact, there are good reasons to
believe that this discussion will fall within the domain of a metaphysical investigation, as
Gamma shows that it is the business of metaphysics to deal with general notions commonly
used by dialecticians, such as ‘one’, ‘same’, ‘other’ and so on.62
62 In particular, it will involve discussion of the fifth aporia of Metaphysics Β (995b18-25) and its solution in book
Γ. Although it cannot be developed here, this line of inquiry might answer Clarke's worry ( Clarke 2019, 15–6)
29
1.3. Two arguments against Eleatic monism
In Physics 1 Aristotle sets out two arguments against Eleatic monism. As is well-known, his
refutation is akin to the Stranger's attack on Parmenides and his followers in Plato's Sophist.63
In the next paragraphs I am going to dwell on this parallelism in order to check the terms in
which it can contribute to our understanding of the Physics' arguments. To this end, I am
going to present the Stranger's refutation and single out its salient points. What I hope to
demonstrate is that a comparison between these Platonic passages and the arguments of the
Physics will elucidate the dialectical nature of Aristotle's rejection.
That Aristotle draws heavily on the Sophist while writing Physics 1.2-3 can hardly escape
our notice. As Crubellier remarks, the very introductory list of the number and
characteristics of the principles posited by the predecessors is reminiscent of Sophist 242bff.
In fact, Aristotle's inclusion of ‘those who inquire into the number of beings (οἱ τὰ ὄντα
ζητοῦντες πόσα, Phys., 184b23-24)’ parallels the Stranger's mention of Parmenides and
‘whoever undertook the task of defining how many and how beings are (τὰ ὄντα … πόσα τε
καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν, Soph., 242b4-6)’. However, it is what comes next in the dialogue that needs
close inspection. After lamenting the obscurity with which his predecessors delivered their
doctrines, the Eleatic stranger starts his investigation of what is. Crucially, he clearly sets out
the way they are going to proceed:
Soph., 243d4-8 (trans. Fowler 1977)
ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ
ὂν φῂς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθ’
οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται;
ΞΕ. Κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε,
Theaet. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you
mean that we must first investigate the term “being,”
and see what those who use it think it signifies?
Str. You have caught my meaning at once,
that, since Aristotle's point at 185a1-5 is general, no investigation of principles has the task of dealing with the
Eleatics. The problem whether being is one and unchanging belongs to the domain of metaphysics; however, it
can only be discussed through a meticulous dialectical analysis.
63 Parallels with the Sophist can be found in both Philoponus' and Simplicius' commentaries.  In particular, the
latter quotes lines 244b6–245e5 in full (Simpl., In Phys., 80.30-90.20) to show that, as Aristotle, Plato does not
reject Parmenides out of love for strife (οὐ διὰ φιλεριστίαν). However, he does not undertake a discussion of the
passage, although acknowledging the matter would require a longer digression (παρέκβασίν τινα μακροτέραν).
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ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν
παρόντων ἀναπυνθανομένους ὧδε.
Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the
best method for us to use, by questioning them
directly, as if they were present in person.
No matter what the specific force of ‘μέθοδος’ is in this occurrence, the Stranger is clear
that he and Theaetetus will have to engage in a dialogue with the supporters of pluralism
(first) and monism (next) in order to understand what their theories amount to. Hence,
when dealing with Parmenidean theses, the Stranger is going to imagine what Parmenides
and his followers meant and how they would defend themselves, if they were questioned.
The refutation consists of two complementary arguments that draw contradictory
conclusions from Parmenides' claim, thus corralling his speech into a blind alley.64 For our
purposes it is relevant to show that these two steps of the refutation aim to exhaust the
possibilities of making sense of Parmenides' claim that there is only one thing.
1.3.1. The Stranger's first argument against Parmenidean monism
The Stranger's first argument concerns the relationship between ὄνομα and πρᾶγμα.
Soph., 244b6-d13 (trans. Crivelli 2012, slightly modified)
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἓν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἆρ’
οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ
ὄν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων. “Ἕν πού φατε
μόνον εἶναι;” — “Φαμὲν γάρ,” φήσουσιν. ἦ
γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. “Τί δέ; ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;”
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
Str. Now, shouldn't we as far as possible find out
from those who say that the totality of things is one
what they call being?
Theae. Why not?
Str. Let them answer this question, then: ‘You
somehow say that only one is?’—‘We surely say
that’, they will say, won't they?
Theae. Yes.
Str. ‘And do you call something “being”?’
64 Scholars have expressed different views as to the relation between the two arguments. It is in particular Bluck
1975, 73 who emphasises that we should see lines 244d-245d not as a distinct argument, but as the continuation
of the preceding discourse. The opposite view had been propounded by Moravcsik 1962, 31 and Runciman 1962,
74.
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ΞΕ. “Πότερον ὅπερ ἕν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ
προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;”
ΘΕΑΙ. Τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτ’, ὦ ξένε,
ἀπόκρισις;
ΞΕ. Δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν
ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν
καὶ πρὸς ἄ•ο δὲ ὁτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον
ἀποκρίνασθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
(A) ΞΕ. Τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι
μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἓν καταγέλαστόν που.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὔ;
ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του
λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν
ἔχον.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;
(a.1) ΞΕ. Τιθείς τε τοὔνομα τοῦ πράγματος
ἕτερον δύο λέγει πού τινε.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
(a.2) ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἂν ταὐτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ
τοὔνομα, ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται
λέγειν, εἰ δέ τινος αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ
ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄ•ου δὲ
οὐδενὸς ὄν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.
ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ ἕν γε, ἑνὸς ὄνομα ὂν καὶ τοῦ
ὀνόματος αὖ τὸ ἓν ὄν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.
Theae. Yes.
Str. ‘Is it the very thing you call “one”, by using two
names for the same thing, or what?’
Theae. What is their answer to this, stranger?
Str. Clearly, Theaetetus, it is not the easiest thing in
the world for one who has hypothesised this
hypothesis to answer the present question, or any
other.
Theae. How so?
( A ) Str. To agree that there are two names after
positing that there is nothing but one thing is most
ridiculous—
Theae. Right.
Str. And even to accept someone's statement that
there is some name is unreasonable.
Theae. How so?
(a.1) Str. By positing the name as different from the
object, one somehow speaks of two things.
Theae. Yes.
(a.2) Str. And if one posits the name as identical to
it, one will be obliged to say either that it is a name
of nothing, or, if one says that it is of something,
the name will result to be a name of a name only
and of nothing else—
Theae. Yes.
Str. And the one will result to be one of one only by
being also in turn the one of the name.
Theae. Necessarily.
The Stranger imagines asking his fellow Eleatics if, by saying that there is only one thing
(ἓν μόνον εἶναι), they are using ‘one’ and ‘being’ (ὄν) as two different terms (ὀνόματα) referring
to one and the same thing (πρᾶγμα).65 Once this has been granted, their monistic claim is at
65 From the formulation of the Stranger's starting point, Wedin 2014, 249–50 infers that Plato thinks there cannot
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great risk. On the one hand, positing that there is some name (ὄνομά τι, i.e. at least one) apart
from the things it may describe is at odds with the thesis that there is only one thing;
specifically, (a.1) positing that the name is different from the thing it designates implies that
there are two things (i.e. the name and the named thing). On the other, (a.2) positing the
name as identical to the thing is problematic, too; for the name will be either a name of
nothing or, in fact, a name of something. In the former case, it will be a name that does not
name anything;66 in the latter, a name will necessarily name another name, because—contra
(a.1)—we are supposing that there are only names and nothing else. As a consequence, τὸ ἕν
will only be a name of one thing (i.e. one name) and of nothing else; in turn, it will also be
the ‘one’ of that name—whatever this might mean—and not its name. As Bluck points out,
this argument is based on the view that names must always designate things other than
themselves: so, a name cannot be a name of another name or of itself. 67 That is why the
Stranger affirms that the very idea of accepting the claim that there is a name would not
make any sense from Parmenides' perspective.68
be two names if there is only one thing. In particular, every name must have a discrete semantic match, so that
the significance of a name depends on its unique nominatum. However, lines 244c8-9 are probably to be taken
ironically. What the Stranger finds ridiculous is that somebody first asserts that there is only one thing but is
then eager to agree that there are two names (by which you can describe the alleged one thing). On this
reading, the real argument only starts at c11, which is also the point where Theaetetus asks for explanation.
66 Plato points to the fact that the name would become void. We can imagine that, as a result, the name would
ultimately not be a name any more. Hence, since names must name something, this consequence is
unacceptable. Bluck 1975, 73 claims that the absurdity is thus generated by the monist's denial of a commonly
accepted way of using words. De Rijk 1986, 95 rather thinks that the first attempt to avoid the assumption of
‘one thing-two names’ would render ‘being’ an empty name, thus contradicting Parmenides' very assumption.
67 Bluck 1975, 73. In expressing this interpretation, Bluck rejects Moravcsik 1962's claim that the Stranger's
argument presupposes that terms exist in the same sense as the things which they designate, because for it to
be valid, it suffices that ‘are’ can be applied to names and named things alike. On the other hand, he disagrees
with Cornford 1935's suggestion that we should presuppose Plato's own view that names refer to forms.
68 Wedin 2014, 249 rejects the following inference as invalid: if the Eleatic being is something that is and it has a
corresponding name, then there will be two things, i.e. the name and the nominatum. In particular, he argues
that this difference does not commit Parmenides to the existence of two things. In truth, the Stranger's
argument is aimed at showing that Parmenides' monism does not allow him to have terms alongside things,
quite regardless of how we might understand the existence or non-existence of terms and things. Since they
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With reference to this point, the phrase λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον (244d1) has received a great deal
of attention. Cornford 1935 and Fowler 1977 seem to refer the participle to the ὡς-clause
expressing the content of the claim; Bluck 1975 and De Rijk 1986, instead, take it with ὄνομα.
Finally, Bluck takes the phrase to explain why we should not accept the claim in question
(i.e. because the name ‘could not explain itself ’); in contrast, De Rijk takes ἔχον attributively,
thus translating it as ‘some name which would be lacking sense’. Bluck's solution is
preferable to De Rijk's for syntactical reasons. Since the present participle (ἔχον) governs the
particle ἄν, it functions as either an imperfect indicative (ἂν εἶχε) or as a present optative (ἂν
ἔχοι).69 In either case, the Greek phrase can only be understood as expressing a consequence,
not a condition.70 However, Bluck's solution is not fully satisfactory either, because, while
‘λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον’ can hardly work as a dependent clause, it would require some connective
particle (such as γάρ) in order to be a distinct independent clause. For these reasons, it is
preferable to follow what seem to be Crivelli's and Taylor's readings.71 In fact, if we refer ‘λόγον
οὐκ ἂν ἔχον’ to the infinitive ‘τὸ ἀποδέχεσθαι’, we get an independent clause where the
participle is predicated of its subject without the copula—very much as in the Stranger's
previous sentence (‘τὸ … ὁμολογεῖν… καταγέλαστον’) and in the exposition of absurd
consequences from 244d5 onwards. Indeed, as we saw, the gist of the Stranger's first
argument is precisely that accepting that there are names alongside things is sufficient to
both can be defined as ὄντα, but are not one and the same thing, they clash with the hypothesis that there is
only one ὄν.
69 Smyth 2002/1920, 411, §1845.
70 When we find ἄν in a protasis, fused with εἰ or some other conjunction, it governs the subjunctive. Kühner &
Gerth 1898, II, §570, 482 also mentions a use of the optative with ἄν, but exclusively in a protasis introduced by
εἰ, which here is missing. Since he also states that (II, § 570, 463, n. 3), in Plato, ἐάν is more common than its
contracted form ἄν, we can be fairly sure that the ἄν we are facing is a particle and not the contraction of the
particle with a conjunction. In fact, in such a construction the ἄν would be governed by the optative and would
not be a part of a composite conjunction. Finally, we can find ἄν with an historical tense of the indicative, but,
again, only if we have an εἰ-clause. Kühner points out (p. 483) that this is an Attic use in which the addition of
an ἄν can only be made if the condition mentioned is to be expressed as being in its turn conditioned.
71 Taylor translates it as ‘[it is] no less irrational’ (Klibansky & Anscombe 1961, 139). Crivelli 2012, 78 also refers the
ἔχον to ἀποδέχεσθαι but takes it as the complement of an understood ‘εἴη’. This reading implies that οὐκ ἄν
would be governed by a lacking form of εἶναι, instead of depending on the explicit participle. However, I think it
correctly reflects the most probable meaning of the Greek.
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question Parmenides' monistic assumption—no matter how exactly names are supposed to
relate to things.
1.3.2. The Stranger's second argument against Parmenidean monism
The second argument against Parmenides' monism takes into account the relationship
between being (τὸ ὄν), the one (τὸ ἕν) and the whole (τὸ ὅλον).
Soph., 244d14-245d11 (trans. Crivelli 2012, modified)
(B) ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἑνὸς
ἢ ταὐτὸν φήσουσι τούτῳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν;
(b.1.1) ΞΕ. Εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ
Παρμενίδης λέγει, Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου
σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μεσσόθεν
ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι
βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,
τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν τὸ ὂν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα
ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη
ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.
ΞΕ. Ἀ•ὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος
μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν
οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὂν
καὶ ὅλον ἓν εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὔ;
ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀδύνατον
αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΞΕ. Ἀμερὲς δήπου δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε
ἀληθῶς ἓν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πο•ῶν μερῶν ὂν
(B) Str. And will they say that the whole is different
from the one that is? Or that it is identical to this?
Theae. How will they not say it? Indeed, they do say
it.
(b.1.1) Str. If then it is a whole, as Parmenides also
says,
… in every way like the mass of a well-rounded sphere,
opposing equal resistance from the middle in all
directions: for it is not appropriate that it be larger or
weaker here than here, …
being, since it is of this sort, has a middle and
extremities, and by having these it is most necessary
that it have parts, must it not?
Theae. Yes.
Str. But nothing prevents what is divided into parts
from having the characteristic of unity with respect
to all the parts, and from being in this way one, since
it is both all and whole.
Theae. Why not?
Str. But isn't it impossible for what has these
characteristics itself to be the one itself?
Theae. How so?
Str. What is truly one, according to its correct
definition, must be called completely partless.
35
οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ [ὅλῳ] λόγῳ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω.
ΞΕ. Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς
οὕτως ἕν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι
μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὄν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν.
ΞΕ. Ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. (b.1.1)
πεπονθός τε γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως οὐ
ταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἑνὶ φανεῖται, καὶ πλέονα δὴ
τὰ πάντα ἑνὸς ἔσται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν (b.2.1) ἐάν γε τὸ ὂν ᾖ μὴ ὅλον
διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου πάθος,
(b.1.2) ᾖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, ἐνδεὲς τὸ ὂν
ἑαυτοῦ συμβαίνει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ
στερόμενον οὐκ ὂν ἔσται τὸ ὄν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.
ΞΕ. Καὶ ἑνός γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα
γίγνεται, (b.2.2) τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου
χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἑκατέρου φύσιν εἰληφότος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. (b') Μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ
ὅλου, ταὐτά τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι, καὶ
πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μηδ’ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὄν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;
ΞΕ. Τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε
οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ
προσαγορεύειν [τὸ ἓν ἢ] τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς
οὖσι μὴ τιθέντα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταῦθ’ οὕτως
ἔχειν.
Theae. It surely must.
Str. But what is such [sc. as we described], since it
consists of many parts, will not fit the definition.
Theae. I see.
Str. Will being be one and a whole by having the
attribute of unity, or should we in all ways deny that
being is a whole?
Theae. You are offering a difficult choice.
Str. You are speaking truly indeed. (b.1.1) For, by
being characterised by being somehow one, being
will appear to be not identical to the one, and all
things will be more than one.
Theae. Yes.
Str. And if (b.2.1) it is not the case that being is a
whole by being characterised by the characteristic of
that, but (b.1.2) it is the whole itself, being results
lacking itself.
Theae. Sure.
Str. Therefore, according to this account, being, since
it is deprived of itself, will be a not-being.
Theae. That is so.
Str. And all things become more than one because
(b.2.2) being and the whole each possess their
peculiar nature separately.
Theae. Yes.
Str. And if (b') the whole is not in any way, these
same characteristics hold of being, and, on top of
not-being, not even ever becoming a being.
Theae. Why?
Str. What becomes always becomes as a whole: so
whoever does not place the whole among beings
must not address either being or becoming as being.
Theae. By all means, this is how things are.
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ΞΕ. Καὶ (b.2) μὴν οὐδ’ ὁποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ
μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ,
τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.
Str. And (b.2) what is not a whole must not even be
of a certain quantity: for, by being of a certain
quantity, however much it is, it is necessary for it to
be such as a whole.
Theae. Absolutely.
The Stranger starts from the assumption that Parmenides describes the one-being as a
whole. However, if the whole is the same as the one-being, as Parmenides says in his poem,
then it must have parts. If it does, it can surely be one, but as a unity of parts. Now, this is at
odds with the very description of Parmenides' one itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν), because the latter
cannot have parts in any sense—whereas the whole has parts at least in some sense.
Accordingly, the Stranger asks Theaetetus whether we could regard being as a whole in this
sense or if we should rather deny that being is a whole. Both horns of the dilemma lead to an
impasse. The first possibility is problematic, because, if we take the whole to be a
characteristic (πάθος) of the one, although not the one itself, then being a whole amounts to
being one only somehow. Crivelli is right in pointing out that the use of πως at 245b8
confirms the distinction of a more genuine way of being one (αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, τὸ ἀληθῶς ἕν) from
other less genuine ways.72 I would like to suggest that the same distinction applies to τὸ ὅλον;
or rather, the Stranger is setting apart a less genuine way of being a whole (as a whole of
parts) from a more genuine one (as an entire without any parts). In order to show this, I shall
defend a different reading of lines 245c1-7 from the traditional one. Since the second
possibility left to Parmenides and his followers is not considered until 245c8, it is not clear—
at least prima facie—how the preceding passage should fit within the question formulated
by the Stranger.
According to the traditional interpretation of this question, the Stranger is supposing on
the one hand (1) that being is not a whole, on the other (2) that the whole exists. From these
two premises the unpalatable consequence follows that being will be deprived of itself.
Crivelli seems to offer the most convincing reconstruction of this deduction. If we accept
72 Crivelli 2012, 81.
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that the argument is still governed by the Parmenidean claim that being is a whole, then
assuming that there is no whole amounts to depriving being of its very nature.73
In favour of this reading one could mention that hypothesis (2) contrasts with the final
passage of the Stranger's refutation, i.e. with the hypothesis that there is no whole at all. This
would imply that (2) represents the positive horn of the same dilemma to which the latter
hypothesis belongs.74 However, there are two main reasons to question this reading. First,
although the contrast between (2) and the negation of the existence of τὸ ὅλον holds, (2) is
too weak a premise for us to conclude that being cannot be being. In fact, t he existence of
the whole is presupposed for the entire group of hypotheses of the Stranger's second
argument, so it would not make much sense for Plato to have him introduce it only now.75
This is confirmed by the fact that only at c11 does the Stranger assume that the whole does
not exist. This is why Crivelli needs to supply an additional (implicit) premise in order for the
argument to reach its conclusion.76 Second, assuming that being is not a whole seems to
anticipate a point that will not be made until c8-9—thus resulting in a redundancy hard to
justify. If being is not a whole, but there is something that is a whole, then Parmenides needs
to admit that there are two things, against his monistic assumption. This also shows that the
kind of absurdity generated by these premises is that it implies pluralism, not that being will
be deprived of itself.
Upon closer inspection, the text does not seem to suggest that being is not a whole, but
rather that it is indeed a whole, but not  in that particular sense in which it constitutes a unity
‘only somehow’. As such, the presupposition implies taking into account the alternative
possibility that being is a whole in the very way Parmenides' claim requires. In fact, the
interpretation I am suggesting relies on a different reading of the phrase expressing the
second premise of the argument: ‘ᾖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον’. In particular, I argue that we should take
73 Crivelli 2012, 83–4, who also discusses and rejects other attempts to explain this rather obscure argument:
Campbell 1867, 114; Cornford 1935; Ambuel 2005, 211. For similar construals, see also Palmer 1999, 177 and Harte
2002, 104.
74 See Cornford 1935, 225.
75 We should not forget that the Stranger's initial presupposition is that Parmenides calls the one-being a whole.
This amounts to assuming that there is something that we call a whole.
76 The complexity of this claim also seems to contrast with the fact that, unlike previous moments in this very
argument, Theaetetus does not display any puzzlement in agreeing with the Stranger's point.
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the verb ‘to be’ as a copula and the rest of the phrase as its nominal complement: ‘[if being]
instead is the whole itself ’.77 If this is our second premise, the conclusion we can draw, if not
straightforward, is rather immediate: if being is the whole itself, then it cannot be anything
else; therefore, it is not being (but it is rather just ‘the whole itself ’). In other words, being
αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον amounts to being exclusively a whole; this implies that this whole thing cannot
receive any attributes whatsoever: Parmenides needs to choose between wholeness (unity)
and being.78
As far as the role of this claim within the broader argument is concerned, the Stranger has
just presented Theaetetus with the following alternatives: either (I) being is a whole in the
sense that it has a characteristic of the one or (II) it is not at all a whole. The difficulty in
opting for (I) is that it leads us to define being as one only somehow, therefore not really one.
On the other hand, what should deter Parmenides from choosing (II) is that in order for
being and the whole to be different, he would be forced to accept that there are at least two
things, namely, being and the whole. Now, the piece of the argument we are dealing with still
falls under (I). After ruling out the hypothesis that Parmenides would refer to the whole in a
sense that allows for plurality, he now envisages an alternative: ‘If being is not a whole by
having been affected by the characteristic that falls under that thing [i.e. the one], but is the
whole itself, then it will consequently be lacking itself ’. We can distinguish two senses of τὸ
ὅλον and refer to the weaker sense by ‘whole(1)’ and to the stronger by ‘whole(2)’. At 245a1 τὸ
ὅλον is understood as τὸ μεμερισμένον and is said to have a πάθος τοῦ ἑνός (characteristic of the
one) regarding all its parts: it is a whole(1). However, something that has acquired this
characteristic (τὸ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα, 245a5) cannot possibly be the one itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν),
because that which is truly one (τὸ ἀληθῶς ἕν, a8), i.e. a whole(2), is completely without parts
(ἀμερὲς παντελῶς), and a being made out of parts would not conform to Parmenides'
account. At this point, the Stranger asks if we should say that, by having a πάθος τοῦ ἑνός,
being will be thus both one and whole (οὕτως ἕν τε… καὶ ὅλον) or if we should on no account
say (παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν) that it is a whole. In the development of the aporia, he recalls the
former option with the words ‘πεπονθός… τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως’, so we are still dealing with
77 Leigh 2010, 73 seems to presuppose a similar reading of 245c1-3.
78 Note that this argument reminds us of the first deduction at Parm., 139b7-c2: if the one is identical to something
other than itself, it is not going to be itself any more, but only that something.
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whole(1). Now, at 245c11-12, it is this very option that he denies when he assumes that being is
not a ‘ὅλον διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου [i.e. of the one] πάθος’. In fact, it is important to
remark that here the negation μή follows εἶναι, so it is not meant to negate the verb but rather
the phrase just quoted in Greek (‘ὅλον διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πάθος’). 79 This, together
with the qualification represented by the διά-phrase, implies that we should expect the
Stranger to mention an alternative way of being a whole, i.e. whole(2). On my reading, this is
exactly what he does, by taking being to be the whole itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον). We can be
reasonably confident that he is not trying to deny that being is a whole, because that is what
he is going to do at 245c8-9, when he considers the second horn of the dilemma (i.e. that
being is by no means a whole). More importantly, though, if he were already dealing with
this possibility now, he would have neglected a crucial alternative of his refutation that could
easily save Parmenides' claim: being is not a whole in the same way as a compound of parts,
but is completely partless as an indivisible entire.80 Finally, how could he leave this
possibility open, after he himself has shown Theaetetus that something one can surely have
parts, but not if it supposed to be the Parmenidean one?
After refuting the two branches of this dilemma, the last part of the Stranger's argument
considers two undesired consequences of a further hypothesis. As we saw, supposing that
being is different from the whole would oblige the monist to accept that there are two things,
i.e. τὸ ὄν on the one hand and τὸ ὅλον on the other. However, if we wanted to avoid this
consequence by denying that there is anything such as τὸ ὅλον, then the consequences for
being will be irremediably destructive: since all that comes to be comes to be as a whole, not
only will τὸ ὄν not be, but nor will it ever become a being.81 This option has been interpreted
as external to Parmenides' talk insofar as it allegedly presupposes the existence of becoming
79 This cannot be seen from the translation, because in English the position of the negation after ‘to be’ cannot be
changed. We should rather think of non-auxiliary verbs, so that the Greek could sound like ‘being constitutes
not a whole by having such and such characteristic’ as opposed to ‘being does not constitute a whole by having
such and such characteristic’.
80 Wedin 2014, 251 indicates precisely this escape.
81 Bluck 1975, 81 n. 1 accuses Plato of confusing two different senses of ‘whole’, which first meant ‘a whole of parts’
but is now used in the sense of ‘entire’. If my reading is correct, Plato's argument is not undermined by this
remark.
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—which Parmenides (at least in Plato's view) would not endorse.82 However, I think the
Stranger here is rather emphasising how extreme the consequences of this last hypothesis
are: being is not and could not possibly ever become a being. Finally, the reference to
quantities is meant to highlight a contradiction in Parmenides' discourse. If being is not a
whole, it can in no way have size, which is at odds with the very words with which
Parmenides describes it in the fragment quoted.
1.3.3. Retrospective and prospective considerations
The reconstruction of the Sophist arguments against Parmenides' monism can be
summarised in the following scheme:
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\ a.2) names are things
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(b) the whole exists)
/
b.1) being is a whole
/ b.1.1) being is a whole(1)
\ b.1.2) being is a whole(2)
\
b.2) being is not a whole
/
b.2.1) being is not a
whole(1)
\ b.2.2) being is not a
whole(2)
\ b') the whole does not
exist
Despite their compressed form, the Stranger's arguments follow a precise dilemmatic
pattern, so as to leave no escape to his adversary. Once both horns of all the dilemmas have
been shown to result in absurdities, Parmenides and his followers are obliged to give up their
monistic claim.83 As we shall see, this is the same strategy that Aristotle adopts in Physics 1.2-
3. There are, however, other relevant points that will play a role in the analysis of this part of
82 Seligman 1974, 28.
83 It should be noted that Plato adopts a literal interpretation of Parmenides' poem, as can probably be confirmed
by 243a6-b1.
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the Physics. Regarding the general structure of the arguments, in the Sophist the Stranger
explicitly engages in an imaginary dialogue with Parmenides himself or a follower of
Parmenides' doctrine. As will be clear in section 4, in his Physics Aristotle will proceed along
the very same lines, by setting out a dialectical discussion with the Eleatics which follows a
dilemmatic pattern. As we saw in the previous paragraphs, this is probably due to the fact
that dialectic (and not any specific science) is the appropriate method to deal with these
thinkers. As far as the content of the arguments is concerned, we shall see that the Stranger's
two arguments will both have a great resonance in the Physics. In conclusion, the three
elements that will require most attention in the comparison between the two rejections of
Eleaticism are the dialectic form of the argument, the relationship between terms and things
and, lastly, the discussion of parts and wholes.
1.4. Aristotle against Eleatic monism
Aristotle deals with Eleatic monism in both Physics 1.2 and in 1.3. The relationship
between these two chapters represented an issue already for the ancient commentators.
Philoponus, Simplicius and Alexander take 1.2 and 1.3 to correspond to a study of unity and
being first διὰ τὸ ὄνομα and then τῷ πράγματι. Averroes refers to ‘meanings’ ( intentiones)
taken first as universal and then as particular; accordingly, Aristotle would be first checking
whether each single understanding of ὄν is predicated of being and would then move on to
his attack on the Eleatic fallacies. Finally, Aquinas thinks that Aristotle first argues against
Melissus' and Parmenides' theses and then against their arguments. Among modern
commentators, Gershenson and Greenberg claim that Aristotle's attacks on the Eleatics in
the Physics constitute two independent arguments, characterised, in the one case, by the use
of Aristotelian technical terms and a dismissive tone, and, in the other, by the lack of
technical language and a generally respectful attitude.84 Quarantotto 2019 also remarks that,
while 1.2 seems to be addressed to an Aristotelian audience, 1.3 is intended to be an internal
criticism.
84 Gershenson & Greenberg 1962, 150.
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From 185a20 to 186a3 Aristotle sets out an argument against the Eleatic doctrines in
which two moments can be distinguished. Overall, he exposes some ambiguities that hide
behind the assertion that all things are one. In this first section he tries to clarify what
understanding of being should be presupposed in order to make sense of the thesis. In the
section which follows he will deal with the different understandings of ‘being one’ for the
same purpose. I shall present the two arguments in the next paragraphs.
1.4.1. Aristotle's first argument against Eleatic monism
1.4.1.1. Ex parte entis85
Phys., 185a20-b5 (trans. Clarke 2019)
(A) ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν,
ἐπειδὴ πο•αχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πῶς
λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα,
(1) πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ
ποιά, καὶ πάλιν (2) πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν
τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἢ ἵππον ἕνα
ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἓν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον
λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄ•ων τι τῶν
τοιούτων. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε
πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν.
(A.1) εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ
ποιὸν καὶ ποσόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ’ ἀπολε-
λυμένα ἀπ’ ἀ•ήλων εἴτε μή, πο•ὰ τὰ
ὄντα· (A.2) εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν,
εἴτ’ οὔσης οὐσίας εἴτε μὴ οὔσης, ἄτοπον,
εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. οὐθὲν
γὰρ τῶν ἄ•ων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν
οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου
λέγεται τῆς οὐσίας.
(A) Since being is said in many ways, the most
appropriate starting point of all is to ask in what way
those who say that ‘all things are one’ speak [of being]
—(1) whether all things are substance, or quantities,
or qualities, and again (2) whether all things are one
substance, like one human being, or one horse, or one
soul, or whether all things are quality, and this is one,
like white or hot or one of the other things of this sort.
For all these differ a great deal, and all are impossible
to maintain.
(A.1) For if, on the one hand, there is substance
and quality and quantity, then whether these things
are detached from one another or not, the things that
are will be many. (A.2) But if, on the other hand, all
things are quality or quantity, then whether substance
is or is not, this is absurd, if one should call the
impossible absurd. For none of the others is separate
apart from substance. For all [the others] are said of
substance as a subject.
85 I borrow Aquinas' expressions for the two parts of the argument, Thom., In Phys., 20.
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Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναί
φησιν. ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον
ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ
ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα
εἶεν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ
προσχρῆται, ἀ•’ οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ.
εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία ἔστι καὶ ποσόν,
δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὄν· εἰ δ’ οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ
ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν
γάρ τι ἔσται.
And Melissus says that what is is unlimited.
Therefore what is is a quantity. For the unlimited is in
[the category of] quantity, and it is not possible for a
substance or a quality or an affection to be unlimited,
except accidentally, if they are at the same time also
certain quantities. For the account of the unlimited
employs quantity, but not substance or quality. If,
therefore, it is both substance and quantity, what is is
two and not one. But if it is substance alone, then it is
not unlimited, nor even will it have any magnitude at
all. For then it will be a quantity.
‘Being is one’ amounts to asserting one of the following:
(1) All being is either substance or quality or quantity.
(2) Being is one single substance or one single quality.
Both (1) and (2) are dismissed as absurdities. On the one hand, if τὸ ὄν is both substance,
quality, quantity and so on, it is not one but multiple, even if the single name we use includes
all these things. On the other hand, it is impossible that all things be qualities or quantities
because the only thing that can be separate is substance. The former argument aims to show
that the plurality of things involves the plurality of ways of being. On the contrary, the latter
seems to underscore that among the different understandings of being there is one that is
more fundamental than the others, namely substance. As a consequence, not only is it
absurd to insist that there is exclusively one way of being, but it is also wrong to choose
quantity and not substance as the univocal way in which to understand what is. This is what
Melissus instead turns out to be doing when he posits the unlimited as the one and only
principle. Since limit is a determination within the predication of quantity, his thesis is
traced back to the claim that ‘being is a quantity’.86 It is not possible that something else is
meant, for a substance cannot be unlimited unless it is also a quantity (it is, as it were,
quantified). Yet, in this case, being would not be one, but manifold. On the other hand, if
86 Top., 185a35.
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there were only substance, it could not be either limited or unlimited, because this would
require quantity, that is to say, again a manifold being.
As for (2), Aristotle limits himself to saying that it is absurd to maintain that all things are
one single individual—be it a substance or something in any other category. He exemplifies
the absurdity by saying that this would amount to saying that all things are one man or one
colour, which is impossible.
The ancient commentators, starting from Themistius, emphasise that a reference is made
here to the categories—even if Aristotle does not mention all of them—as first exposed in
the work of that title. This opens the general problem of whether and to what extent we can
regard the critique of the Eleatics as dialectical. The initial move of the full section may be
read as the application of one of the principles for dialectical discussion set out in the  Topics:
discerning in how many ways something is spoken of is foundational to any discussion.87
However, since Melissus and Parmenides did not distinguish different ways of being and
certainly did not do so according to Aristotle's division of categories, Aristotle's argument has
a premise that could not be endorsed by the target of his criticisms.88 In this sense, his
argument is going to represent an external critique. Does this undermine the discussion of
the rest of the chapter? It can be argued that in Physics 1.2 Aristotle is merely interested in
showing that he has good reasons for not accepting Eleatic monism. As we shall see, only in
chapter 3 will he pursue the objective of rejecting their position on account of their internal
contradictions. In contrast, these earlier passages are intended as criticisms that are justified
from an Aristotelian perspective. Why we—and the Eleatics too—ought to embrace the
view that being is said in many ways will be clarified in the next chapter.
Before moving on to the second part of the argument, it is interesting to note that in this
chapter Aristotle mentions the possibility of a substance being also a quantity accidentally.
What he means is that a substance can also be a quantity, but not in the sense that quantity
is going to be its definition. I shall focus on the role of the distinction between per se and
accidental predications in paragraph 1.4.2. What Aristotle will introduce in the next section
87 Cf. Top., 105a32.
88 Note, however, that Aristotle's basic worry does not necessarily depend on any specific categorial distinction,
but seems to consist in asking ‘if what is is one, then it is one what?’.
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is, rather, the complementary passage of his critique. In what sense of unity did the Eleatics
claim that all is one?
1.4.1.2. Ex parte unius
Phys., 185b5-186a3 (trans. Clarke 2019)
(B) ἔτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πο•αχῶς
λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, σκεπτέον τίνα
τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἓν τὸ πᾶν. λέγεται
δ’ ἓν ἢ (1) τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ (2) τὸ ἀδιαίρετον
ἢ (3) ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ὁ τοῦ τί
ἦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος.
(B.1) εἰ μὲν τοίνυν συνεχές, πο•ὰ τὸ
ἕν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές.
(ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ
ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀ•’
αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτήν, πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ
μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἓν ἢ πλείω,
καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν
μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἓν
ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ
αὑτοῖς.)
(B.2) ἀ•ὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον,
οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ
ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν,
οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης·
τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ
πεπερασμένον.
(B.3) ἀ•ὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἓν τὰ ὄντα
πάντα ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν
Ἡρακλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν
αὐτοῖς· ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ
κακῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ
εἶναι—ὥστε ταὐτὸν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ
(B) Further, since one itself is also said in many
ways, just as being is, it is necessary to investigate in
what way they say that the universe is one. And we call
one either (1) the continuous, or (2) the indivisible, or
(3) those things of which the account of their essence
is one and the same, such as methu and oinos.
(B.1) Now, if it is continuous, the One is many. For
the continuous is divisible to infinity. (And there is a
difficulty with regard to the part and the whole,
although presumably it is not [a difficulty] for the
argument, but [a difficulty] in its own right. That is,
whether the part and the whole are one or more than
one, and how they are one or more than one, and if
they are more, how they are more. This also applies
with regard to non-continuous parts. And if each
[part] is one with the whole by being indivisible [with
respect to the whole], then [there is the difficulty] that
they [sc. the parts] also bear this relation to one
another.)
(B.2) But if it is one by being indivisible, then
nothing will be a quantity or a quality, nor then will
what is be unlimited, as Melissus says, nor limited, as
Parmenides says. For the limit is indivisible, but not
the limited thing.
(B.3) But if all beings are one in account, as are
mantle and cloak, then it follows that they are
affirming the account of Heraclitus. For to be good and
bad will be the same, and to be good and not-good, so
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οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ
οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται
ἀ•ὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν—καὶ τὸ τοιῳδὶ εἶναι
καὶ τοσῳδὶ ταὐτόν.
that the same thing will be good and not-good, and a
human and a horse, and their account will not be
about the fact that the beings are one, but about the
fact that they are nothing. And to be this quality and
this quantity will be the same.
The section displays Aristotle's distinction of three different senses of unity, each of
which turns out not to be a helpful way of understanding the Eleatic hypothesis. In order for
the argument to work, the list of ways of being one needs to be exhaustive—or at least to
consist of the only sensible options we should take into account. However, if compared with
other places of the Aristotelian corpus, it does not appear to meet this requirement, at least
prima facie. In the next table, I sketch the descriptions of τὸ ἕν that can be found throughout
the Corpus Aristotelicum.89
Physics Metaphysics
1.2 Δ.6 Ι.1
accidental unity
(1) unity as continuity (Δ.1) unity as continuity (I.1a) unity as continuity
(indivisibility of movement in time)
(2) unity as indivisibility (Δ.2) unity because the substrate 
is not differentiated into species
(I.1b) unity as wholeness
(indivisibility of movement in time 
and place)
(3) unity because the 
definition of the essence is 
one
(Δ.3) unity because the definition
of the essence is one
(I.2a) unity as being a universal
(indivisibility of thought in species)
(I.2b) unity as being a particular
(indivisibility of thought with respect
to what is one in number)
89 It should be observed that, even if Aristotle carefully discerns different understandings of ‘being one’, he never
clearly discriminates between different uses of this notion. In particular, he does not seem to differentiate
between a monadic and a dyadic (or polyadic) use of ‘one’. See, in particular, Mariani 2005. As can be seen in
the table, Aristotle treats at least one case of dyadic unity (i.e. 3) within his discussion of τὸ ἕν.
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There seems to be a certain agreement between our text and the list found in Metaphysics
Δ.6. What we do not find in the Physics (but do find in Delta) is a distinction between
accidental and proper ways of speaking of unity. However, this difference can be easily
explained in view of the general purpose of Physics 1.2. If Aristotle's argument selects the way
of understanding ‘one’ that could make sense of the Eleatic claim, the cases of accidental
unity are not a reasonable option—especially because, in general, they are considered not to
be proper ways in which words are predicated.90
More importantly, Iota suggests that there is a general notion of unity that applies to all
cases, i.e. indivisibility.91 Specifically, while the correspondence between (3)/(Δ.3) and (Ι.2a-b)
is not straightforward, in Iota continuity and wholeness are regarded as two understandings
of one and the same notion: indivisibility in time. Following this thought, there is another
chapter of Delta that we should turn to: the one dealing with ὅλον. In fact, within the
treatment of wholeness, Aristotle distinguishes two understandings of ὅλον that seem to
reflect (or be reflected by) (1) and (2) in the Physics:
Met., 1023b28-34 (trans. Ross 1963)
(a) ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕκαστον ἓν ἢ ὡς ἐκ
τούτων τὸ ἕν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, καὶ τὸ
ὅλως λεγόμενον ὡς ὅλον τι ὄν, οὕτως ἐστὶ
καθόλου ὡς πο•ὰ περιέχον τῷ κατη-
γορεῖσθαι καθ’ ἑκάστου καὶ ἓν ἅπαντα
εἶναι ὡς ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἵππον
θεόν, διότι ἅπαντα ζῷα· (b) τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς
καὶ πεπερασμένον, ὅταν ἕν τι ἐκ πλειόνων
ᾖ, ἐνυπαρχόντων μάλιστα μὲν δυνάμει, εἰ
δὲ μή, ἐνεργείᾳ.
(a) For that which is true of a whole class and is
said to hold good as a whole (which implies that it is a
kind of whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it
contains many things by being predicated of each,
and by all of them, e.g. man, horse, god, being
severally one single thing, because all are living things.
(b) But the continuous and limited is a whole, when it
is a unity consisting of several parts especially if they
are present only potentially, but, failing this, even if
they are present actually.
The fact that the difficulty raised in Physics 1 concerns parts and wholes might already
suggest that it is here that we should look for a criterion for the exhaustivity of our argument.
90 To be precise, Δ.6 presents another list of ways in which ‘one’ is said at 1018a4-9; on the correspondence
between the two lists, see Mariani 2005.
91 Indivisibility will play a key role in chapter 3.
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But, in addition, in Δ.26 τὸ πᾶν also appears, which is the subject of the Eleatic thesis dealt
with in this part of the critique (ἓν τὸ πᾶν):92
Met., 1024a1-6  (trans. Ross 1963)
ἔτι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἔχοντος δὲ ἀρχὴν καὶ
μέσον καὶ ἔσχατον, ὅσων μὲν μὴ ποιεῖ ἡ
θέσις διαφοράν, πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσων δὲ
ποιεῖ, ὅλον. ὅσα δὲ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ
ὅλα καὶ πάντα· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ὅσων ἡ μὲν
φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ μένει τῇ μεταθέσει, ἡ δὲ
μορφὴ οὔ, οἷον κηρὸς καὶ ἱμάτιον· καὶ
γὰρ ὅλον καὶ πᾶν λέγεται· ἔχει γὰρ
ἄμφω.
Again, of quanta that have a beginning and a middle
and an end, those to which the position does not make
a difference are called totals, and those to which it
does, wholes. Those which admit of both descriptions
are both wholes and totals. These are the things whose
nature remains the same after transposition, but whose
form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; they are called both
wholes and totals; for they have both characteristics.
This passage is the key to understanding why the list of ways in which ‘one’ is spoken of
considered in the Physics is exhaustive. In fact, in the argument, Aristotle is discussing the
thesis that τὸ πᾶν is ἕν. Since he has already discussed the thesis that all things are one (τὰ
πάντα ἓν), this new formulation of the claim points at a single object. The first two
understandings of ‘being one’ he mentions are continuity and wholeness, which represent
monadic uses of unity. As was remarked before, this distinction in use is not followed strictly
by Aristotle. However, since what is at stake is the kind of monism propounded by the
Eleatics, in this particular place he focuses exclusively on those understandings of ‘one’ that
have to do with a single object. He is entitled to assume this since his opponents want there
to be only one thing. Moreover, he explicitly treats the case of τὸ πᾶν being one after dealing,
in the previous section, with τὰ πάντα being one. If the object of inquiry is τὸ πᾶν contrasted
with τὰ πάντα, then the senses of unity we need to check are those that have to do with
monadic unity. That is why the notion of ὅλον is the one specifically needed here. To
continuity and indivisibility, he adds a case that could be defined as synonymy (in a non-
technical sense)—which prevents the possibility that the whole question is reduced to a
terminological matter. By so doing, Aristotle covers all the understandings of unity for which
the Eleatic claim could possibly make sense from an Aristotelian perspective.
92 On this part of Aristotle's argument see Crubellier 2019, 73–6.
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1.4.2. Aristotle's second argument against Eleatic monism
1.4.2.1. Against Melissus
Phys., 186a4-22 (trans. Clarke 2019)
Τόν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιοῦσιν
ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι, καὶ
ἐξ ὧν ἐπιδεικνύουσι, λύειν οὐ χαλεπόν.
ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συ•ογίζονται,
καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν παραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον· (i)
οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον
ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπαν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενό-
μενον οὐκ ἔχει. εἶτα (ii) καὶ τοῦτο
ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς εἶναι ἀρχήν—τοῦ
πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ
γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀ•ὰ καὶ
ἀ•οιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γιγνο-
μένης μεταβολῆς. ἔπειτα (iii) διὰ τί
ἀκίνητον, εἰ ἕν; ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος
ἓν ὄν, τοδὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, κινεῖται ἐν ἑαυτῷ,
διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ πᾶν; ἔπειτα (iv)
ἀ•οίωσις διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη; ἀ•ὰ μὴν
οὐδὲ τῷ εἴδει οἷόν τε ἓν εἶναι, πλὴν τῷ ἐξ
οὗ (οὕτως δὲ ἓν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τινες
λέγουσιν, ἐκείνως δ’ οὔ)· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ
ἵππου ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει καὶ τἀναντία
ἀ•ήλων.
So, if we approach the matter in this way, it appears
impossible for the things that are to be one. And the
arguments which they use to prove this claim are not
hard to solve. For both reason eristically, both Melissus
and Parmenides. That Melissus argues fallaciously is
clear. (i) For, in assuming that everything which has
come to be has a beginning, he thinks he has also
assumed that that which has not come to be does not
have a beginning. Next, (ii) this is also absurd, that
there is a beginning of everything—of the thing and
not [only] of the time, and not [only] of simple coming
to be but also of alteration, as though no change takes
place all at once. Next, (iii) why is it unmoving, if it is
one? For just as even the part, being one—for example,
this water—moves within itself, why not the universe
too? Next, (iv) why could there not be alteration? But
nor indeed is it possible for it to be one in form, except
with regard to what it is from. And even some of the
natural philosophers say that it is one in this way,
although not in that way. For human is different from
horse in form, and the contraries [are different in form]
from one another.
In the previous section, Aristotle has shown that the conclusion of the Eleatics is absurd;
now he goes on to show that their arguments are unsound. The general way he proceeds
consists in spotting the logical fallacies that underlie their arguments.
The main logical fallacy that Aristotle spots in Melissus' argument could be formalised as
follows. Melissus argues: if p, then q, but ¬p, then ¬q, but the negation of the antecedent
50
does not logically imply the negation of the consequent. It is not true that, if all that comes
to be has a beginning, that which does not come to be has none. What can be deduced from
the first conditional is that, if something has no beginning (¬q), then it is not a γενόμενον
(¬p).93
The second mistake found in Melissus' argument is presented in a very compressed
form.94 Ross observes (p. 471) that, unlike Melissus, Aristotle does not think that all change
takes place in a particular part of a thing first and then spreads to the whole. In fact, some
kinds of change do not happen gradually, but rather immediately, as when water freezes
(according to Aristotle).95 If that is the case, we may draw the conclusion that Melissus'
argument is not valid for all kinds of change.
The third absurdity is represented by the thesis that unity implies motionlessness. In fact,
even if there is only one thing, it can still have motion within itself, as happens with a mass
of water.
Finally, Aristotle concludes by making two distinct points. First, monism with respect to a
substrate does not rule out other kinds of κίνησις; no matter in what sense of unity the
universe is one, there must be at least one respect in which change takes place. Second, it is
absurd to deny that human beings and horses are different, so there must be some way to
account for this difference.
1.4.2.2. Against Parmenides
Phys., 186a22-b14 (trans. Clarke 2019, modified)
καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς
τρόπος τῶν λόγων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄ•οι
εἰσὶν ἴδιοι· καὶ ἡ λύσις τῇ μὲν ὅτι ψευδὴς
τῇ δὲ ὅτι οὐ συμπεραίνεται, (I) ψευδὴς
μὲν ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι,
And the same sorts of arguments apply to
Parmenides too, even if certain other arguments are
specific [to him]. The solution [to Parmenides'
argument] is partly that it is false, and partly that it does
not establish its conclusion. (I) It is false because it
93 Cf. Aristotle's attack on Melissus at SE, 167b13-20; 168b35-40; 181a27-30. The fact that Melissus' claims are also
rejected in the Sophistical Refutations corroborates the idea that Aristotle is dealing with his theses dialectically.
94 A full critical exploration of Melissus' argument against motion is provided in Phys. 6.4; Aristotle has probably
in mind Melissus' fragment B7.
95 Cf. Phys., 236a27; 253b23.
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λεγομένου πο•αχῶς, (II) ἀσυμπέραν-
τος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη,
σημαίνοντος ἓν τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὐθὲν ἧττον
πο•ὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν· οὔτε γὰρ τῇ
συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ
λόγῳ. ἄ•ο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ
καὶ τῷ δεδεγμένῳ. καὶ οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ
τὸ λευκὸν οὐθὲν χωριστόν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ
χωριστὸν ἀ•ὰ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τὸ
λευκὸν καὶ ᾧ ὑπάρχει. ἀ•ὰ τοῦτο
Παρμενίδης οὔπω συνεώρα. ἀνάγκη δὴ
λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθ’
οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀ•ὰ καὶ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ
ὅπερ ἕν. τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ’
ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ὥστε ᾧ
συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσται (ἕτερον γὰρ
τοῦ ὄντος)· ἔσται τι ἄρα οὐκ ὄν. οὐ δὴ
ἔσται ἄ•ῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ
ἔσται ὄν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πο•ὰ τὸ ὂν
σημαίνει οὕτως ὥστε εἶναί τι ἕκαστον.
ἀ•’ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν.
εἰ οὖν τὸ ὅπερ ὂν μηδενὶ συμβέ-
βηκεν ἀ•ὰ <τὰ ἄ•α> ἐκείνῳ, τί
μᾶ•ον τὸ ὅπερ ὂν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν ἢ μὴ
ὄν; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν τοῦτο καὶ
λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δ’ εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ
ὄν (οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν
τε τὸ ὄν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὂν ὃ οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν),
οὐκ ἄρα ὂν τὸ λευκόν· οὐχ οὕτω δὲ
ὥσπερ τι μὴ ὄν, ἀ•’ ὅλως μὴ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα
ὅπερ ὂν οὐκ ὄν· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι
λευκόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὂν ἐσήμαινεν.
assumes that being is said in a single way, when in fact it
is said in many ways. (II) And it is inconclusive because
if the white things were assumed to be the only things,
and if the white signifies one thing, nevertheless the
white things will be many and not one. For the white
will not be one by continuity, nor in account. For to be
white and to be the thing that has received [it] will be
different—and there will not be anything separate
beyond the white; for it is not by being separate but in
being that the white and that to which it belongs are
different. But Parmenides did not yet see this. It is
necessary, then, [for him] to assume not only that being
signifies one thing of whatever it is predicated of, but
that it signifies both what is being as such and what is
one as such. For the accident is said of an underlying
subject in such a way that the thing to which being is
accidental will not be; for it is different from being. So,
there will be a non-being. Now, what is being as such
will not be something that belongs to something
different. For it will be impossible for it to be a being,
unless being signifies many things in such a way that
each is something. But being is assumed to signify one
thing.
So, if what is being as such is accidental to nothing,
but <the other things> are accidental to that, then why
does what is being as such signify what is rather than
what is not? For if what is being as such is this [sc.
being]96 and white, and to be white is not being as such
—for nor can being be accidental to it, for nothing is a
being which is not being as such—then the white will
be a non-being. And [it will be a non-being] not insofar
as it is not something, but insofar as it is not at all. So,
96 I read ‘τοῦτο’, with (perhaps) Themistius: Them., In Phys., 10.7-21.
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ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκὸν σημαίνει ὅπερ ὄν·
πλείω ἄρα σημαίνει τὸ ὄν. οὐ τοίνυν
οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει τὸ ὄν, εἴπερ ὅπερ ὂν
τὸ ὄν· ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ ἕτερον τὸ εἶναι τῶν
μορίων.
what is being as such is a non-being. For it is true to say
that it is white, and this signified a non-being. So, the
white too signifies what is being as such. But then being
signifies more than one thing. Therefore, nor even will
what is have magnitude, if indeed what is is what is
being as such. For the being of each of the two parts will
be different.
The second section of Physics 1.3 is devoted to the refutation of Parmenides' arguments in
support of his thesis that being is one. Parmenides' general mistake is twofold. On the one
hand, Parmenides' assumption that being is univocal is false. On the other hand, he invalidly
draws from its univocity the consequence that there is no plurality. There seems to be a
difference in how we should regard the two aspects of the mistake, although they both
contribute to the rejection of Parmenides' theses. In fact, accepting or not accepting the
univocity of being could hardly work as a rejection unless the choice is grounded in some
deeper reason. This is why Aristotle's argument has to show that it is this very assumption
that results in absurdities. Since it is possible to draw true conclusions even from false
premises, Aristotle needs to show that assuming ex hypothesi Parmenides' premise leads us
into contradiction. 
The argument against Parmenides appears to be in a very condensed form, in which two
moments can be distinguished: before and after line 186a32. Aristotle's general strategy is a
reductio ad absurdum: (1) he starts by accepting the hypothesis that being means ‘one’; (2) he
then tests this hypothesis for the different understandings of ‘one’, and (3) finally shows that
the conclusions we can draw from each case contradict our hypothesis. The part of the
argument that ends at 186a31 is aimed at demonstrating that Parmenides was failing to see
an important distinction within being. What we see after 186a32 is Aristotle correcting his
understanding of the initial hypothesis. In order for it to be acceptable, the thesis that being
is one should be meant in a more precise sense: being as such is one as such. However, this
new hypothesis also results in a contradiction, so the Parmenidean hypothesis must be
rejected.
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As a first move in his argument, Aristotle substitutes ‘being’ with ‘white’: our hypothesis
becomes that there are only white things (μόνα τὰ λευκά). Now, presupposing that ‘white’
only signifies one thing does not prevent us from acknowledging many white things. The
reason Aristotle adduces is that ‘the white’ cannot be one either by continuity or by being
identical in definition. Ross supposes that Aristotle omits the third of the modes of unity
that he had listed at 185b7-9 because it is sufficiently obvious that it should be excluded, too.
However, that the white might be something indivisible does not seem more peculiar than
hypothesising that it should be continuous or one in account. If Aristotle mentions two
modes of unity out of three, the reader is rather led to consider the missing mode as the one
he or she should accept by means of exclusion. This seems to be very much in line with the
aim of the argument. In fact, if the white is not one in the two senses mentioned, then it
must be one insofar as it is something indivisible. As a consequence, it is true, at least in
some sense, to maintain that there is nothing apart (χωριστόν) from the white. However,
Aristotle shows that this is still not enough to guarantee that the white is one. In fact, the
colour white and the thing coloured are different ὄντα not because they are separate from
each other (which would be false in our example), but insofar as the latter is the subject in
which the former inheres. In other words, if the white is understood as an indivisible whole,
it will still contain in itself two different things, although they form something unitary.
Hence, of the elements that compose this unitary whole, τὸ λευκόν would only represent one
out of two—which is at odds with the very hypothesis that there are only λευκά.
This part of the proof has been led by presupposing that ‘being’ works in the same way as
‘white’.97 However, this has turned out not to be the case, because ‘being white’ is different
from that thing which, in some sense or other, has received τὸ λευκόν. Since this first attempt
to make sense of the Eleatic tenet has failed, Aristotle now tests the same hypothesis for the
alternative possibility.
In the second part of Aristotle's argument, the initial hypothesis is not only that being
merely signifies one thing, but that it also signifies both ὅπερ ὄν and ὅπερ ἕν. These two
97 Perhaps the use of a term which Aristotle would include in the category of quality shows some degree of
continuity with Aristotle's first argument (see 1.4.1.1), which explicitly tested the Eleatic thesis assuming their
one being was supposed to be understood as one substance, one quantity or one quality.
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expressions are far from clear, at least prima facie, and have given rise to various
translations.98 I have rendered them as being and unity ‘as such’ and I shall account for my
choice in 2.4.
The way the argument works can be reconstructed as follows. In order to make any
headway, we have to understand being not as an accidental property, but as said in its own
right. Because of this assumption, whatever is predicated of being as such is going to be
something different from being. In fact, we have excluded the possibility that being as such
inheres in anything else. If we were instead to call both different things ‘beings’, we would be
forced to admit that being signifies two things and not only one. In other words, if we want
to stick to our new hypothesis, we have to suppose that being only signifies being as such and
nothing else. However, this hypothesis too leads to absurdities. On the one hand, if we say
that being is being as such and is also white, we shall end up affirming that being as such is
nothing. In fact, if being as such is the only being there is, anything that is not being as such
will be nothing. So, if white is different from being as such, it signifies nothing. 99 But if it is
true to say that being as such is white, then it is also true to say that being as such is nothing.
As a result, being will signify not being rather than being. On the other hand, this also
implies that being will turn out to signify both being as such and white, which amounts to
saying that it does not only signify one thing (i.e. being as such), but many. This contradicts
our initial hypothesis.
Aristotle's strategy ultimately consists in forcing Parmenides into a dilemma in which
neither horn can be accepted. If the Eleatics want being to signify unity, the only
understanding of ‘being one’ they can opt for is indivisibility. However, the indivisibility
signified by being cannot be reduced to mere separability, because the separable object itself
contains at least two different beings: a subject and its attributes. As a consequence, if we
want to defend the claim that being is one, we shall have to check if it holds for one and only
98 Charlton 1970 and Ross 1979 translate them as ‘what just is’ and ‘what is just one’; Castelli 2018b as ‘what is
precisely being’ and ‘what is precisely one’; Clarke 2019 as ‘essentially being’ and ‘essentially one’. The Latin
translation used by Aquinas in his commentary has ‘quod vere est’ and ‘quod vere unum est’; in the Latin version
of Averroes' long commentary we also find the alternative translations ‘illud quod est ens’ and ‘illud quod est
unum’.
99 On the force of σημαίνειν here see Castelli 2018b, 87–91.
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one of these two elements. However, if we take being to function like an attribute (e.g.
white), we have to admit of a plurality of referents; instead, if we take being exclusively to
signify being as such, then it will not be possible to predicate unity or any attribute
whatsoever of it, unless we are willing to affirm that being is not being. As a result, the
dilemma into which Parmenides is forced is a checkmate: either way, his claim that being is
one is untenable.100
The dilemmatic structure of Aristotle's argument recalls the rejection of Parmenidean
monism in Plato's Sophist. Besides this general strategy (which is surely not a unicum for
either Aristotle or Plato), Aristotle clearly draws on the Stranger's second argument. In fact,
just as in the case of Plato the argument was based on the distinction between two senses of
‘whole’, here too there is a contrast between two senses of being and unity, namely, an
accidental and an essential sense. In particular, as in the Sophist, here Aristotle also argues
that if being is understood as τὸ ὅπερ ὄν, then it cannot be τὸ ὅπερ ἕν and vice versa. This
point seems therefore to be the very core of both Aristotle's and Plato's rejection of
Parmenides' monism.
1.4.3. Ὅπερ ὂν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν
1.4.3.1. On Aristotle's use of ὅπερ
As was remarked at the end of the previous section, Aristotle's argument in Physics 1.3
hinges on a specific sense in which we should understand Parmenidean being, which is
expressed by the phrase τὸ ὅπερ ὄν. Commentators have been puzzled by this expression
since antiquity.101 The debate can be traced back to the following alternative: either there is a
(non-technical or semi-technical) sense in which the ὅπερ-expression plays an important
role in the dialectical argument or it should rather be understood as a technical formula
denoting what is primarily (κυρίως) and mostly (μάλιστα) being. In this case, being would
correspond to being itself (τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν) in Platonic terms and to substance (οὐσία) in Aristotle's
more usual terminology. As Castelli remarks, this alternative is less strict than it could appear
100 I shall leave aside the last part of Aristotle's refutation (analysed in Clarke 2019, 133–43), which is only of relative
interest for our purposes.
101 Starting from Them., In Phys., 10.7-21; see Castelli 2018b, 94.
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at first glance. Taking up this suggestion, I shall examine some parallel passages that help us
to clarify what is meant by this use of ὅπερ. I shall then reflect more broadly on the phrase as
it seems to be used in Aristotle and, finally, I shall consider whether the origins of  the ὅπερ-
expression can be traced back to the passage of the Sophist on which we have been focusing.
To this end, it is useful to have a look at the occurrences of these expressions in the Corpus
Aristotelicum, which is displayed in the following table:
Metaphysics Physics
ὅπερ ὄν Γ (1), Η (1) 1 (18)
ὅπερ ἕν Β (1), Η (2) 1 (1)
It appears that the two expressions are used in only a very few places; moreover, they
occur together in both Metaphysics H and Physics 1. However, such a limited distribution only
exacerbates the difficulty of rendering them into English. If we therefore expand our textual
search to the occurrences of the expressions ὅπερ x or ὅπερ x τι (where x is a nominal
element), things appear in a different light:102
102 In the table, the references in bold are the cases where x stands for ὄν; those underlined, the cases where x
stands for ἕν.
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APr APo EN GC Met. Phys. SE Top.
ὅπερ x
(tot. 64)
(1)
49a18
(1)
83a14
83a24
83a27
83a29
83a30
89a35
89b4
89b5
(2)
91a39
91b3
(2)
330a26
330a26
330a27
330a27
(Β)
1001a26
(Γ)
1003b33
1006b13
1007a22
1007a23
1007a28
1007a28
1007a28
1007a33
(Ζ)
1030a3
(Ι)
1052b16 
(1)
186a33
186a34
186b2
186b4
186b5
186b6
186b7
186b8
186b10
186b12
186b13
186b14
186b33
179a5
179a6
182a21
(3)
116a25
116a26
116a27
(4)
120b23
120b24
122b19
122b26
122b26
122b38
123a2
123a2
124a18
124a18
124b8
124b20
124b21
125a28
125a29
126a21
127b15
128a35
(6)
147a14
ὅπερ x τι
(tot. 29)    
(1)
30a12
49b7
(1)
[83a14]
83a7
83a24
83a27
83a29
83b10
89a36
(VI) 
1140a7
(VII)
1153b6
(Ζ)
1030a4
1030a5
(Η)
1045b1
1045b1
1045b23
(Θ)
1051b30
(Κ)
1069a5
(Ν)
1091b25
1091b27
(1)
186b14
186b15
186b16
186b17
186b32
187a8
(5)
227a10
179a4
179a6
(3)
116a23
Tot. 93 3 16 2 4 20 20 5 23
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The greatest number of occurrences, besides those in the Physics, are concentrated in the
Posterior Analytics, in the Metaphysics and in the Topics. Examining some chosen passages
will enable us to reflect on the way in which this expression is used.
The most interesting case to analyse is found in Posterior Analytics 1.22, which sets out a
very important distinction between predications.
Again, the things signifying a reality (τὰ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνοντα) signify of what they
are predicated of just what is that thing (ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο) or just what is a particular sort of
it (ἢ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνό τι); but the things which do not signify a reality but are said of some
other underlying subject which is neither just what is that thing nor just what is a
particular sort of it, are incidental, e.g. white of the man. For the man is neither just
what is white (ὅπερ λευκόν) nor just what is some white (ὅπερ λευκόν τι)—but
presumably animal; for a man is just what is an animal (ὅπερ… ζῷον). But the things
that do not signify a reality must be predicated of some underlying subject, and there
cannot be anything white which is not white through being something different.103
The distinction is between accidental and essential predications. What is of particular
interest for the present inquiry is that Aristotle uses the ὅπερ-phrase to clarify what he means
b y per se predication. This has a fundamental consequence: ὅπερ ὄν and ὅπερ ὄν τι should
probably not be regarded as technical expressions. The fact that Aristotle uses them to clarify
a technical expression (καθ᾽ αὑτό) makes it likely that they are not technical expressions
themselves. However, they are certainly used in a rather specific sense, which can be better
understood by taking into account a passage from the same book of the Posterior Analytics:
Again, what is not said of some other underlying subject—as what is walking is
something different walking (and white), while a reality (οὐσία), and whatever signifies
some this (ὅσα τόδε τι σημαίνει), is just what it is (ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν) without being
something else. Thus things which are not <said> of an underlying subject I call things
in themselves (καθ᾽ αὑτά), and those which <are said> of an underlying subject <I call>
incidentals (συμβεβηκότα).104
103 APo, 83a14-32, trans. Barnes 1984.
104 APo, 73b5-10, trans. Barnes 1984.
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Unlike the previous passage, this quotation does not correspond to an entry in the table
above, because it is not in the form of ὅπερ x. Nevertheless, it is still clear that we are faced
with very much the same case as before. A ὅπερ-clause exemplifies an essential predication.
However, here the terms of this exemplification are then set out in a more straightforward
fashion: if something signifies a determinate particular, this something will be precisely that
which it is (i.e. ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν) and nothing more. The additional aspect that is pointed out
here is the exclusive value of the ὅπερ-phrase. Hence, it is used to contrast predications
where some additional characteristic of an object of reference is given with predications
where it is the object itself that is signified. The former is the predication of an accident
(συμβεβηκός), the latter of the thing itself (αὑτό) that is in question. In other words, Aristotle
is exploiting this value of the strengthened relative pronoun to identify exclusively the
proper referent of an expression, by separating it from all the rest of its attributes.
The very same point is used in the Topics, when Aristotle reflects on the choice of some
predicates over others in a dialectical discussion; in particular, it is preferable to predicate
something belonging to a genus rather than something external to it:
Next, that which is just of a certain kind (τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι) is more worthy of choice
than that which is not in the genus of that thing, for example, justice is more worthy of
choice than the just thing; for the former is in the genus ‘good’, but the latter is not, and
the former is that which is just good (ὅπερ ἀγαθόν), but the latter is not. For nothing is
said to be just the genus (ὅπερ τὸ γένος) which does not actually belong to the genus; for
example, the white man is not that which is just a colour (ὅπερ χρῶμα) and so likewise
in the other cases.105
If we take ‘good’ to work as a genus, the reason ‘justice’ is a better predicate than ‘just
thing’ is that, while ‘justice’ can be regarded as a particular of the genus, ‘just thing’ does not
belong to the genus. Also in this case, in order to phrase this relation, Aristotle uses the ὅπερ-
expression. He thus shows not only that all things of which we say they are ὅπερ x (where x is
a genus) belong to one and the same x, but also that they are the only things that belong to x.
In that sense, checking whether we can say that ‘white man’ is ὅπερ χρῶμα is a reliable test of
105 Top., 116a23-28; trans. Tredennick & Forster 1960, slightly modified. 
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whether two things belong or do not belong to the same genus because of the exclusive force
of ὅπερ: it picks exactly what belongs to the genus ‘colour’.
The passage where the force of ὅπερ is most clearly exclusive is found in Metaphysics Γ:
And in general those who say this do away with substance and essence (τὸ τί ἦν
εἶναι). For they must say that all attributes are accidents, and that there is no such thing
as ‘being a man as such’ (τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι) or ‘an animal’ (ἢ ζῴῳ εἶναι). For if there
is to be any such thing as ‘being a man as such’ this will not be ‘being a not-man’ or ‘not
being a man’ (yet these are negations of it); for there was one thing which it meant, and
this was the substance of something. And denoting the substance of a thing means that
the essence of the thing is nothing else. But if its being a man as such is to be the same
as either being a not-man as such or not being a man as such, then its essence will be
something else. Therefore our opponents must say that there cannot be such a
definition of anything, but that all attributes are accidental; for this is the distinction
between substance and accident—‘white’ is accidental to man, because though he is
white, he is not white as such (ὅπερ λευκόν).106
In this passage, Aristotle is discussing the position of those thinkers who deny the
principle of non-contradiction. What is interesting for our purposes is that Aristotle uses the
expression ὅπερ x in order to point out that signifying substance amounts to stating that
something is nothing other than itself. In fact, if we affirm that man is both ‘a man as such’
and its negation (either ‘not a man as such’ or ‘a not-man as such’), we shall not have a
definition anymore, for all predications will be accidental. It appears therefore that, in this
case too, Aristotle is using this expression because of its exclusive value. As such, the passage
seems to be in line with the previous ones, even though each belonged to a different context.
What we can conclude from this rapid overview of the supposedly technical use of ὅπερ is
the following: Aristotle does not use ὅπερ in a technical sense, but rather emphasises and
exploits the sense of exclusively defining the object to which it refers. 107 If we now look back
106 Met., 1007a20-33; trans. Ross 1963, slightly modified.
107 Hence, while I agree with Clarke 2019, 118–21, I prefer to think that Aristotle's use of the ὅπερ-expression in place
of καθ᾽ αὑτό is justified by the dialectical context and because of its exclusive force, which plays a crucial role in
Aristotle's refutation. This is why in my translation I opt for ‘being/one as such’ as opposed to ‘essentially
being/one’.
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at the argument in Physics 1.3, we can confirm these conclusions. In fact, the contradiction
underlying Parmenides' position arises because he imposed too tight a relation between
being and unity. As becomes manifest, after Aristotle's rephrasing of the initial hypothesis in
his rejection, Parmenides' being must signify both ὅπερ ὄν and ὅπερ ἕν; however, each
excludes the other.
1.4.3.2. Ὅπερ ἕν in the Sophist
The expression ὅπερ ἕν also appears at Sophist, 244c1. In the next paragraphs I am going to
present an overview of ὅπερ x in the Platonic corpus in order to see if we can find a use of the
expression analogous to that found in Aristotle. The following table displays all the
occurrences of ὅπερ x where—as in the Aristotelian case—x is a nominal element.
Charmides Gorgias Phaedo Sophist
160e4 448b6 103c13
104a1
104a7
104b1
104b3
244c1
The first datum that can be noticed in the table is that the number of occurrences is
considerably lower than in Aristotle's case. Furthermore, in both the Gorgias and the Phaedo,
the phrase is apparently used unemphatically. However, it is useful to have a look at these
passages, because they might shed light on the use of the same expression in the Sophist.
(1) Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that
temperance is just what modesty is (ὅπερ αἰδὼς). (Charm., 160e4-5; trans. Lamb 1979,
slightly modified)
(2) Then I ask you, if Gorgias chanced to be skilled in the same art as his brother
Herodicus, what should we be justified in calling him? Just what we call his brother
(ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον), should we not? (Gorg., 448b4-6; trans. Lamb 1975, slightly modified)
(3) ‘Moving on then, consider the following’, he said: “and see if you can agree. You
call something hot and something cold, don't you?’
‘I do.’
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‘Are they just what you call “snow” and “fire” (ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ)?’ (Phdo, 103c10-13;
trans. Sedley & Long 2010)
( 4 ) ‘(…) presumably the odd must always be given this name that we are now
uttering, mustn't it?’
‘Certainly.’
‘Is it the only thing of which that is true – this is my question – or is there also
something else, which is not just what the odd is (οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν), but all the same
must always be called “odd” too, together with its own name, because its nature is such
that it is never deprived of the odd? (…) Consider the case of threeness. Don't you think
that threeness should always be called both by its own name and by the name of the
odd? The odd is not just what threeness is (οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος), but nevertheless
threeness, fiveness, and an entire half of the number series are somehow naturally such
that each of them is always odd, despite not being just what the odd is (ὅπερ τὸ
περιττὸν). Again, the two, the four and in its turn the entire other column of the number
series are each always even, despite not being just what the even is (ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον). Do
you accept that or not? (Phdo, 103e9-104b4; trans. Sedley & Long 2010)
Unlike the instances we have seen in Aristotle, it seems that here ὅπερ has a less emphatic
force. In examples (2) and (3) the verb that needs to be understood in order to complete the
clause is καλῶ—not εἰμί. This rules out the possibility that we are facing a technical use of
the same expression. By contrast, in (1) and (4) the verb governed by ὅπερ is, explicitly or
implicitly, εἰμί. So, in these cases ὅπερ x can be interpreted as having an emphatic nuance,
especially when it is contrasted with things that only take the name of x or that are x but not
that which x is—as in the closing lines of the last passage.
After marking this distinction, we can turn back to the Sophist passage, which reads as
follows:
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Soph., 244b12-c2 (trans. Fowler 1977, slightly modified)
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Πότερον ὅπερ ἕν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσ-
χρῶμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν ἢ πῶς;
STR. Well then, do you give the name of being to
anything?
THEAET. Yes.
STR. Is it just what you call “one”, using two names
for the same thing, or how is it?
As can be seen from the Greek, the passage seems to allow for both interpretations of the
ὅπερ ἕν. However, the use of καλεῖτε immediately before the Stranger's second question
strongly suggests that this is the verb that is omitted—as in examples (2) and (3) rather than
(1) and (4): ‘ὅπερ ἕν καλεῖτε;’ (‘is it that very thing which you call “one”?’). In the light of this,
what importance can we attribute to the fact that ὅπερ ἕν is found both here and in the
Physics?
In section 1.3.3, it was established that the rejection of the Eleatics in the Physics is closely
related to the discussion of Parmenidean monism in the Sophist. After surveying both the
Aristotelian and the Platonic uses of ὅπερ, we can draw the conclusion that Aristotle relies on
a well-established, although probably not fully regimented, technical use of ὅπερ-phrases in
Plato's philosophical language. Within this framework, what we can safely affirm with
respect to the ὅπερ-expression in the Sophist is that it confirms that Aristotle has in mind the
Platonic passage in question. However, we could even go so far as to suppose that Aristotle
borrows the formulation of the problem from the Sophist and loads the ὅπερ with a more
regimented and technical sense than in the Platonic passage. In the text of the Physics this
happens in two steps. Aristotle first expresses his perplexity in exactly the same terms as the
Stranger: Parmenides must have considered not only that being signifies one thing, but that
the single thing signified is precisely the same thing that being and unity signify. The
problem with this identification is that it is too tight; it is also exclusive, as the opponent
claims there is just one thing. On the other hand, the Stranger also claims that, if we
understand ἕν as whole in a strong sense (i.e. as completely partless), then we cannot say
that being is one. Although the expression Plato uses is αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον—and not τὸ ὅπερ ὅλον—
the argument seems to be grounded in the very same idea that underlies Aristotle's. In both
the Sophist and the Physics, these expressions have an exclusive force. Accordingly, we can
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conclude that the ὅπερ-expression in Aristotle's Physics 1.3 is used in a technical sense that
does not, however, presuppose Aristotelian substance. Τὸ ὅπερ ἕν and τὸ ὅπερ ὄν mean
respectively ‘exclusively “one”’ and ‘exclusively “being”’, whatever ‘one’ and ‘being’ might be
taken to mean. That said, this interpretation does not prevent ὅπερ from being used to define
substance in particular occurrences, but this will depend on the context of use rather than
on the intrinsic meaning of the expression.
If my reconstruction of the usage of this expression in Aristotle is correct, it plays a
crucial role in Physics 1.3, insofar as it leads us to focus on the very core of Eleatic monism:
the problems with claiming that being signifies one thing (ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν).
Aristotle's λύσις therefore demonstrates why it is false to assume that being signifies one
thing. Since this assumption was incompatible with any investigation of principles, once this
point has been accepted, the ground is clear for an inquiry into causes. This introduces a
broader question as to the role of unity and being not in physics, but in ‘another science or
one common to all’. We too should thus turn to ‘the books that come after the Physics’.
1.5. One being but many causes
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle's discussion of τὸ ἕν makes its first appearance in book Alpha
Meizon, once again in the context of his confrontation with his predecessors. Aristotle thinks
that the majority of these philosophers maintained that the principles of all things are
material principles. They shared the view that this principle is (a) that of which all beings are
constituted and at the same time (b) that from which they stem and into which they are
going to dissolve. What they disagree on is the number and the kind of such principles. In
this section, I am going to focus on Aristotle's remarks on those thinkers who posited only
one principle, among whom Parmenides seems to occupy a special position.
After recalling his predecessors from Thales down to Anaxagoras, Aristotle points out that
their principles turn out to be insufficient to explain generation and corruption. In fact,
whether they posit one or more elements, they cannot answer the question ‘why does
change occur?’ or ‘what is the cause of change?’. In other words, the one principle that they
posit as a material substrate cannot additionally be the cause of its becoming. They ought to
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have remarked that the latter is rather a different principle from the material cause, namely
what Aristotle calls ‘that from which change occurs’:
Met., 984a25-b1 (trans. Barney 2012, modified)
τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν
ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἡ
ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. οἱ μὲν οὖν πάμπαν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ἁψάμενοι τῆς μεθόδου τῆς τοιαύτης καὶ
ἓν φάσκοντες εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐθὲν
ἐδυσχέραναν ἑαυτοῖς, ἀ•’ ἔνιοί γε τῶν ἓν
λεγόντων, ὥσπερ ἡττηθέντες ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς
ζητήσεως, τὸ ἓν ἀκίνητόν φασιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν
φύσιν ὅλην οὐ μόνον κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν
ἀ•ὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄ•ην μεταβολὴν πᾶσαν.
To search for this is to search for the other
cause, as we would say, that from which comes the
beginning of change. Well then, those who at the
very beginning touched on this subject, and said
that the underlying substrate was one, didn't give
themselves a hard time about it; but some of those
who said it was one, as if defeated by this search,
say that the one and nature as a whole is
unchangeable, not only in respect of generation
and destruction but also in respect of all other
change.
The general picture emerging from this passage is that none of the monists108 was able to
discover a cause other than matter, even though they were engaged in a physical
investigation. However, Aristotle remarks that a second group of thinkers (in all likelihood,
the Eleatics) was somehow defeated by the search itself for a cause of change. This may
strike the reader as somewhat bizarre, given that, in Phys. 1.2, Aristotle had argued that their
strict monism would not allow any kind of principle nor, a fortiori, any principle of change
whatsoever. However, the contrast with the attitude displayed by the other monists—who
οὐθὲν ἐδυσχέραναν ἑαυτοῖς—strongly suggests that the Eleatics did try to explain at least some
form of change, albeit unsuccessfully. Starting from the premise that there is no generation
or destruction, they were forced to deny all other forms of change as well. A reason for this
philosophical defeat is suggested by Alexander: having hypothesised that the all is one, they
wondered how this one thing was supposed to change from itself but were no longer able to
save (σώζειν) the oneness of their being, if not by denying what is evident (τὰ φανερά). 109 That
said, Aristotle seems to regard Parmenides as an exception even among the Eleatics.
108 The Milesian school, Heraclitus and the Eleatics are included.
109 Alex., In Met., 30.1–6.
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Met., 984b1-4 (trans. Barney 2012)
τῶν μὲν οὖν ἓν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν
οὐθενὶ συνέβη τὴν τοιαύτην συνιδεῖν αἰτίαν
πλὴν εἰ ἄρα Παρμενίδῃ, καὶ τούτῳ κατὰ
τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐ μόνον ἓν ἀ•ὰ καὶ δύο πως
τίθησιν αἰτίας εἶναι.
So then, of those who say that the universe is
one, none happened to see a cause of this sort
too, except perhaps Parmenides, and he insofar
as he posits that there is not only one thing but
also in a way two causes.
Following the metaphor used in the preceding lines, we can conclude that Parmenides
was probably not completely defeated by the search for an efficient cause. Here Alexander's
commentary reports Theophrastus' Physical Opinions in support of what he considers to be
Aristotle's position. According to Theophrastus' interpretation, Parmenides both affirms that
the universe is eternal and tries to account for the generation of beings; however, only from
the viewpoint of truth does he assume that everything is one and ungenerated, whereas,
following the opinion of the many, he posits two principles to explain how things come to
be. These principles are fire and earth, which respectively function as a material and an
efficient cause. Accordingly, in Aristotle's history of his predecessors, Parmenides is
described as an exception not qua monist, but insofar as he attempted an explanation of
things that come to be and pass away.110 Given the context of the Metaphysics, he thus seems
to make some headway in the study of the principles of being. His intuition is confirmed by
the opening lines of A.4, where Aristotle attributes the discovery of the efficient cause to
Hermotimus of Clazomenae, but then leaves open the possibility of dating it further back to
previous thinkers.
Met., 984b23-26 (trans. Betegh 2012)
ὑποπτεύσειε δ’ ἄν τις Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον
ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄ•ος ἔρωτα ἢ
ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχήν, οἷον
καὶ Παρμενίδης· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων
τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν πρῶτον μέν φησιν
“ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων”.
One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to
search for such a thing, or someone else who put
erôs or desire among beings as a principle, as also
Parmenides did. For this latter, in constructing the
coming into being of the universe, says that first
‘she devised Eros among the gods’.
110 Alex., In Met., 31.9–16.
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After Hermotimus, Aristotle had mentioned his fellow citizen Anaxagoras, whereas now,
after introducing love, he will move on to deal with Empedocles. Even if these philosophers
have contributed to our investigation of causes, Aristotle does not, as it were, ascribe to them
the full merit of their intuitions. In fact, what he is interested in is less what causes they
might have happened to introduce than how they used them as principles of explanation.
This point is made clear in the following passage and will play a crucial role in the next
section.
Met., 985a10-18 (trans. Betegh 2012, slightly modified)
—οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, καὶ
μέχρι τούτου δυεῖν αἰτίαιν ἐφήψαντο ὧν
ἡμεῖς διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, τῆς
τε ὕλης καὶ τοῦ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, ἀμυδρῶς
μέντοι καὶ οὐθὲν σαφῶς ἀ•’ οἷον ἐν ταῖς
μάχαις οἱ ἀγύμναστοι ποιοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ
ἐκεῖνοι περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι πο•άκις
καλὰς πληγάς, ἀ•’ οὔτε ἐκεῖνοι ἀπὸ
ἐπιστήμης οὔτε οὗτοι ἐοίκασιν εἰδόσιν λέ-
γειν ὅ τι λέγουσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐθὲν χρώ-
μενοι φαίνονται τούτοις ἀ•’ ἢ κατὰ μικρόν.
These people then, just as we say and up to this
point, got engaged with two of the causes that we
distinguished in our work on nature—i.e. with both
the matter and the source of change—indistinctly
however and in no respect clearly, but acting like
unexercised men in fights; for these too often bring
in nice blows as they circle around their enemies,
but they do not do it on the basis of knowledge, just
as these do not look like people who know how to
say what they say; for they evidently make
practically no use of these causes, if not to a small
extent.
In Metaphysics A.5, Aristotle turns to considering the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, who
explicitly posited τὸ ἕν as a principle. Within his exposition of their theories, Aristotle again
mentions the Eleatics, declaring that they should be left aside for the purpose of his present
investigation. As we saw, this passage provides some interesting hints as to Aristotle's overall
interpretation of Parmenides' monism. What should be considered now is the role of these
lines within Aristotle's general discussion of his predecessors.
At 987a9-13, introducing those philosophers whom he calls οἱ Ἰταλικοί, Aristotle points out
an important difference that distinguishes them from other thinkers, both earlier than and
contemporary with their schools. Modern editors, with the exception of Primavesi, accept
the following reading of the manuscripts:
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μέχρι μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰταλικῶν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνων μορυχώτερον εἰρήκασιν οἱ ἄ•οι περὶ αὐτῶν,
πλὴν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν δυοῖν τε αἰτίαιν τυγχάνουσι κεχρημένοι, καὶ τού-των τὴν ἑτέραν οἱ μὲν
μίαν οἱ δὲ δύο ποιοῦσι, τὴν ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις.
So up to the Italians, and aside from them, the rest spoke rather obscurely about
them, except as we said we find them making use of two causes, and of these some
make the second—the source of change—one, others two. (trans. Schofield 2012)
The adverb μορυχώτερον is problematic in many respects but seems to have two
advantages: it is a lectio difficilior and it reflects a negative judgment that Aristotle expresses
vis-à-vis his predecessors throughout the whole first book of the Metaphysics. However, some
good reasons to reject this reading and to accept an alternative can be found as early as
Alexander's commentary. While accepting μοναχώτερον (‘too monistically’), Alexander
mentions that some manuscripts read μορυχώτερον—which is thus, in his view, an
alternative reading. For that term itself he suggests two possible explanations: ‘more
obscurely’ (σκοτεινότερον) or ‘more imprecisely’ (μαλακώτερον). Alexander claims that,
besides being an unfamiliar word, this reading is also inconsistent with Aristotle's general
discourse, in which the Pythagoreans too are charged with unclarity. Moreover, had he
wanted to say ‘more imprecisely’, Aristotle could have chosen μαλακώτερον or other
expressions that he more commonly uses. Finally, at the very end of book A, Aristotle says
that all previous philosophers that expressed their views on principles talked vaguely
(ἀμυδρῶς).111 To these arguments, we should add that the adverb μορυχώτερον is a hapax
legomenon in Greek, insofar as it only occurs in this place of Aristotle's Metaphysics and in
Alexander's comment on this very passage. This also suggests that it could be a corruption of
μοναχώτερον rather than an alternative reading.112 As a result, at this point of his investigation,
111 Met., 993a13.
112 The Arabic translation of Aristotle's passage seems to confirm this reading: ‘Ilà waqti l-īṭālīyyīna wa-takallama fī
hāḏihi l-āḫarūna ġayru hāʾulāʾi kalāman yasīran ġayra annahu kamā qultu min anna llāḏīna yaǧʿalūna l-ʿilala
ṯnatayni yaḫtalifūna fī l-ʿillati l-uḫrà li-anna baʿḍahum yaqūlu innahā wāḥidatun wa-baʿḍa ṯnatāni aʿnī l-šayʾa
llāḏī ʿanhu takūnu l-ḥarakatun (Averr., Tafsīr 1, 56.15-57.2).’ ‘Up to the time of the Italians, (and) the others
different from these spoke about these things in simple words, except that, as I said, those who made the
causes two differ regarding the other cause, because some of them say that it is one and some two, I mean the
thing from which movement is.’ Although ‘simple’ cannot be regarded as a good translation of μοναχώτερον, it
69
what Aristotle laments regarding this first group of thinkers as opposed to the Pythagoreans
is not their unclarity, but their treating all causes in a rather—perhaps excessively—monistic
way. That this is a sound reading of the text is confirmed by the syntactic opposition between
μοναχώτερον and the concession made for those thinkers who somehow worked with two or
more principles (marked by πλήν).
The way in which this reading improves our understanding of the text is the following: at
this point of the Metaphysics, Aristotle is clear that the main problem with positing merely
one principle is that this one principle takes on many different causal roles. Since, however,
each of these roles expresses the function of a different causal principle, we are ultimately
facing some form of pluralism, rather than monism. In other terms, the problem at stake in
these pages of Metaphysics A is the unity of causes, as was remarked by Betegh.113 Showing
that this problem is crucial for Aristotle's own investigation will be the next step in my
research.
1.6. The pay-off of Aristotle's confrontation with the Eleatics
In this section I have examined Aristotle's confrontation with the Eleatics in two places of
the Corpus Aristotelicum. I have pointed out that Aristotle views Eleaticism as an extreme
form of monism and that Parmenides distinguishes himself for being a more refined
proponent of what can be called change-free monism. Such a philosophical position is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, in his general argument against monism, Aristotle
shows that positing only one being prevents the philosopher from admitting principles or
treating the one being as a principle. This undermines the very possibility of undertaking an
inquiry into causes. As a result, Eleatic monism leaves no room whatsoever not only for an
investigation of change, but more generally for any causal inquiry. Second, Aristotle shows
that Melissus' and Parmenides' arguments are faulty insofar as they rest on a wrong,
monistic, premise. In the Physics, Aristotle divides his critique into two distinct sections, of
which the former is aimed at clarifying how one could understand the Eleatic theses, the
cannot surely be a translation of μορυχώτερον.
113 Betegh 2012, 127.
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latter more explicitly at rejecting them. As such, the dialectical analysis provided is of
elenctic character—as the comparison with Plato's Sophist has contributed to showing.
There is, however, an important sense in which a critique of Parmenides' and Melissus'
theses can be used to the advantage of Aristotle's own study of the causes of being. Alpha
Meizon's attitude towards earlier thinkers has been recently described by Rachel Barney as
dialectic in a very specific sense. Aristotle undertakes a dialogic examination at once
refutative and constructive, in that, although superficially elenctic, it aims to clarify the
claims of his predecessors, refute what is false in them and extract what is true for
constructive use.114 As such, this kind of ‘clarification-dialectic’ can serve the purpose of
adjusting the views of previous philosophers so that they can contribute to our own
knowledge of truth. This is particularly important if we wish to draw more general
conclusions about the Metaphysics as a whole. If we accept that, rather than a preliminary
discussion, book A already constitutes the beginning of the metaphysical inquiry, it provides
us with some precious hints as to Aristotle's overall investigation.
Against this background we can reflect on how the present analysis also contributes
positively to the study of being and the one in the  Metaphysics. Crucially, Parmenidean
monism will play a key role in the dialectical investigation that will follow in Metaphysics B.
In particular, Parmenides is mentioned—along with Pythagoras and Plato—in B.4, where
Aristotle develops the aporia that concerns the substantiality of being and the one (aporia
11). Thus, the pay-off of Aristotle's critique of the Eleatics is a necessary requirement for his
own metaphysical investigation, namely that we regard being as not univocal, but said in
many ways. This examination of Aristotle's attitude towards the Eleatics is therefore
fundamental as a prolegomenon to the study of being and the one, to which I shall now turn.
114 Barney 2012, 101.
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2. Aristotle's Parricide of Plato
Introduction
In the first chapter of my thesis I reconstructed Aristotle's rejection of Eleatic monism,
which enabled me to infer a necessary requirement for Aristotle's metaphysical
investigation, namely that we regard being as not univocal, but said in many ways. On
Aristotle's view, the Eleatics' failure to recognise the multivocity of being cost them the very
possibility of undertaking an inquiry into principles and causes—as well as a prominent
position in Metaphysics A's survey of previous philosophers. Specifically, since the Eleatics
were not aware of the distinction between essential and accidental predication, they
admitted only one being, thus rejecting not only any kind of plurality but also the possibility
of talking about principles of the one being or treating the one being as the principle of
something else. However, Parmenides will still play a crucial role in the aporia of
Metaphysics Beta which deals with the ontological status of being and the one: ‘Are being
and the one the substances of all things or is there something else which underlies them?’. It
will turn out that, as a sort of ancestral sin, Parmenides' mistake is inherited by his
philosophical descendants, amongst whom Aristotle places Plato himself. More importantly,
Aristotle's discussion of the eleventh aporia will reveal the philosophical relevance of his
engagement with his predecessors in the economy of the Metaphysics. To this end, in the first
half of this chapter (2.1) I shall pin down the general characteristics of Metaphysics Beta,
while in the second half (2.2) I shall analyse Aristotle's discussion of what he defines as the
hardest of all difficulties.
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2.1. The aporiai of book Beta
The third book of the Metaphysics sets out a series of difficulties that will have to be
discussed and solved in order to discover the characteristics of the sought-for science. That is
why scholars agree that Beta is dialectical, aporetic, and preliminary to the books that follow
in the Metaphysics.115 However, it is not clear in what sense Beta has these three
characteristics.
I shall devote sections 2.1.2-3 to showing how this treatise contributes to the general
project of Aristotle's work. To this end, I shall divide this section into three parts. The first
point that requires scrutiny is whether Aristotle is following a specific method in Beta and
what this tells us about the difficulties he raises. Accordingly, in 2.1.1 I shall deal with the
problem of Beta's general dialectical character, while in 2.1.2 I shall address the question of
how Beta is aporetic in a specific sense. Finally, in the third and last part of this section, I
shall show how Beta as a whole follows on from the programme begun in the first books of
the Metaphysics and is supposed to contribute to the remainder of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
This will enable me to outline the framework within which Aristotle's eleventh aporia is
formulated.
2.1.1. Investigating through aporiai
Book Beta is traditionally referred to as the book of aporiai.116 In its opening, Aristotle
states that we must consider some fundamental problems prior to undertaking our search
for σοφία. Before listing such problems, he also provides three claims to persuade the reader
that this ought to be the first item on our agenda. (1) Those who do not know how a knot has
been tied are unable to loosen it, so, if they have been tied, they cannot free themselves and
move forward; (2) those who are at a loss are similar to people who do not know which
direction to take and who would fail to recognise their destination, even if they should have
115 Madigan 1999, xii–xl.
116 Aristotle himself refers to Beta as the book of ‘διαπορήματα’ at I.2, 1053b10, M.2, 1076b1, M.10, 1086b15.
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reached it; (3) a judge who has listened to the reasons of both parties is in a better condition
to formulate his or her verdict.117
Claims 1 and 2 are based on a comparison between our condition and that of somebody
who is unable to move forward; in contrast, the last argument has rather to do with a
deliberative context, whereby the choice between two opponents in court is at stake. It
should be noted that these arguments seem mainly aimed at gaining the reader's assent; as a
result, we ought to be careful in charging them with specific argumentative value. That said,
Aristotle's language in Beta is reminiscent of the Topics, where Aristotle states that the aim of
dialectic is to discover a method to discuss any issue whatsoever by starting from reputable
opinions (ἔνδοξα) without contradicting oneself. At Topics 1.2, 101a34-36, Aristotle explains
that this discipline is useful ‘for those which are sciences according to philosophy (πρὸς δὲ
τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας)’, ‘because, if we are able to raise difficulties on both sides, we
will more easily discern both truth and falsehood on each point (ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα
διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος)’. This passage seems to echo
the very same idea that was expressed in B.1 in support of the necessity of raising aporiai. In
line with the third claim adduced there, we can say that raising difficulties in both directions
puts us in a better position to discern and judge what is true and what is false.118
This general application of dialectic is found in many different parts of the Corpus
Aristotelicum and has received a great deal of attention.119 Within the debate on the role of
dialectic as an Aristotelian method, Enrico Berti advanced a suggestion that should be
discussed in detail. At the beginning of his Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle establishes a criterion
according to which one should select the opinions which are worth considering in an ethical
inquiry. He distinguishes three kinds: those expressed by children, ill or insane people; those
expressed by the majority of people; finally, those of the wise. Only the latter are said to be
relevant to the analysis: ταύτας οὖν καλῶς ἔχειν τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν, ‘it is good to examine these
opinions’. In contrast, regarding the things said by children, by the ill or by the insane, he
states: ἂν οὐθεὶς νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν, ‘no sane person would raise aporiai’. Now, the
parallelism between the two sentences suggests that the meanings of διαπορέω and ἐξετάζω
117 Met., 995a33-b4.
118 For a detailed account of this use of dialectic see Rapp 2018.
119 See Introduction.
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here are basically the same.120 However, upon closer inspection, the two verbs display a
morphological difference which has important consequences for their meanings. On the one
hand, the aorist ‘διαπορήσειεν’ seems to denote the beginning of an action in a given
context.121 On the other hand, the present infinitive ‘ἐξετάζειν’ conveys an idea of continuity
or repetition and seems thus to refer to a general habit. This suggests that, although the two
verbs can have very close meanings, their resemblance should be qualified. Accordingly, this
passage cannot be regarded as evidence for identifying dialectic and aporetic method. What
it seems to suggest is that, when starting an investigation, (1) one should ἐξετάζειν the
reputable opinions that have been expressed on that given subject; (2) the first step of this
procedure is to διαπορῆσαι, to raise difficulties. I shall come back to the vocabulary of aporia
and to its scientific role in the next paragraph; in what follows I shall briefly address a
broader problem that has to do with dialectic and its relation to other disciplines.
In the second part of Topics 1.2, Aristotle defines dialectic precisely as a procedure of
examination.
Top., 101a36-b4 (trans. Tredennick & Forster 1960)
ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην
ἐπιστήμην. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν
κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν
ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ
πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων εἰσί, διὰ δὲ τῶν
περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν
διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ’ ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον
τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ
οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς
ὁδὸν ἔχει.
Further, it is useful in connexion with the
ultimate bases of each science; for it is impossible to
discuss them at all on the basis of the principles
peculiar to the science in question, since the
principles are primary in relation to everything else,
and it is necessary to deal with them through the
reputable opinions on each point. This process
belongs peculiarly, or most appropriately, to
dialectic; for, being of the nature of an investigation,
it has access to the principles of all disciplines.
It is not clear whether Aristotle is adding a fourth use of dialectic or whether he is simply
presenting a further point within the same use.122 However, what should be noted is that in
120 This was first noticed in Barnes 1980; see also Berti 1995.
121 Aoristus ingressivus, see Kühner & Gerth 1898, I, 155, 5.
122 On this passage, see Smith 1997, 51–4.
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these lines Aristotle seems to mention a precise object of inquiry (first principles: τὰ πρῶτα).
In contrast, in the previous lines of the passage, he had limited himself to explaining why the
dialectical method was useful for sciences in general, not for studying some specific object.
On the basis of this passage, scholars have maintained or rejected the idea that it is the
business of dialectic to discover first principles.123 An exhaustive discussion of this issue
would require much more space than can be afforded here. However, the following
considerations are relevant to the overall aim of this chapter. Aristotle does not state that
dialectic studies the first principles of all sciences, but that it enables us to say something
about them. Moreover, this capability is unique to dialectic, because all other sciences rely
upon some principles which are proper to a specific domain of knowledge, whereas dialectic
alone can deal with principles which are prior to any other specific principle. This suggests
that dialectic is the discipline one resorts to whenever one has to do with principles that
cannot be treated within the domain of one science.
In general, what can be safely stated after reading these passages of the Topics is that
Aristotle, in assigning a scientific role to dialectic, is very cautious.124 On the one hand, he
emphasises the broad domain to which it applies: it has a use that ranges over all disciplines
or methods. On the other hand, he confines himself to saying that dialectic ‘has access (ὁδὸν
ἔχει)’ to any discipline.125 In other words, he does not say that these disciplines (or their first
principles) constitute the object of dialectic, but that dialectic helps us to evaluate the
authoritative opinions expressed about the first principles of any other discipline
whatsoever. The explanation that is given as to why discussing something through ἔνδοξα is
the peculiar process of dialectic is that dialectic is an ‘examinative’ discipline. In the light of
the parallel passage of the Eudemian Ethics, it seems reasonable to conclude that dialectic is
designed for examining reputable opinions, even when it comes to things that are prior to
anything else. This process might amount to (but is not limited to) analysing the reasons pro
and contra any given thesis, so as to be in the best possible position to evaluate the claim in
question.
123 On relevant secondary literature see Introduction.
124 On this point, see in particular Menn 1995, 316–8.
125 This expression has a parallel in the Metaphysics (I.4, 1055a7).
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Now, the Metaphysics is far from being the only work of the corpus where Aristotle's
analysis is introduced by the previous discussion of a group of difficulties.126 However, Beta
seems to follow a particular pattern, which, according to Michel Crubellier and André Laks,
exhibits the following three characteristics:
(a) each question gives rise to two mutually exclusive theses;
(b) the development of each aporia involves two (series of) arguments
that tackle each of the alternative theses;
(c) no indications are given as to which thesis should be preferred.
By way of introduction, I should like to take a closer look at these three characteristics by
studying Aristotle's vocabulary of aporia. The set of words related to ἀπορία has been
thoroughly analysed in Motte-Rutten 2001, where four basic meanings of the term are
singled out. Ἀπορία can denote a condition of physical lack in either (i) a physiological or (ii)
a material sense; it can further convey (iii) an ethical or psychological nuance, describing
either a lack of affection or perplexity as to how to conduct oneself in a given situation;
finally, it can have (iv) an epistemological or methodological value, signifying critical
examination of theoretical difficulties. Although the fourth sense appears to be the only one
represented in the occurrences of this and related words in the Metaphysics,127 the
boundaries between these different nuances are not so sharp. In particular, it is interesting to
reflect on the relationship between meanings (iii) and (iv).
Aristotle seems to provide a definition of ἀπορία at Topics 6.6, 145b1-19, where he discusses
one of the mistakes which concern definitions. It is a mistake to attribute an affection to
something that cannot admit of it, e.g. to say that ἡ ἀπορία is ἰσότης ἐναντίων λογισμῶν (‘an
equality of contrary reasonings’), because perplexity is an affection of the soul and not of
reasonings.128 In the light of this passage, the core meaning of ἀπορία seems to be its sense
(iii): aporia is an affection of the soul resulting from the equality of two contrary reasonings.
This entails a problem regarding the epistemological status of this equality: do these
reasonings need to be contrary reasonings or is it sufficient that they appear to be such?129
126 For example, APo, 90a35-38, Phys., 217b29-32, DA, 402a22-b 16, NE, 1145b2-7; see Crubellier & Laks 2009, 2–3, 8.
127 Stevens 2001, 260.
128 Zadro 1981, 487.
129 Pironet 2001, 180–1. 
78
Although Aristotle does not seem to clarify the matter, in most cases he mentions some
difficulties precisely in order to opt for one of the alternatives. In fact, Aristotle tends to
present aporiai as choices between contradictory—rather than simply contrary—
alternatives.130 As such, one of the two theses at stake ought to be necessarily true and the
other, false. Finally—and more importantly—the Topics passage also suggests that the sense
of embarrassment does not coincide with the impasse itself, but rather is its effect. These
reflections prepare the ground for studying the singular case of book Beta, to which I shall
turn in the next section.
Before doing so, a quick historical note, to which I shall return at the end of this chapter.
The dilemmatic practice which Aristotle deploys in Metaphysics Beta recalls, at least in its
general outline, the argumentative strategy which operates in the second part of Plato's
Parmenides. Given Aristotle's close engagement with the Eleatics in my previous chapter, in
the present chapter I shall entertain the possibility of an Eleatic heritage to this procedure,
precisely via Plato's later dialogues. Now, although the Parmenides has an indisputably
methodological character, Verity Harte has recently argued that this is not tied to the
dialogue's own use of aporia language.131 On the contrary, Plato makes abundant use of
ἀπορία and its cognates in the middle part of the Sophist, which has already played a crucial
role in the first part of my dissertation. As will turn out at the end of this chapter, the analysis
of Aristotle's aporia on being and the one will enable me to take a further step in the
evaluation of Aristotle's debt towards the Sophist. Specifically, I shall claim that Aristotle not
only inherits Plato's problems but also his very method of going about resolving them. In this
respect, it will be useful to take up Lesley Brown's suggestion that, in the Sophist, Plato uses
aporiai to reach results, thus marking off a philosophical application of them from a
sophistical one.132
130 Aristotle hence seems to think that contrariety is sufficient to give rise to a condition of aporia, but almost
exclusively discusses pairs of contradictory propositions.
131 Harte 2018.
132 Brown 2018.
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2.1.2. The diaporetic method
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle refers back to Beta three times by means of the phrase ἐν τοῖς
διαπορήμασιν.133 This gives us some grounds to define it as a diaporetic treatise. In particular,
unlike other places in the Corpus Aristotelicum, here a whole book is exclusively devoted to
listing and discussing a series of aporiai,134 as we read in the opening lines of the book.
Met., 995a27-30 (trans. Ross 1963)
ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις
προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ
ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον
ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν (…).
For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is
advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the
subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of
the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a
knot of which one does not know (…).
As we saw, the two fundamental meanings conveyed by ἀπορία are that of a lack—be it of
physiological, material or psychological character—and that of being at a loss as to how to
proceed—both with ethical and epistemological implications.135 The same nuances are
conveyed by the verb ἀπορέω. As for the compound form διαπορέω, telling it apart from
ἀπορέω is not as straightforward as it might seem. Διαπορέω can either work as a synonym of
ἀπορέω or it can express a more precise meaning: to examine an aporia, to go through all its
aspects. Accordingly, context plays a fundamental role in establishing whether we are facing
an instance of the former or of the latter meaning.
In the Metaphysics, all the occurrences of ἀπορία we come across can be traced back to its
epistemological sense—hence, the usual rendering into English as ‘difficulty’. In the specific
case of B.1, we find ἀπορέω alongside its derivate forms, which excludes the possibility that
διαπορέω is understood as a synonym of its cognate. Therefore, the triad ἀπορέω, διαπορέω,
εὐπορέω should rather be understood as ‘to raise, develop and solve a difficulty’. As such, it
seems to constitute a set of technical terms which describe how one should proceed in
133 I.2, 1053b10; M.2, 1076b1; M.10, 1086b15.
134 In the APo too the expression ‘ἐν τοῖς διαπορήμασιν’ is used with reference to a previous list and discussion of
puzzles.
135 Pironet 2001, 151–2; cf. Madigan 1999, xix.
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tackling theoretical problems. However, this first impression is not free from interpretative
issues.
The first commentator who described book Beta as διαπορητικόν was Syrianus.136 In the
introductory remarks to his commentary, he points out that the puzzles raised in this treatise
will find no solution before book Gamma, which he in contrast defines as ὑφηγηματικόν
(‘expository’). That said, the first attempts to read the book as complying with a precise
epistemological procedure are found only in much more recent scholarship.137 In order to
check to what extent we can attribute some degree of systematicity to Aristotle's way of
proceeding, I shall take into consideration some relevant passages of his works. In the
following table I list all the occurrences of διαπορέω outside the  Metaphysics which are
accompanied by the adverb πρῶτον.
An. Post. De cael. Eth. Eud. Eth. Nic. De long. Meteo. Phys. Pol.
2.3
90a38
1.9
277b29
4.1
308a5
2.10
1225b18
7.1
1145b4
1
464b22
1.6
342b26
1.13
349a14
4.10
217b30
7.15
1336b26
In all these passages, Aristotle sets out to discuss some theoretical difficulties prior to
undertaking his own investigation. In the Posterior Analytics, a survey of some difficulties
related to definition and demonstration precede (in 2.3-7) Aristotle's positive inquiry into
their relationship (in 2.8). Likewise, in the first occurrence of the De Caelo, the way for his
proof of the uniqueness of the world is paved by the discussion of some difficulties related to
its form and matter and by the distinction of the different ways in which we refer to the word
οὐρανός. Finally, the same also applies to the discussion of choice (προαίρεσις) in the
Eudemian Ethics, to the discussion of comets and the Milky Way first and of winds, rivers and
the sea later in the Meteorologica, and finally to the discussion of time in the Physics.
Although in Physics 4.10 Aristotle emphasises that undertaking this discussion of difficulties
136 Syr., In Met., 1.19-20 (873b2-3). He uses ‘διαπορητικόν’ interchangeably with ‘ἀπορητικόν’, as appears from 54, 5
(865a1-2).
137 Curiously, the family of aporia terms has no systematic translation into Arabic (Bauloye 2001) or into Latin
(Lambert 2001).
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is good (καλῶς ἔχει), this first group of passages displays an order of investigation but
provides no hints as to why this should be our first step.
In contrast, the remaining occurrences constitute a group of greater interest for the sake
of our inquiry, in that they explicitly state why we must start by raising and discussing
aporiai on a given topic. In these cases, διαπορέω is both accompanied by πρῶτον and
connected to an expression of necessity: the verb δεῖ in the Nicomachean Ethics and the
adjective ἀναγκαῖος in the De caelo, in the De longitudine et brevitate vitae and in the Politics.
This last passage is not useful for our purposes and should thus be excluded: Aristotle
promises he will go back to some points of the physical training of young citizens which he
had already mentioned, this time by raising and discussing first of all the question of
whether they should be excluded or not from such training. Hence, the priority of this
question is relative to the local context of utterance, not to the necessity of starting from
some preliminary difficulties.138
The second occurrence of διαπορέω alongside πρῶτον in Aristotle's De Caelo turns out to
be more interesting; in his chapter devoted to the study of weight and lightness, Aristotle
states: ‘Let us then first see what others have said, then state the difficulties whose
recognition is demanded (ἀναγκαῖον) by the subject, and so reach an explanation of our own
view’.139 In this case, two points should draw our attention: (1) the discussion of the
difficulties raised on the subject focuses on problems that it is necessary to investigate; (2)
this discussion ought to follow an overview of previous opinions expressed on the matter.
These two points should be kept distinct, although they constitute two operations which
should both be carried out at the outset of any investigation. As such, they are both described
as preparing the ground for Aristotle's own investigation, which implies that these
operations have a certain degree of complementarity. As for why the discussion of these
difficulties takes place before Aristotle's own, we find but a brief justification: it is required
by the subject itself.
138 ‘Ἀναγκαῖον’, in this context, is not governed by διαπορέω but belongs to the phrase ὅσον ἀναγκαῖον, ‘as far as [it
was] necessary’.
139 DC, 308a4-6: Ἰδόντες οὖν πρῶτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄ•ων εἰρημένα, καὶ διαπορήσαντες ὅσα πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην διελεῖν
ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν (trans. Guthrie 1939).
82
The necessity of diaporetic discussion is also manifest at the beginning of the treatise De
longitudine et brevitate vitae, which belongs to the Parva Naturalia:
De long., 464b19-24  (trans. Hett 1935)
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μακρόβια τῶν
ζῴων τὰ δὲ βραχύβια, καὶ περὶ ζωῆς ὅλως
μήκους καὶ βραχύτητος, ἐπισκεπτέον τὰς
αἰτίας, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἀναγκαία
πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτῶν. οὐ
γάρ ἐστι δῆλον πότερον ἕτερον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ
αἴτιον πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς τοῦ τὰ μὲν
εἶναι μακρόβια τὰ δὲ βραχύβια.
Our task is now to consider the reasons why
some living creatures are long-lived and others
short-lived, and generally to inquire into length and
shortness of life. The necessary starting-point of our
inquiry is the difficulties that arise on the subject.
For it is not clear whether the reason why some
animals and plants are long-lived, and others short-
lived, is the same in all cases or different.
Here too Aristotle emphasises that we must start from some specific difficulties that we
encounter at the very outset of our inquiry. The necessity of this procedure is justified by the
observation that the cause of different life spans in animals and plants might be either the
same in all cases or different in different cases. Such a passage seems to be compatible with
an idea that was only sketched in the De Caelo passage and which—as we shall see—is also
maintained in Beta. The difficulty which our thought encounters in dealing with a given
matter reflects a difficulty that is found in the matter itself.
But the most telling passage with regard to Aristotle's method of investigation is no doubt
his discussion of incontinence in Nicomachean Ethics 7.
NE, 1145b2-7 (trans. Rackham 1962, slightly modified)
δεῖ δ’, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄ•ων,
τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον
διαπορήσαντας ο ὕ τω δ ε ι κ ν ύ ν α ι
μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ
ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα
καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ
δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ
ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.
Our proper course with this subject as with others will
be to present the various views about it, and then, after
first reviewing the difficulties they involve, finally to
explain if possible all or, if not all, the greater part and the
most important of the opinions generally held with
respect to these states of mind; since if the discrepancies
can be solved, and a residuum of current opinion left
standing, the true view will have been sufficiently
established.
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This passage has famously been at the centre of debates with respect to the role of
dialectic in Aristotle's philosophy.140 Here too a discussion of previous opinions on the
subject-matter is to be followed by an analysis of the difficulties which they raise. What is
particularly relevant for our purposes is the explanation that Aristotle provides as to how this
survey of previous opinions contributes to his investigation—here as well as in other
contexts: it is necessary because it will lead us to a satisfactory demonstration. Specifically,
the opinions concerning a given object need to be winnowed so that only those which are
trustworthy may be preserved. On this interpretation, I am reading τὰ φαινόμενα and τὰ
ἔνδοξα as both referring to common views expressed on a given topic but characterising them
in a different fashion. Although these two words can in principle be synonymous, Aristotle
here is clearly restricting the domain of his inquiry from the broad group of all the views (or
most of them) to those opinions upon which we can rely. This procedure seems to go in the
same direction as the passage of the Eudemian Ethics which was taken into account in 2.1.1
and might give us some hints as to the general aim of Metaphysics Beta too.
However, the most important passage which parallels the beginning of the book of
aporiai is a quotation not listed above:
DA, 403b20-25 (trans. Hett 1935)
Ἐπισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγ-
καῖον ἅμα, διαποροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐ-
πορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προ-
τέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι
περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν
καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ
καλῶς, τοῦτ’ εὐλαβηθῶμεν.
ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ
μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ’ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ
φύσιν.
For our study of soul it is necessary, while
formulating the problems of which in our further
advance we are to find the solutions, to call into
council the views of those of our predecessors who
have declared any opinion on this subject, in order
that we may profit by whatever is sound in their
suggestions and avoid their errors.
The starting-point of our inquiry is an exposition
of those characteristics which have chiefly been held
to belong to soul in its very nature.
As in the previous passages, we find here too a clear statement of what the beginning of
the inquiry ought to be. Furthermore, the vocabulary used is very close to that of B.1: here too
140 Here I limit myself to mentioning Owen 1961 and Nussbaum 1982.
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it is necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) to call in for advice the views of our predecessors in order to make
further headway in the investigation of the soul. What this passage also mentions is the
reason this survey of opinions turns out to be useful: comparison with previous views will
provide both some negative and some positive help. More importantly, in this passage the
two approaches are combined: Aristotle states that he should analyse his predecessors' views
and at the same time formulate some difficulties related to the study of the soul. While
bearing these parallel passages in mind it is now time to re-visit the opening lines of Beta.
2.1.3. Aporiai from A to B
What Aristotle is doing at the beginning of Metaphysics Beta is taking into consideration
the difficulties that need to be addressed at the very outset of his inquiry, which include both
previous views on the subject matter and theoretical difficulties that need to be borne in
mind.
Met., 995a24-30 (trans. Ross 1963)
Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην
ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον περὶ
ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν
ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄ•ως ὑπειλήφασί
τινες, κἂν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει
παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι
βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι
καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν
πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ’
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν.
We must, with a view to the science which we are
seeking, first recount the subjects that should be first
discussed. These include both the other opinions that
some have held on the first principles, and any point
besides these that happens to have been overlooked.
For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is
advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the
subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of
the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a
knot of which one does not know.
The tight connection between this passage and the final lines of book Alpha Meizon has
not escaped scholarly attention. However, no common agreement has been reached as to
how precisely the two treatises are supposed to interact.141 Hence, I shall conclude the first
141 Laks 2009, 28–34.
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half of this chapter by showing that Metaphysics Beta carries out the programme which is
announced at the end of Metaphysics Alpha Meizon.
The connection between these two treatises is explicitly stated at the end of the analysis
of the opinions of Aristotle's predecessors on the causes and principles of being:
Met., 993a24-7 (trans. Ross 1924)
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δεδήλωται καὶ
πρότερον· ὅσα δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων
ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν·
τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν εὐπορήσαιμέν τι
πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον ἀπορίας.
On these questions our views have also been
expressed before; as for those that one might raise on
these very questions, let us return to them again: for
from them we would probably get some help
towards our later difficulties.
As Laks notes, the vocabulary of these lines is undoubtedly echoed at the beginning of
Beta: besides the terms of the ἀπορία family, we also find the verb ἐπέρχομαι, which indicates
what Aristotle is going to do next. It should be noted, though, that the form that we find in
Alpha is ἐπανέρχομαι, which entails the idea of a repetition: ‘to go back to’. On this basis we
can infer that Aristotle has concluded a first group of puzzles concerning the investigation of
first principles and causes and intends to return to them. However, it is far from clear what
this group of puzzles is supposed to be. Moreover, the final lines of the chapter exacerbate
the overall lack of clarity of the passage, insofar as they mention a further list of difficulties
which is hard to identify.142 In order to shed some light on these lines, we ought to read them
in their context.
A.10 concludes the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics by summing up the conclusions of
his first confrontation with previous philosophers, which he had undertaken in A.3 with
these words: ‘For those who go over their views (ἐπελθοῦσιν), then, it will be of profit to the
present inquiry, for we shall either find another kind of cause, or be more convinced of the
correctness of those which we now maintain (ἐπελθοῦσιν οὖν ἔσται τι προὔργου τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ
142 That the final lines of A refer to B and not to α has been a matter of disagreement. Alexander thinks that they
anticipate α, which in turn will be useful to answer the later difficulties of B (Alex., In Met., 136.12–7; 137.5–9).
Ross, instead, thinks that they anticipate B, which will be useful to answer the later difficulties in the rest of the
work (Ross 1924, I, 211–3). Laks 2009, 28–34 convincingly shows that the passage should be read in connection
with the beginning of B 1. See also Cooper 2012, 351–4.
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νῦν· ἢ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι γένος εὑρήσομεν αἰτίας ἢ ταῖς νῦν λεγομέναις μᾶ•ον πιστεύσομεν, 983b4-6)’.
Here Aristotle declares that surveying—note the use of ἐπέρχομαι—the views that other
thinkers have expressed on the subject of first principles and causes can contribute to his
investigation, by proving the exhaustivity of his list of the four causes. The mention of other
thinkers' principles takes up chapters 3-6; thereafter, Aristotle pauses to look back at his brief
survey: ‘In a concise and summary way we have gone over the views (ἐπεληλύθαμεν) of those
who have spoken about first principles and truth and the way in which they have spoken
(συντόμως μὲν οὖν καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπεληλύθαμεν τίνες τε καὶ πῶς τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες περί τε
τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, Met. A.7, 988a18-20)’—note again the use of ἐπέρχομαι. Finally,
Aristotle introduces his next step in Alpha Meizon, namely evaluating their views:
Met., 988b16-21 (trans. Ross 1963)
—ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς διώρισται περὶ
τῶν αἰτίων καὶ πόσα καὶ ποῖα,
μαρτυρεῖν ἐοίκασιν ἡμῖν καὶ οὗτοι
πάντες, οὐ δυνάμενοι θιγεῖν ἄ•ης
αἰτίας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ζητητέαι αἱ
ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὕτως ἅπασαι ἢ τινὰ τρόπον
τοιοῦτον, δῆλον· πῶς δὲ τούτων ἕκαστος
εἴρηκε καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν,
τὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀπορίας μετὰ τοῦτο
διέλθωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
All these thinkers, then, as they cannot pitch on
another cause, seem to testify that we have determined
rightly both how many and of what sort the causes are.
Besides this it is plain that when the causes are being
looked for, either all four must be sought thus or they
must be sought in one of these four ways. Let us next
discuss the possible difficulties with regard to the way in
which each of these thinkers has spoken, and with
regard to this situation relative to the first principles.
Sure enough, A.8-9 are devoted to a dialectical engagement with the views that Aristotle
had just presented to his readers. Now, when we reach A.10, Aristotle rounds off the analysis
carried out in his treatise by recalling both of the two steps of which it consisted.
The chapter is made up of three relatively distinct segments. Aristotle begins by stating
the conclusion which had been enunciated in A.3 and then complains about the obscurity of
his predecessors:
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Met., 993a11-16 (trans. Ross 1963)
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰς εἰρημένας ἐν τοῖς
φυσικοῖς αἰτίας ζητεῖν ἐοίκασι πάντες, καὶ
τούτων ἐκτὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχοιμεν ἂν εἰπεῖν,
δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων· ἀ•’
ἀμυδρῶς ταύτας, καὶ τρόπον μέν τινα πᾶσαι
πρότερον εἴρηνται τρόπον δέ τινα οὐδαμῶς.
ψε•ιζομένῃ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία
περὶ πάντων, ἅτε νέα τε καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς
οὖσα.
It is evident, then, even from what we have said
before that all men seem to seek the causes named
in the Physics, and that we cannot name any
beyond these; but they seek these vaguely; and
though in a sense they have all been described
before, in a sense they have not been described at
all. For the earliest philosophy is, on all subjects,
like one who lisps, since it is young and in its
beginnings.
What follows in the text is a special mention for Empedocles' confused conception of the
bone (τὸ ὀστοῦν), after which Aristotle reprises the beginning of the chapter with μὲν οὖν, 143
which I now quote in Greek:
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δεδήλωται καὶ πρότερον· ὅσα δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀπορήσειεν
ἄν τις, ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν εὐπορήσαιμέν τι πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον ἀπορίας.
After this rapid overview we are better armed to get to grips with these final lines of A.10.
As can be concluded from the beginning of the chapter, the τούτων at 993a24 must refer to
the causes, like its parallel at 993a12.144 This τούτων is then picked up by the emphatic τῶν
αὐτῶν τούτων at 993a25;145 in fact, the ὅσα-clause refers to any doubts which might arise on
the opinions expressed on the four causes and very plausibly refers to chapters A.8-9. It is to
these aporiai that Aristotle suggests going back again (ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν). Now, up to this
point, all interpreters agree that Aristotle has mentioned a group of aporiai—let us call them
A-aporiai—and is going to produce another one—let us call them B-aporiai. What causes
the confusion is that the referent of the aporiai mentioned at 993a27 is unclear.
Upon closer inspection, the ambiguity of these lines rests on what we take ‘ἐξ αὐτῶν’ at
a26 to stand for. This expression is usually thought to refer to the B-aporiai, namely the
difficulties that Aristotle is about to list. As a result, he would be saying that, once these new
143 For this transitional use of μὲν οὖν in combination with δέ (a25), see Denniston 1966/1934, 472.
144 See Laks 2009, 29–30.
145 The two pronouns can hardly have distinct referents, pace Laks 2009, 30, n. 16.
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aporiai have been discussed, we shall be in a better position to discuss a further group of
aporiai. There are, however, two major problems with this reading: first, it is hard to identify
this third group of difficulties in any of the later treatises that make up our Metaphysics;
second, if the aporiai in question were to be taken as, quite generally, questions that might
arise throughout the work, as Ross proposes, then it would be hard to explain why Aristotle
uses the definite article. My suggestion is that we should refocus the reference of ἐξ αὐτῶν to
what seems to be—grammatically—its antecedent: namely the A-aporiai. The only aporiai
that Aristotle mentions (as it were) ‘in words’ before a26-7 are those regarding previous
opinions on the causes (ὅσα… ἀπορήσειε ἄν τις). Although he does say that he will go back to
them, he does not mention this second round of aporiai, which is only implied as the result
of Aristotle's going back to the A-aporiai. This means that there is no word yet in the text
which stands for the B-aporiai. Consequently, although ‘ἐξ αὐτῶν’ at a26 does pick up ‘ὅσα’ at
a25—as Ross thinks—the ‘ὅσα’ refers to the aporiai already listed in A.8-9, not to the aporiai
yet to be formulated. Therefore, in the final lines of A.10 Aristotle is stating that ‘perhaps
from the difficulties we have already raised we may get some help towards our later
difficulties’. Finally, if my reading is correct, τὰς ὕστερον ἀπορίας (a27) refers to the B-aporiai,
which have full rights to a determinate article, given that they were announced to the reader
previously. This is why I think that A.10, consistent with B.1, mentions two and only two
groups of aporiai. As we shall see, in accordance with the closing lines of Alpha Meizon, at
the beginning of Beta (995a27) Aristotle states that discussing aporiai properly (διαπορῆσαι
καλῶς) will enable us to succeed in solving them (εὐπορῆσαι). It is in this sense that Beta
thoroughly carries out a programme begun in Alpha. Before turning to the eleventh aporia, it
should be noted that the Eleatics do not appear in the aporetic part of Alpha; however, we
shall see in 2.2.4-5 that they will play a pivotal role in Beta's discussion of being and the one.
2.2. The eleventh aporia
In the first part of this chapter I attempted to provide a general description of the method
followed in Metaphysics Beta. After listing reputable views on the first principles and causes
of being, Aristotle deems it necessary to discuss whatever difficulties might be raised for
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these very views.146 I observed that Aristotle's aporiai follow a specific pattern: they are
developed in a dilemmatic form and are intentionally left unsolved. In this part of the
chapter, I set out to analyse what is described by Aristotle himself as the hardest difficulty of
those listed in Beta, as well as the most necessary for knowing the truth: whether unity and
being are the substance of all things or whether they are rather attributes of something else
(aporia 11, 996a5-9). This is the only aporia in whose formulation Aristotle explicitly
associates both conflicting views with the names of some previous philosophers: Plato and
the Pythagoreans on the one hand and Empedocles and the physicists on the other.
Consequently, it has been suggested that, in discussing this aporia, Aristotle gives clear
indications in favour of the anti-Platonic horn of the dilemma, thus failing to conform to the
neutral pattern of the remaining aporiai.147 In this section I shall argue for the opposite view:
I shall claim that aporia 11 epitomises Aristotle's dialectical confrontation with previous
views on principles and first causes. In so doing, I shall try to define the background of an
Academic debate about unity and being. While the connection between aporia 11 and Plato's
dialogues has not gone unnoticed,148 the specific terms of this connection deserve to be
explored in greater detail. In fact, once we lay out the specific way in which Aristotle engages
in a dialogue with (in particular) Plato, we will be in a better position to appreciate the
novelty and philosophical significance of Aristotle's own investigation. As will emerge, not
only the arguments, but also the very method which Aristotle follows in discussing aporia 11
depends on Plato's Sophist. This will bring me to conclude that, if we want to understand
Aristotle's account of unity and being, the first text we should read is Plato's Sophist. This
confirms the importance of that dialogue for Aristotle's presentation of questions of unity
and being, something that has already emerged in my discussion of Metaphysics A and
Physics 1.
I shall begin by suggesting an explanation of the unique nature of this aporia, which is
both particularly difficult and openly polemical towards Aristotle's predecessors. I shall then
move on to analyse its discussion in B.4 by focusing first on the background of the
contradictory pair of views with which it deals and then on the arguments against each of
146 See Laks 2009, 34–5.
147 Berti 2003, 109.
148 Madigan 1999, 109; Castelli 2010, 40–4.
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the alternatives. The result of this analysis will shed light on the aim of Aristotle's reference
to his predecessors when developing the aporia. I shall show that the kind of argument
Aristotle puts forward is one that attacks other philosophers within their own positions. At
the same time, I shall emphasise that, within this interpretation of the overall argument of
aporia 11, Plato is Aristotle's main interlocutor. Finally, this reading will enable me to make
clear once again the crucial role played by the Eleatics—who had been side-lined in the
doxography of Book Alpha Meizon—within Aristotle's discussion of the relationship
between unity and being. (It is no accident that Zeno is also invoked in this aporia, at
1001b7ff.) I shall conclude that Aristotle's strategy, in discussing the theories of his
predecessors, is specifically aimed at testing the foundations of previous metaphysical
positions with a view to providing a new and solid basis for his own theory.
2.2.1. The formulation of the eleventh aporia
In Metaphysics B.1, Aristotle introduces the following difficulty:149
Met., 996a4-9 (trans. Ross 1963)
ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον καὶ
πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, (A) πότερον τὸ
ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ
Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἀ•’
οὐσία τῶν ὄντων; (B) ἢ οὔ, ἀ•’ ἕτερόν τι
τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
φησὶ φιλίαν ἄ•ος δέ τις πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ
ἢ ἀέρα.
Furthermore, <we should ask> the hardest of all
questions and the one containing the greatest
difficulty: (A) whether unity and being—as the
Pythagoreans and Plato used to say—are nothing else
but the substance of beings or (B) whether they are
not, but there is something else that underlies them—
as Empedocles says it is friendship, somebody else that
it is fire, others water or air.
As is clear from the formulation of the aporia, alternative responses are offered; there are
two possible views on unity and being and their relationship to the substance or ‘being’
(ousia) of things: A and its opposite B, which implies the contradictory of A—an opposition
which is in line with the general structure of these aporiai that we outlined in the first part of
149 Aporia 11 is analysed in Cherniss 1944, 324–6; Lowe 1977; Madigan 1999, 107–18; Bell 2000; Berti 2003; Cavini
2009; Halper 2009, 261–2; Castelli 2010, 37–48, 61–6; Castelli 2018a, 94–5 and Menn in progress, Iβ3-4.
91
this chapter. On the one hand, unity and being can be regarded as the substance of things; on
the other, they are not substances, but rather the attributes of something else which
underlies them. Two aspects of this choice are worth noting: first, Aristotle emphasises that
we are facing the hardest of all difficulties; second, this is the only aporia in which both of
the contradictory theses at stake are explicitly labelled with the names of some other
philosophers. In what follows I shall reflect on these two elements and on their possible
connection.
In his reprise of the difficulties in B.4, Aristotle describes both the eighth and the eleventh
aporia as the most difficult to face (1001a4-5). In neither case does he clarify why they seem
to have a special place within the list of aporiai, nor their relationship to one another.
However, it is only aporia 11 which had been announced as the hardest in its first formulation
in B.1.
The eighth aporia addresses the question of whether there is some other cause besides
matter, whether it is separate or not, as well as whether it is one or more in number. When
commenting on this problem, Alexander underlines that it is extremely hard to solve with a
view to the knowledge of principles and in general to the whole work (πραγματεία) itself. As
for the perplexity it entails, Alexander seems to suggest that it stems from the two previous
difficulties that Aristotle had taken into consideration, which also had to do with the status
of universals and particulars. As we shall see, aporia 11 also deals with similar questions,
although it adopts a different angle. This might provide us with a first explanation of the
high level of difficulty which both aporiai bear.
Commentators—ancient much more than modern—have dwelled at greater length on
the difficulty of aporia 11.150 In particular, Alexander and Aquinas come up with two different
—but not incompatible—explanations of its specific difficulty. According to the Greek
commentator, what is very hard is the judgment (διάκρισις) about the topic of this aporia,
150 Among modern commentators, Bonitz 1848–1849, 162 thinks that this aporia is the hardest difficulty because
unity and being are the most universal of all notions as well as the furthest away from perception; Cavini 2009,
175–6 seems to link both the difficulty and the necessity of aporia 11 to the fact that it marks a breaking point in
Greek metaphysics, reduced to the exhaustive alternative between the opposite positions of the physicists and
the Pythagoreans.
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because ‘knowledge of intelligibles and of the primary causes and beings is most difficult’.151
Similarly, Averroes seems to suggest that this aporia (hāḏihi al-masʾalatu) is puzzling and
very ambiguous (muʿḍilatun mubhamatun ǧiddan) because the doubt (al-šakku) it amounts
to has to do with the prime mover (fī l-muḥarriki l-awwali).152 Finally, Aquinas' suggestion is
rather that the arguments against and in favour of the thesis at stake are both compelling
(propter efficaciam rationum ad utramque partem).153 These explanations bring to the fore
two important aspects of Aristotle's discussion, namely the difficulty of the object of inquiry
on the one hand and the force of the reasons pro et contra the thesis on the other. We shall
have occasion to reflect on both of these characteristics throughout the analysis of Aristotle's
discussion in B.4.
Unlike aporia 8, aporia 11 is also described as the most necessary for knowing the truth
(πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι τἀληθές). This point, too, is commented upon by both Alexander (followed by
Asclepius) and Aquinas. The former provides four different reasons in support of the
necessity of this inquiry (ζήτησις): (1) because thinkers have expressed themselves in both
ways, some holding one of the alternatives at stake, some holding the other; (2) because of
the aporiai that will follow—supposedly, in Aristotle's list; (3) because the inquiry into being
is of the highest importance in the investigation of truth; (4) because the possibility of
positing numbers as the principles and elements of all beings depends on the resolution of
this issue. Aquinas, in somewhat more general terms, subscribes to (3) and (4), as he claims
that this aporia is the most necessary, because our judgement concerning the substance of
all things is going to depend on it.154
Although, in this case too, the reasons adduced are not mutually exclusive, the first of
those mentioned by Alexander seems particularly appealing. As we have already noted, in
aporia 11 Aristotle explicitly connects the two branches of the contradiction to other
philosophers. This is not to say that he does not deal with other thinkers throughout his
151 Alex., In Met., 223.20.
152 Averr., Tafsīr 1, 182.10–12.
153 Thom., In Met., §488, 266
154 Thom., In Met., §488, 266 ‘Quia ex hoc dependet iudicium de substantiis rerum’. In this statement, Aquinas might
be influenced by Averroes, see above.
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discussion of other aporiai.155 But in no other case does Aristotle explicitly assign both the
thesis and its antithesis to some named predecessors. As a result, aporia 11 is not only the
hardest and the most necessary of all aporiai, but also—as it were—the most doxographic.
Accordingly, Alexander's point (1) looks appealing insofar as it picks up on a characteristic
which is unique to aporia 11.156
Aristotle devotes the second half of B.4 to discussing aporia 11. He begins by restating
what the difficulty amounts to—with some interesting variations.
Met., 1001a4-9 (trans. Ross 1963)
Πάντων δὲ καὶ θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτα-
τον καὶ πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι τἀληθὲς ἀναγ-
καιότατον πότερόν ποτε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν
οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐ-
τῶν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὂν τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ δὲ ὄν
ἐστιν, ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ
ἓν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄ•ης φύσεως. οἱ μὲν
γὰρ ἐκείνως οἱ δ’ οὕτως οἴονται τὴν φύσιν
ἔχειν.
The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the
most necessary for knowledge of the truth is whether
being and unity are the substances of things, and each
of them, without being anything else, is unity and
being, or whether we must inquire what being and
unity are, as if there were some other underlying
nature. For some people think they are of the former,
others think they are of the latter character.
If we compare this formulation with that which we had encountered in B.1, it should
surprise us that here Aristotle uses the plural form of οὐσία, as if implying that being and
unity should be posited as two distinct substances of all things. To be sure, the difference
between positing unity and being as two distinct substances and regarding them as one and
the same substance would be of no little relevance. Part of Aristotle's refutation of this
branch of the contradiction will depend precisely on the absurdity of considering being as
signifying exclusively being, when we also want to define it as one. However, upon closer
inspection, this reading does not force us to take being and unity as two distinct substances.
As is clear from 996a5-7, on Aristotle's interpretation, Plato and the Pythagoreans claimed
155 Aristotle mentions Protagoras at 998a3-4, Empedocles at 998a30 and at 1000a25, Hesiod at 1000a9.
156 On this reading, the γάρ at 1001a8 would be explanatory. Bonitz 1848–1849, 162 also attributes the importance of
this aporia—though not specifically its difficulty—to the fact that it divides Greek metaphysics into two
opposite positions; for the same reason, Cavini 2009, 176 underlines the ‘historical’ importance of the aporia.
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that the substance of all things is a being which is also one (collective sense), not that being
and unity are the two substances of all things (distributive sense). What they did not
understand is precisely that their assumptions result in contradiction: it is impossible that
the one-being is both exclusively one and exclusively being, because each attribution rules
out any other attribution whatsoever. In other words, starting from their assumptions on
being and unity, they confused the collective and the distributive senses in which their thesis
could be formulated. Since they failed to notice the problem built into their starting
assumption, they tacitly endorsed the second formulation of aporia 11, although consciously
subscribing to its first formulation. Aristotle's use of the plural at 1001a6 might therefore
reflect the Platonic-Pythagorean confusion in using the predicates ‘one’ and ‘being’.157
Concerning the overall argument of aporia 11, it should be noted that as yet no
interpretation has offered a unified reading of the two horns of the dilemma, that is, a
reading which reconciles the alternative sketched by the aporia with the general pattern
promised in B.1.158 I shall try to show how such a reading is not only possible but indeed
fundamental for our understanding of Aristotle's position with respect to unity and being. In
particular, my reading will attribute a crucial role to the way in which the dilemma which
constitutes the aporia turns out to be specifically aimed at tackling Plato's account of τὸ ἕν
and τὸ ὄν.
2.2.2. Plato and the Pythagoreans vs. the Physicists
After spelling out what the thesis and the antithesis in question are, Aristotle relates who
held the former and who supported the latter view about unity and being:
157 This reading suggests a solution to Madigan's perplexity about Aristotle's oscillation between singular and
plural expressions to designate respectively one or two substances with the predicates ‘one’ and ‘being’, see
Madigan 1999, 108–9.
158 In particular, Madigan 1999 divides the whole discussion into eight distinct issues and analyses them separately;
Berti 2003 exclusively focuses on the polemic against Plato and the Pythagoreans, connecting aporia 11 with the
rejection of being and the one as genera within the discussion of aporia 6; Cavini 2009 analyses the two
branches of the aporia separately but does not dwell on how they interact with one another; Castelli 2010
provides a detailed study of the problems explicitly and implicitly at stake, but mainly focuses on the
arguments against the Platonic-Pythagorean option.
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Met., 1001a9-19 (trans. Ross 1963)
Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐχ
ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἀ•ὰ τοῦτο αὐτῶν
τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ
τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι· οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὡς εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀνάγων
λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν ἐστιν· δόξειε γὰρ ἂν λέγειν
τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία γοῦν ἐστὶν
αὕτη τοῦ ἓν εἶναι πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ’
ἀέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ
τὰ ὄντα εἶναί τε καὶ γεγονέναι. ὣς δ’ αὔτως
καὶ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι· ἀνάγκη
γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ
ὂν ὅσας περ ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν.
Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being and
unity were nothing else, but this was their nature,
their essence being unity and being. But the natural
philosophers take a different line; e.g. Empedocles
—as though reducing it to something more familiar
—says what unity is; for he would seem to say it is
love: at least, this is for all things the cause of their
being one. Others say this unity and being, of which
things consist and have been made, is fire, and
others say it is air. A similar view is expressed by
those who make the elements more than one; for
these also must say that unity and being are
precisely all the things which they say are
principles.
The text at 1001a11-12 has created a number of problems for editors of the Metaphysics and
is probably corrupt. The manuscripts offer two different readings which share what seems to
be a grammatical blunder in the phrase introduced by ὡς. In all of them but A b, the scribes
transmit ‘ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας ταὐτὸ τὸ ἓν εἶναι καὶ ὄν τι (lit. ‘as if the [i.e. its] substance were
the same being one thing and a being’)’; in Ab we find instead ‘ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τὸ ἓν
εἶναι καὶ ὄν τι (lit. ‘as if the substance of it were being one thing and a being’)’. These readings
seem to display a defective genitive absolute, because we would expect the elements
following οὐσίας to be in the genitive too. That said, commentators are of only little help.
When Alexander quotes this lemma in his commentary, he writes ‘ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτὸ τὸ
ἓν εἶναι καὶ ὄν τι (‘as if their essence were being the one itself and a being’)’. 159 For his part,
Asclepius provides two different readings of the same phrase: he first quotes it as ‘ὡς οὔσης
τῆς οὐσίας ταὐτοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι <καὶ> ὄντι (‘as if their essence were the same thing as being one
159 Curiously enough, none of the ancient commentators seems to notice anything weird in the text they would
read, let alone Alexander—who is always meticulous in commenting on Aristotle's language. I think it is
possible to understand the subject of the genitive absolute as consisting in εἶναι (taken as a subject) and (τ)αὐτὸ
τὸ ἕν… καὶ ὄν τι as the nominal elements which complete it (in other words, ‘being the one itself and some
being’). On the infinitive used without article (here, in the genitive), see Kühner & Gerth 1898, II, 3, §472.
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<and> being’)’160 and, later on, as ‘ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι (‘as if their
essence were this very being one and a being’)’. 161 Finally, the Arabic translation seems to
support the proposed emendation; whereas the Latin translation probably read by Aquinas
seems to support the reading of the manuscripts.162
Despite the textual problem, the thesis in question is fairly clear: on Aristotle's view, the
Pythagoreans and Plato posited one principle which is at once being itself and unity itself.
Walter Cavini has recently argued against this view on the grounds that saying that the
essence of unity is to be one and that the essence of being is to be are two tautologies.163 In
contrast, he suggests we should follow Aquinas' interpretation, whereby the οὐσία Aristotle is
referring to is the substance of all things, as opposed to the essence of unity and being. Upon
closer inspection, though, what Aristotle contrasts here are two different ways of defining
unity and being, rather than the substance of all things. Of course, the two matters are
complementary, because the two divergent definitions of the substance of all things depend
on two divergent assumptions. However, in line with the traditional interpretation of these
lines, I think that Aristotle is focusing precisely on these assumptions, rather than on their
consequence. More importantly, the view attributed to the Pythagoreans and to Plato is
contrasted with that of Empedocles and the physicists, who ascribe unity to something else
that is more familiar (γνωριμώτερον). The second term of this opposition suggests that the
alternative view is indeed tautological, in that it does not reduce unity and being to anything
else, but instead declares that their essence is precisely their being one and being. Finally, the
determinate article in our phrase (‘τῆς οὐσίας’ as opposed to ‘οὐσίας’ alone) forces the reader
to take the essence (or substance) to refer to something which has just been mentioned and
not to substance (or essence) more generally. For these reasons, I think that Aristotle's
160 Ascl., In Met., 203.24–5.
161 Ascl., In Met., 204.6.In this case, τοῦτο αὐτό can be understood as an emphatic version of αὐτὸ τοῦτο, which is
indeclinable.
162 The Arabic translator (Usṭāṯ) writes: ‘ka-anna ǧawharahumā an yakūnā wāḥidan wa-huwiyyan (‘as if their
substance is to be one and being’; Averr., Tafsīr 1, 261.3–4)’; the Latin translator (William of Moerbeke): ‘quasi
existente substantia ipsum unum esse et ens aliquid (‘as if substance were being the one itself and some being’;
Thom., In Met., 488: §267.13–4)’.
163 Cavini 2009, 177.
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formulation aims to capture the specific view which separates Plato and the Pythagoreans
from the rest of Aristotle's predecessors.
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Metaphysics Alpha Meizon is not the only
place in the Corpus Aristotelicum to devote a great deal of attention to previous philosophers.
However, what Alpha Meizon tries to do is to offer an exhaustive overview of previous
theories, so as to ascertain that the causes of being are four and no more than four. In this
section, I should like to show how aporia 11 too encompasses all previous theories of being—
which will have important implications for its characterisation as the hardest and the most
necessary of all aporiai. Specifically, I shall argue that the question of the substantiality of
unity and being divides philosophy before Aristotle into two distinct groups.164 The way I am
going to show this is by placing side-by-side some general Aristotelian remarks on previous
theories of being. With respect to my overall argument, this will be the first step towards
Aristotle's demonstration that all previous accounts of unity and being fall short of their
explicandum.
In Physics 1.2, Aristotle outlines a survey of previous theories concerning principles. This
brief summary distinguishes monists from pluralists, and sharply divides two further
categories within these groups. In particular, the Eleatics are distinguished from the
physicists in view of their extreme form of monism. On the other hand, under the umbrella
of pluralists, those positing a finite number of principles are set apart from those positing an
infinite plurality. Now, when Aristotle discusses infinity in Physics 3, he divides his
predecessors into two further groups, suggesting a division which matches that of aporia 11:
Phys., 203a4-10, a16-18 (trans. Hardie & Gaye 1984)
οἱ μέν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ
Πλάτων, καθ’ αὑτό, οὐχ ὡς συμβεβη-
κός τινι ἑτέρῳ ἀ•’ οὐσίαν αὐτὸ ὂν τὸ
ἄπειρον. πλὴν οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι ἐν
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς (οὐ γὰρ χωριστὸν
ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἀριθμόν), καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἔξω
Some, such as the Pythagoreans and Plato, make the
infinite a principle in the sense of a self-subsistent
substance, and not as a mere attribute of some other
thing. Only the Pythagoreans place the infinite among
the objects of sense (they do not regard number as
separable from these) and assert that what is outside the
164 This reading follows the line of interpretation initiated by Alexander and adopted by Bonitz and, more recently,
by Cavini.
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τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἄπειρον, Πλάτων δὲ ἔξω
μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι σῶμα, οὐδὲ τὰς ἰδέας,
διὰ τὸ μηδὲ ποὺ εἶναι αὐτάς, τὸ μέντοι
ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν
ἐκείναις εἶναι.
οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως πάντες [ἀεὶ]
ὑποτιθέασιν ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν τῷ
ἀπείρῳ τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων, οἷον
ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων.
heaven is infinite. Plato, on the other hand, holds that
there is no body outside (the Forms are not outside,
because they are nowhere), yet that the infinite is present
not only in the objects of sense but in the Forms also. (…)
The physicists, on the other hand, all of them, always
regard the infinite as an attribute of a substance which is
different from it and belongs to the class of the so-called
elements—water or air or what is intermediate between
them.
Aristotle groups together the Pythagoreans and Plato and contrasts them with the φυσικοί,
insofar as the former regard the infinite as a substance, while the latter consider it an
attribute of substance. Since both the criterion of the division and the groups of thinkers in
which it consists are the same, Aristotle seems to draw a line which demarcates the two
trends of philosophy before him. However, this division does not coincide with that which
we had encountered at the very beginning of Physics 1, where the main criterion was the
number of principles posited in order to account for the physical world. In this case, he
seems to take a further step forward: he spots the two radically different basic conceptions of
predication which underlie different philosophical stances on the subject of causal
principles. This move stands out from the following passage of the Metaphysics, where
Aristotle marks off the territory of Pythagorean philosophy on the grounds that they are the
first thinkers to work out a pluralist theory:
Met., 987a9-19 (trans. Ross 1963)
μέχρι μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰταλικῶν καὶ χωρὶς
ἐκείνων μοναχώτερον εἰρήκασιν οἱ ἄ•οι
περὶ αὐτῶν, πλὴν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν δυοῖν τε
αἰτίαιν τυγχάνουσι κεχρημένοι, καὶ τούτων
τὴν ἑτέραν οἱ μὲν μίαν οἱ δὲ δύο ποιοῦσι, τὴν
ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις· οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι δύο μὲν
Down to the Italian school, then, and separate
from it, philosophers have treated these subjects
rather monistically165 except that, as we said, they
have in fact used two kinds of cause, and one of
these—the source of movement—some treat as
one and others as two. But the Pythagoreans have
165 On this word, see section 1.5.
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τὰς ἀρχὰς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν εἰρήκασι τρόπον,
τοσοῦτον δὲ προσεπέθεσαν ὃ καὶ ἴδιόν ἐστιν
αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον
[καὶ τὸ ἓν] οὐχ ἑτέρας τινὰς ᾠήθησαν εἶναι
φύσεις, οἷον πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον,
ἀ•’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν οὐσίαν
εἶναι τούτων ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, διὸ καὶ
ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν πάντων.
said in the same way that there are two principles,
but added this much, which is peculiar to them,
that they thought that finitude and infinity were
not attributes of certain other things, e.g. of fire or
earth or anything else of this kind, but that infinity
itself and unity itself were the substance of the
things of which they are predicated. This is why
number was the substance of all things.
As in the Physics, here too Aristotle affirms not only that their principles are unity and
infinity, but also that they are treated as substances and not as attributes of anything else.
More importantly, considering unity as a substance is the very doctrinal point which the
Pythagoreans have in common with Plato's philosophy, as is witnessed by A.6:
Met., 987a29-31, b29-988a1 (trans. Ross 1963)
Μετὰ δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας φιλοσοφίας ἡ
Πλάτωνος ἐπεγένετο πραγματεία, τὰ μὲν
πο•ὰ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦσα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια
παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἔχουσα φιλο-
σοφίαν. (…)
τὸ μέντοι γε ἓν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ
ἕτερόν γέ τι ὂν λέγεσθαι ἕν, παραπλησίως
τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἔλεγε, καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθ-
μοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄ•οις τῆς οὐσίας
ὡσαύτως ἐκείνοις· τὸ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς
ἑνὸς δυάδα ποιῆσαι, τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον ἐκ
μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τοῦτ’ ἴδιον· καὶ ἔτι ὁ
μὲν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δ’
ἀριθμοὺς εἶναί φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ
τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων οὐ τιθέασιν.
After the systems we have named came the
philosophy of Plato, which in most respects
followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that
distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians.
(…)
But he agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying
that the one is substance and not a predicate of
something else; and in saying that the numbers are
the causes of the reality of other things he agreed
with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the
infinite out of great and small, instead of treating
the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his
view that the numbers exist apart from sensible
things, while they say that the things themselves are
numbers, and do not place the objects of
mathematics between Forms and sensible things.
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In this passage Aristotle focuses on both the affinities and the divergences between Plato's
and the Pythagoreans' respective theories. On the one hand, it completes Aristotle's
reconstruction of what will become one line of thought in aporia 11: the Pythagoreans (first)
and Plato (later) held that unity and being are not attributes of something else, but
substances themselves. On the other hand, Plato also detached himself from the
Pythagoreans in that he considered numbers to be separate from things and insofar as he
also posited the dyad as a principle alongside the one. The two elements which represent
Plato's innovations with respect to the Pythagoreans will prove to be crucial in Aristotle's
discussion of aporia 11, because he will tackle both points. For the sake of clarity, I shall
hence distinguish between unity as a principle of being in general and, more specifically,
unity as the principle of number. Before embarking upon this theoretical line, however,
Aristotle will criticise the opposite view. It is in the next paragraph that we shall witness an
interesting twist in Aristotle's argument, for, while criticising the physicists, Aristotle in fact
has his master Plato in mind.
2.2.3. Against the physicists (contra the antithesis)
As we saw in our last section, Aristotle divides previous philosophical approaches to this
matter into two distinct groups: monists and pluralists. On the other hand, he also divides his
predecessors according to whether they view unity as a substance or as an attribute of
something else which is itself a substance (whatever this might be in their individual
theories). In the first part of his discussion of aporia 11, he focuses on one of the pluralists, i.e.
Empedocles.
Before the formulation of our aporia, Empedocles is mentioned 9 times (in Book Alpha
Meizon). When Aristotle introduces his philosophy, he lists him among the φυσικοί, not
without emphasising how he differs from most of them. Talking about the idea of a single
principle's priority over others, he writes:
Met., 984a8-11 (trans. Ross 1963)
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ τέτταρα, πρὸς τοῖς
εἰρημένοις γῆν προστιθεὶς τέταρτον (ταῦ-
Empedocles says it of the four elements (adding a
fourth—earth—to those which have been named);
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τα γὰρ ἀεὶ διαμένειν καὶ οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀ•’
ἢ πλήθει καὶ ὀλιγότητι, συγκρινόμενα καὶ
διακρινόμενα εἰς ἕν τε καὶ ἐξ ἑνός).
for these, he says, always remain and do not come to
be, except that they come to be more or fewer, being
aggregated into one and segregated out of one.
In this first description of Empedocles' philosophy, Aristotle hence emphasises that
Empedocles shared the basic assumption that some principles are prior to others. In so
doing, the physicists were taking these simple bodies to be the subjects of these changes,
because Empedocles' four bodies—precisely like water, air or fire for previous thinkers—
undergo change from one state to another, while not staying the same. Accordingly, in the
passage quoted, Empedocles seems to account for unity as an aggregation of the four
elements—thus exemplifying a conception of unity as an attribute of some substrate. But, if
Empedocles propounded a theory very similar to that of the other physicists, why does
Aristotle mention him in particular as the main supporter of the antithesis of aporia 11 in B.1?
I shall suggest two complementary explanations, which can account for Empedocles' role in
Aristotle's version of the history of philosophy and for his role in the development of the
aporia we are analysing.
Aristotle's attitude towards Empedocles appears to be twofold: on the one hand, he
blames Empedocles for the lack of clarity in the way in which he expresses himself; on the
other, he regards Empedocles as the first philosopher to have had some important insights
which he will embrace, too.
Met., 985a21-28, a29-b2 (trans. Ross 1963)
καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐπὶ πλέον μὲν τούτου
χρῆται τοῖς αἰτίοις, οὐ μὴν οὔθ’ ἱκανῶς, οὔτ’ ἐν
τούτοις εὑρίσκει τὸ ὁμολογούμενον. πο•αχοῦ
γοῦν αὐτῷ ἡ μὲν φιλία διακρίνει τὸ δὲ νεῖκος
συγκρίνει. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διίστη-
ται τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, τότε τὸ πῦρ εἰς ἓν
συγκρίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄ•ων στοιχείων ἕκαστον·
ὅταν δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας συνίωσιν εἰς τὸ
ἕν, ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ἑκάστου τὰ μόρια δια-
κρίνεσθαι πάλιν.
And Empedocles, though he uses the causes
to a greater extent than this, neither does so
sufficiently nor attains consistency in their use.
At least, in many cases he makes love segregate
things, and strife aggregate them. For whenever
the universe is dissolved into its elements by
strife, fire is aggregated into one, and so is each of
the other elements; but whenever again under
the influence of love they come together into
one, the parts must again be segregated out of
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—Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοὺς πρό-
τερον πρῶτος τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν διελεῖν εἰσήνεγκεν,
οὐ μίαν ποιήσας τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἀ•’
ἑτέρας τε καὶ ἐναντίας, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης
εἴδει λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν
(οὐ μὴν χρῆταί γε τέτταρσιν ἀ•’ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι
μόνοις, πυρὶ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς δ’ ἀντικειμένοις
ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, γῇ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι· λάβοι δ’
ἄν τις αὐτὸ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν).
each element.
Empedocles, then, in contrast with his
predecessors, was the first to introduce the
dividing of this cause, not positing one source of
movement, but different and contrary sources.
Again, he was the first to speak of four material
elements; yet he does not use four but treats
them as two only; he treats fire by itself, and its
opposites—earth, air, and water—as one kind of
thing. We may learn this by study of his verses.
In the first half of this passage, Aristotle laments Empedocles' sloppy use of both what
Aristotle will call the efficient and the material cause; however, the Sicilian thinker has the
merit of working with two contrary sources of movement, as well as four distinct material
elements.166 Finally, despite his critical remarks on the distribution of roles to φιλία and
νεῖκος,167 Aristotle not only considers Empedocles' theory to be one that takes into account
different principles which act on something else; he also acknowledges that—although in a
confused way—Empedocles tried to specify a cause of unity through the action of love. If we
also think that Aristotle will embrace the Empedoclean alternative of the aporia, there are
good reasons to believe that Empedocles has a primary role in Aristotle's history of first
philosophy. This could explain why Aristotle labels the antithesis of aporia 11 as
Empedoclean.
166 Aristotle credits Empedocles with the discovery of the four elements at A.4, 985a31-3.
167 The relation of earth, air, water and fire with Friendship and Strife emerges in particular from DK 31 B 17.1-35.
However, the interpretation of this fragment is highly controversial, as well as the distribution of roles of the
two principles. Scholars disagree on whether the twofold cosmic cycle Empedocles mentions is to be
understood as describing two distinct cosmogonies—respectively under the dominant influence of Love and of
Strife (O’Brien 1969; Wright 1981)—or whether it is rather intended as a single cosmogony—displaying
fluctuations of Love and Strife within the progress from the domination by Strife to that by Love (Bollack 1965–
1969; Solmsen 1965; Long 1974). The recent discovery of the Strasburg Papyrus (Martin & Primavesi 1999) does
not seem to provide decisive evidence in favour of either view; Primavesi himself, Inwood 2001 and Trépanier
2003 support the former interpretation, which is questioned by Curd 2001, Laks 2001 and Balaudé 2010.
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My second suggestion for why Empedocles is the name Aristotle picks out at 1001a12
requires a somewhat longer route. As was said above, the complementary aspect of
Aristotle's engagement with Empedocles in Alpha Meizon is represented by his reservations
about the latter's use of ἀρχαί. The confusion regarding the task that each principle is
supposed to carry out is all-pervasive, as is also clear from the criticisms Aristotle addresses
to Empedocles in A.8. The fundamental objections which Aristotle expresses against the
monists are the following: (1) they do not explain incorporeal entities (988b24–26); (2) they
abolish the cause of movement (988b26–28); (3) they fail to assign a causal function to
substance (988b28–29); (4) they neglect the incompatibility of the two opposite hierarchies
of simple bodies which can be deduced from elementary change, i.e. according to the
minimal or to the maximal degree of combination (988b29–989a18).168 Of these objections
some apply to all the physicists and to Empedocles too, while some are raised only against
him.169
The specific criticisms Aristotle levels at Empedocles refer to his account of the four
simple roots, and in particular the causes of their changing and moving. On Aristotle's
interpretation, Empedocles (1) fails to clarify how each of the elements works as a
substratum when it changes into another element (989a22–24), (2) implausibly posits two
moving causes instead of one (989a25–26) and (3) eliminates the possibility of change from
a quality to its opposite (989a27–30).170 As far as the material cause is concerned, Empedocles
provides an unsound account of the role of the four elements. As for the efficient cause,
Aristotle reproaches him for having posited two distinct principles which work in a
confusing way. Against this background, in the discussion of aporia 11 we would expect to
find a criticism of Empedocles' account of unity along the same lines. What we are faced
with instead is a rather different series of objections:
Met., 1001a19-29 (trans. Ross 1963)
(B) συμβαίνει δέ, εἰ μέν τις μὴ θήσεται
εἶναί τινα οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, μηδὲ τῶν
(B) If we do not suppose unity and being to be
substances, it follows that none of the other
168 On these points see Menn 2012, 210–4.
169 As Primavesi 2012b, 230 reports: (1) and (3) according to Bonitz's 1848, Ross' 1924 and Reale's 1968 editions, with
whom he agrees; (3) and (4) according to Aquinas, In Met., ad loc.
170 Primavesi 2012b, 229.
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ἄ•ων εἶναι τῶν καθόλου μηθέν (ταῦτα
γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων, εἰ δὲ
μὴ ἔστι τι ἓν αὐτὸ μηδ’ αὐτὸ ὄν, σχολῇ τῶν
γε ἄ•ων τι ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα καθ’
ἕκαστα), ἔτι δὲ (B.b) μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς
οὐσίας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ὡς
κεχωρισμένη τις φύσις τῶν ὄντων (ὁ μὲν
γὰρ ἀριθμὸς μονάδες, ἡ δὲ μονὰς ὅπερ ἕν τί
ἐστιν)· (A) εἰ δ’ ἔστι τι αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ ὄν,
ἀναγκαῖον οὐσίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ
ὄν· οὐ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται
ἀ•ὰ ταῦτα αὐτά.
universals is a substance; for these are most universal
of all, and if there is no unity-itself or being-itself,
there will scarcely be in any other case anything apart
from what are called the individuals. Further, (B.b) if
unity is not a substance, evidently number also will
not exist as an entity separate from the individual
things; for number is units, and the unit is precisely a
certain kind of one. But (A) if there is a unity-itself
and a being-itself, unity and being must be their
substance; for it is not something else that is
predicated universally of the things that are and are
one, but just unity and being.
In this first section of the discussion, Aristotle provides three arguments against the thesis
that unity and being are not substances.171 The first is shown a fortiori: (B) if the most general
of all things are not substances, then no other universal is a substance. On top of that (B.b), if
unity is not a substance, then number—which stems from unity—cannot be some nature
distinct from other entities, for number in this sense is ‘units’ and each of these is just a unit,
a one. Although Aristotle does not explicitly consider case (B.a), i.e. ‘if being is not a
substance’, it seems to be implied in the argument against Plato's position. Accordingly, the
passage above could be summarised as follows:
(B) being and unity are not
substances
/ [(B.a) being is not a substance]
aporia 11
/ \ (B.b) unity is not a substance
\
(A) being and unity are
substances
171 I agree with Cavini 2009, 182–3 in taking the third argument in the series to belong to this branch of Aristotle's
refutation. I also think that it introduces the branch of the dilemma which is going to be discussed next in B.4.
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What is striking about these first two arguments is that they do not seem to go in the
same direction as the objections to Empedocles mentioned above, even if this branch of the
aporia is supposed to argue against his position. More importantly, although argument (B)
might still constitute a genuine problem for Aristotle at this stage of his investigation, this is
surely not true for (B.b), because Aristotle has clearly expressed his aversion to separate
numbers in Alpha Meizon. Finally, (B.b) would also be unproblematic for the Pythagoreans,
according to Aristotle's reconstruction of their thought. The only thinker for whom both
objections hit the mark is Plato. Since Aristotle would not endorse any of the premises which
led Plato to these absurdities, Berti has suggested that, in this aporia, Aristotle takes a clear
stance against his master, thus contravening the general pattern of book Beta.172 Analogously,
on Cherniss’ reading of the argument, Aristotle’s explicit reference to the Sophist testifies the
mala fide intention of his ad hominem attack.173
An alternative explanation can be given: one which emphasises that this series of
arguments is meant to be dialectical and which retains as its focus the observation that the
problems Aristotle identifies here are problems for Platonism. We should keep in mind that
the focus of aporia 11 is the affirmation or negation of the substantiality of unity and being.
But, if that is the case, then the arguments pro et contra are supposed to address the
Pythagorean-Platonic tenet that being and unity are substances: arguing contra this tenet
will result in a list of reasons pro its antithesis, while arguing contra its antithesis will amount
to arguing pro the Platonic tenet. In other words, although Aristotle labels the antithesis with
Empedocles' name, he takes his philosophy merely as exemplifying the negation of Plato's
position. This becomes clear if we compare this branch of Aristotle's aporia 11 with Plato's
engagement with Empedoclean philosophy in the Sophist. This comparison will show that
Aristotle inherits from Plato his basic objection to the very substantiality of unity and being,
but in aporia 11 Aristotle takes this Platonic inheritance and turns it against Platonism itself.
More importantly, I suggest that Aristotle inherits from Plato's Sophist the very method for
engaging with previous accounts. The crucial relation of aporia 11 to Plato's rejection of
previous theories of being in the Sophist has received only little attention in the
172 Berti 2003, 109.
173 Cherniss 1944, 324–5.
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scholarship.174 Besides having important consequences for Aristotle's confrontation with his
predecessors, the comparison also explains the sequence of the two horns of the dilemma:
Aristotle first argues with Plato that Empedocles' views are not acceptable but then reveals
that there are equally strong reasons to reject the Platonic view that was elaborated in
contrast to this Empedoclean account. In what follows I shall defend this reconstruction of
Aristotle's dilemma.
At Sophist 242e, the Stranger from Elea mentions Empedocles in his narrative of previous
theories concerning being. Crucially, after mentioning various ancient cosmogonies, he sets
out a clear division between the Eleatics—who held that all things are one—and Ionian and
Sicilian thinkers—who instead combined the one and the many into a unified account:
Soph., 242c8-243a2 (trans. Fowler 1977)
ΞΕ. Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι
διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς
τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀ•ήλοις ἐνίοτε
αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα
γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν
ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών,
ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν,
συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρ’
ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε
καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος
τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται
τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες
ὕστερον Μοῦσαι συνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέ-
κειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς
τὸ ὂν πο•ά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ
φιλίᾳ συνέχεται. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ
Str. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as
if we were children. One says there are three
principles, that some of them are sometimes waging
a sort of war with each other, and sometimes
become friends and marry and have children and
bring them up; and another says there are two, wet
and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together
and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our
region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier,
has their story that all things, as they are called, are
really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian
Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the
two tales and to say that being is many and one, and
is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship.
For the more strenuous Muses say it is always
simultaneously coming together and separating; but
174 A step in this direction is made by Castelli 2010, 40–4, who emphasises how aporia 11 seems to be connected to
an ongoing debate within Plato's Academy, as witnessed by—among other dialogues—the Sophist, the
Parmenides, the Theaetetus and the Euthydemus. I shall devote the final section of this chapter to spelling out
the terms of this relation.
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συμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν
Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ
ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ
τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναί φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ’
Ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πο•ὰ καὶ πολέμιον
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ διὰ νεῖκός τι.
the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the
doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is
sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of
Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance
with itself by reason of some sort of strife.
In this narrative, an important position is reserved for ‘the more strenuous’ of the Muses
but also for ‘gentler ones’, who thought that being was sometimes held together and
sometimes divided by the combined action of strife and love (or Aphrodite). If, as it seems,
the Eleatic Stranger is referring to Empedocles in the latter case, then the Sicilian thinker had
a prominent role also in the Eleatic Stranger's brief history of philosophy, as the advocate of
a form of pluralism which reconciles the one and the many. This would already represent a
good reason to believe that Aristotle singles out Empedocles because he was—as Plato
already acknowledged—the foremost advocate of a specific way of treating unity, namely
regarding love as a cause of unity. But, in emphasising Empedocles' role in his attack on
Plato's view on unity and being, Aristotle seems to have taken a further step forward. As will
become clear from the following passage, the Eleatic Stranger's approach is reflected in
Aristotle's aporetic tactics not only in its division of previous philosophy into two strands,
but also in the Stranger's arguments against these earlier forms of pluralism.
Soph., 243d8-244a3 (trans. Fowler 1977)
ΞΕ. “Φέρε, ὁπόσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν
ἤ τινε δύο τοιούτω τὰ πάντ’ εἶναί φατε, τί
ποτε ἄρα τοῦτ’ ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν φθέÕεσθε,
λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ
εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; (α)
πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ
τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀ•ὰ μὴ δύο ἔτι καθ’ ὑμᾶς
τιθῶμεν; (β.α) οὐ γάρ που τοῖν γε δυοῖν
καλοῦντες θάτερον ὂν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως
εἶναι λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως
Str. Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or
any two such principles are the universe, what is this
that you attribute to both of them when you say that
both are and each is? What are we to understand by
this “being” (or “are”) of yours? (α) Is this a third
principle besides those two others, and shall we
suppose that the universe is three, and not two any
longer, according to your doctrine? (β.α) For surely
when you call one only of the two “being” you do not
mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases
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ἕν, ἀ•’ οὐ δύο εἴτην.”
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΞΕ. “Ἀ•’ ἆρά γε (β.β) τὰ ἄμφω
βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν;”
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.
ΞΕ. “Ἀ•’, ὦ φίλοι,” φήσομεν, “κἂν
οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτ’ ἂν σαφέστατα ἕν.”
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα εἴρηκας.
they would pretty certainly be one and not two.
Theaet. True.
Str. Well, then, do you wish (β.β) to call both of
them together being?
Theaet. Perhaps.
Str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you
would very clearly be saying that the two are one.
Theaet. You are perfectly right.
As is clear from this passage, the Stranger forces his imaginary interlocutors into a
dilemma whose horns are equally unacceptable. His argument engages with a pluralism
which posits two opposite elements as principles of all things. (α) If such pluralists attribute
being to these two principles, they would need to include being too as a principle alongside
the two which they explicitly posit. However, to do so would transform their dualism into a
‘triadism’. (β) To avoid this embarrassment, we could imagine that they would not posit
being as an additional principle on a par with the hot and the cold. This alternative offers
two possibilities. (β.α) They might decide to attribute being to one of their principles only;
yet, in this case, only that one principle would be a being—whether it is the hot or the cold
—while the other would be something other than being, and therefore not be at all. (β.β) As
an alternative, these pluralists might want to attribute being to the combination of both;
however, this would reduce their two principles to one thing, namely being, and not two. The
way the argument runs is summarised in the following outline:
/
α) being is a third
principle
hot and cold
are
/
β.α) either hot or cold is
being
/ β.α') hot is being
\
β) being is not a third
principle
\ β.α'') cold is being
\ β.β) hot and cold are (one)
being
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As it appears, this argument is designed to force pluralists either to accept being as an
additional item in their ontologies or to give up their theories because the alternative is to
collapse into a monism that—as we saw in section 1.3—the Stranger will also show to be
unacceptable. Here, positing being as an item in one's ontology amounts to considering it to
be a separate principle. In fact, on the one hand, alternative α is an option that pluralists may
accept at the cost of regarding ‘being’ as a genuine, distinct principle. They would still be
pluralists but would need to include an additional principle, i.e. being, in their doctrines. If
they instead prefer to regard being as a principle different from the hot and the cold, then
the Stranger shows how the one principle they would have to regard as separate is indeed
being (not the hot, the cold or both taken together). Accordingly, what the Eleatic Stranger
reproaches pluralists for is their refusal to posit being as a substance. Given that the
alternative which will be considered in the dialogue is, as we discussed earlier in chapter 1.3, a
certain form of monism—whereby being coincides with the one—it seems fair to assume
that the Eleatic Stranger would push pluralists to posit a being-itself and a unity-itself. This
argument sounds very close to Aristotle's first objection to the Empedoclean thesis: if being
is not a substance, what will be?
From the Sophist, therefore, we can see a certain powerful dialectical argument that can
be levelled against these earlier ontologies, Empedocles' philosophy included. The lesson the
Stranger wants to draw is that any ontology whatsoever must somehow include being as a
fundamental item. We should remember this when we look back at Aristotle because once
again we see his use of a stretch of argument from the Sophist to generate difficulties for an
Empedoclean view of unity and being. But this time, as we shall see, he will also use it to
embarrass the Platonists because, having shown the problems with Empedocles, he will then
use the same tactics to show that the alternative possibility of aporia 11 also generates
unacceptable consequences.
2.2.4. Against the Pythagoras-Plato line (contra the thesis)
In the previous section of this chapter, I suggested that Aristotle's rejection of the first
branch of aporia 11 is inspired by Plato's dialectical argument against earlier pluralist natural
philosophies in the Sophist. In this section I aim to show that this inspiration is also true of
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the alternative branch of the aporia, which is aimed at the Pythagoreans and Plato himself.
So here Aristotle is turning Plato's clever argument against its inventor. When Aristotle, in
Alpha Meizon, summarises the theories of the Pythagoreans, he devotes particular attention
to their account of unity. Since the universe, in their doctrines, is composed of numbers, and
since unity is the principle which produces them, their description of unity amounts to a
definition of it as a principle of number.
Met., 986a15-21 (trans. Ross 1963)
φαίνονται δὴ καὶ οὗτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν
νομίζοντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ ὡς ὕλην τοῖς
οὖσι καὶ ὡς πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις, τοῦ δὲ
ἀριθμοῦ στοιχεῖα τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ
περιττόν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πεπερασμένον
τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον, τὸ δ’ ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι
τούτων (καὶ γὰρ ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν),
τὸν δ’ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ἀριθμοὺς δέ,
καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν.
Evidently, then, these thinkers also consider that
number is the principle both as matter for things and
as forming both their modifications and their
permanent states, and hold that the elements of
number are the even and the odd, and that of these
the latter is limited, and the former unlimited; and
that the one proceeds from both of these (for it is
both even and odd), and number from the one; and
that the whole heaven, as has been said, is numbers.
Another point on which Aristotle focuses is the Pythagoreans' way of dealing with οὐσία.
At 987a19-27 he observes that the kind of predication the Pythagoreans had in mind when
dealing with substances is fairly naïve. As we shall see in chapter 3, predication will play a
key role in determining how we should deal with unity and being according to Aristotle. That
said, the absurdities mentioned in aporia 11 do not seem to follow that line, but rather consist
in problems internal to the Pythagorean-Platonic perspective. What I mean is that aporia 11
derives absurd consequences from premises which are not Aristotle's own, but those adopted
by the supporters of the thesis that unity and being are the substance of all things. In this
respect, of course, it continues the familiar tactic of dialectical engagement and refutation
we have seen elsewhere in Aristotle's preliminary discussions and have traced back to the
Sophist. Aristotle's argument against the Platonic stance on unity and being runs as follows:
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Met., 1001a29-b1 (trans. Ross 1963)
—ἀ•ὰ μὴν (A) εἴ γ’ ἔσται τι αὐτὸ ὂν
καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν, πο•ὴ ἀπορία πῶς ἔσται τι
παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ πῶς ἔσται
πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ ὄντα. (A.a) τὸ γὰρ ἕτερον
τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸν
Παρμενίδου συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη λόγον ἓν
ἅπαντα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ
ὄν.
But (A) if there is to be a being-itself and a unity-
itself, there is much difficulty in seeing how there will
be anything else besides these—I mean, how things
will be more than one in number. (A.a) For what is
different from being does not exist, so that it
necessarily follows, according to the argument of
Parmenides, that all things that are are one and this is
being.
The absurdity which stems from the Pythagorean-Platonic position is the negation of
plurality. Crucially, Aristotle claims that this thesis would commit its supporters to
embracing Parmenides' argument. This implies that, on Aristotle's view, Plato commits the
very same error which in the Sophist the Eleatic Stranger accuses Parmenides of making.
There is a pleasing irony, in that case, in Aristotle's use of arguments from Plato's own pen—
arguments which we have seen Aristotle also use against the Eleatics—against Plato's own
position. In fact, on the one hand, if being is that which is exclusively one, plurality cannot
come about. On the other hand, since being must exclusively signify being and nothing else,
unity cannot be included among the things that are. Thus, the Pythagorean-Platonic branch
o f aporia 11 ultimately collapses into unacceptable Eleatic monism, indeed into a monism
which the supporters of this position themselves are on record as finding unacceptable. And
we have also noted that the supporters of this branch cannot take refuge in the alternative
position in the aporia since that has also been shown to have consequences, particularly for
the possibility of universals and a certain account of numbers, which they will find
unacceptable. This is confirmed by Aristotle's summary of his refutation, where the two sides
of the impasse come to the fore.
Met., 1001b1-6 (trans. Ross 1963)
ἀμφοτέρως δὲ δύσκολον· ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ
ᾖ τὸ ἓν οὐσία ἄν τε ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀδύνατον
τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν μὴ
ᾖ, εἴρηται πρότερον δι’ ὅ (= B.b)· ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ,
There are objections to both views. For whether
unity is not a substance or there is a unity-itself,
number cannot be a substance. We have already said
why this result follows if unity is not a substance (=
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ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος (≈ A.a).
(A.b) ἐκ τίνος γὰρ παρὰ τὸ ἓν ἔσται αὐτὸ
ἄ•ο ἕν; ἀνάγκη γὰρ μὴ ἓν εἶναι· ἅπαντα
δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ ἓν ἢ πο•ὰ ὧν ἓν ἕκαστον.
B.b); and if it is, the same difficulty arises as arose
with regard to being (≈ A.a). (A.b) For whence is there
to be another one besides unity-itself? It must be not-
one; but all things are either one or many, and of the
many each is one.
(B) being and unity are not
substances
/ (B.a) being is not a substance
aporia 11
/ \ (B.b) unity is not a substance
\
(A) being and unity are
substances
/ (A.a) being is a substance
\ (A.b) unity is a substance
The way in which this passage confirms the idea that we are facing a replica of Plato's
argument against Parmenidean monism is that it replays the dilemma into which Plato leads
Parmenides' λόγος in the Sophist. In the first chapter of this thesis I argued that Aristotle's
rejection of Parmenides in the Physics is reminiscent of Plato's counterpart in the Sophist.
What has become clear in this chapter is that, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle not only borrows
Plato's arguments against pluralism too; he also turns Plato's arguments against their own
inventor. Whether or not we regard unity as a substance, we cannot pursue the Pythagorean-
Platonic way of dealing with numbers, for they cannot be substances. It might strike us that
Aristotle simply makes Parmenides turn on Plato, but I suggest that here Aristotle deftly
applies his tactic of internal dialectic—a tactic he inherits from Plato—to the Platonic
position. As such, Aristotle builds on the work of his master and incorporates Plato's
doctrine into his critical examination of previous theories of being and the one. The missing
premise in this reconstruction is that Aristotle believed that Plato shared the basic
assumption of Parmenides' philosophy, namely that being is one. This is asserted quite
explicitly in Metaphysics N.2, where he blames his master for formulating problems in an
old-fashioned manner:
113
Met., 1089a1-6 (trans. Ross 1963)
—πο•ὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια τῆς ἐπὶ
ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτροπῆς, μάλιστα δὲ
τὸ ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς. ἔδοξε γὰρ αὐτοῖς
πάντ’ ἔσεσθαι ἓν τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν, εἰ
μή τις λύσει καὶ ὁμόσε βαδιεῖται τῷ
Παρμενίδου λόγῳ “οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο
δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,” ἀ•’ ἀνάγκη εἶναι
τὸ μὴ ὂν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστιν· οὕτω γάρ, ἐκ
τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἄ•ου τινός, τὰ ὄντα
ἔσεσθαι, εἰ πο•ά ἐστιν.
There are many causes which led them off into
these explanations, and especially the fact that they
framed the difficulty in an obsolete form. For they
thought that all things that are would be one (viz. Being
itself), if one did not join issue with and refute the
saying of Parmenides: ‘For never will this be proved,
that things that are not are.’ They thought it necessary
to prove that that which is not is; for only thus—of that
which is and something else—could the things that are
be composed, if they are many.
This passage is important for two reasons. First, it shows that, in Aristotle's mind, Plato
and his followers tried to overcome the absurd consequences of Parmenides' monism by
explaining away not being, or rather showing that not being is. What they should have
realised is that not being, as well as being, is said in many ways; what they do, on the
contrary, is to hold that position in order to avoid Parmenides' monism. As a result, it is
particularly embarrassing for Plato to be caught either having to embrace Empedocles' view
—when he himself is on record as arguing that it either does away with being or collapses
into monism—or allying with the Pythagoreans—whose position is equally likely to collapse
under his own attacks. In the economy of my overall argument, this shows how Aristotle
finds the Platonic solution unsatisfactory: despite his attempts, Plato does not manage to go
beyond Parmenides and is even vulnerable to the very same objections he himself had set
out against Parmenides. Second, since Aristotle in N.2 quotes the fragment also commented
upon in Plato's Sophist, these lines also testify that the Sophist plays a key role when it comes
to deciding on the relationship between unity and being. This passage will also cast light on
the final steps of Aristotle's discussion of aporia 11.
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2.2.5. The Eleatic danger
After repeating that there are objections to both the alternative views introduced in the
aporia, Aristotle argues against the tenet that unity itself is indivisible. At this point he
makes use of an argument borrowed from Zeno of Elea.
Met., 1001b6-19 (trans. Ross 1963, slightly modified)
ἔτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, κατὰ μὲν
τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη (ὃ γὰρ
μήτε προστιθέμενον μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον
ποιεῖ μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὔ φησιν εἶναι
τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, ὡς δηλονότι ὄντος
μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος· καὶ εἰ μέγεθος,
σωματικόν· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντῃ ὄν· τὰ δὲ ἄ•α
πὼς μὲν προστιθέμενα ποιήσει μεῖζον, πὼς
δ’ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐπίπεδον καὶ γραμμή, στιγμὴ
δὲ καὶ μονὰς οὐδαμῶς)· ἀ•’ ἐπειδὴ οὗτος
θεωρεῖ φορτικῶς, καὶ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
ἀδιαίρετόν τι ὥστε [καὶ οὕτως] καὶ πρὸς
ἐκεῖνόν τιν’ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν (μεῖζον μὲν
γὰρ οὐ ποιήσει πλεῖον δὲ προστιθέμενον τὸ
τοιοῦτον)· —ἀ•ὰ πῶς δὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου
ἢ πλειόνων τοιούτων ἔσται μέγεθος; ὅμοιον
γὰρ καὶ τὴν γραμμὴν ἐκ στιγμῶν εἶναι
φάσκειν.
Further, if unity-itself is indivisible, according to
Zeno's postulate it will be nothing. For that which
neither when added makes a thing larger nor when
subtracted makes it smaller, he asserts to have no
being, evidently assuming that whatever has being is
a spatial magnitude. And if it is a magnitude, it is
corporeal; for the corporeal has being in every
dimension, while the other objects, e.g. a plane or a
line, added in one way will increase what they are
added to, but in another way will not do so, and a
point or a unity does so in no way. But, since his
theory is of a low order, an indivisible thing can also
exist in such a way as to have a defence even against
him (for the indivisible when added will make the
number, though not the size, greater)—yet how can
a magnitude proceed from one such indivisible or
from many? It is like saying that the line is made out
of points.
This refutation also seems to be addressed to the Pythagorean-Platonic thesis. However,
nowhere before this passage had Aristotle attributed the view that unity itself is indivisible
to either the Pythagoreans or Plato. If we, on the contrary, accept the premise that by this
point Aristotle is treating Plato as if he were an Eleatic thinker or, at least, as if his position
had been shown as liable to collapse into an Eleatic position, it should not surprise us that he
depicts him as a supporter of a Parmenidean tenet. In what follows I shall take my reading of
aporia 11 a step further: I shall try to show how Aristotle's mention of Zeno serves the
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purpose of strengthening his destructive dilemma. I shall suggest that Zeno is mentioned not
only as a prominent exponent of destructive dialectic, but also—and especially—as one of
Parmenides' foremost defenders.175 The use of Zeno as a source for a further difficulty is
another twist of the knife and a further embarrassment to this position. To this end I shall
focus on two related questions: (1) Is Aristotle endorsing a Zenonian principle for the sake of
his refutation? (2) Did Aristotle view Zeno as a faithful defender of Parmenides' doctrine? (3)
Why use—and label it by name—a Zenonian argument here?
The first question arises from Aristotle's use of a Zenonian principle within his rejection
of the indivisibility of unity itself.176 Aristotle assumes this principle as the starting point of
his objection only after restricting its validity. Therefore, it seems that he does not endorse
Zeno's postulate as such, but that he does accept a corrected version of it. In order to clarify
this matter and to evaluate its relevance for my overall argument, I shall now try to
distinguish Zeno's principle from its Aristotelian version.
In our passage, Zeno's formulation seems to be the following: (Z1) ‘That which neither
when added makes a thing larger nor when subtracted makes it smaller, has no being.’ 177
Aristotle attributes to Zeno a premise which he probably derives from the postulate itself:
Zeno assumed that whatever has being is a spatial magnitude.178 Now, Aristotle remarks that,
because of this assumption, Zeno ends up restricting the validity of his principle to the case
of three-dimensional bodies. But there are beings, such as points, that have no magnitude;
when such things are added to something, they can indeed increase it in number (or make it
175 Although this interpretation of Zeno's relation to Parmenides is the dominant trend in both ancient and
modern scholarship, two alternative interpretations have been suggested. According to the pseudo-Plutarchan
Miscellanies and, in our times, to Barnes 1979 and Palmer 2009, Zeno was rather a critic free of all ideological
commitments. Finally, Seneca and, among modern scholars, Cordero 1988 present Zeno as a propounder of
nihilism. See Sedley 2017, 4.
176 Sedley 2017, 23 observes that ἀξίωμα here should be translated as ‘principle’ rather than ‘axiom’, in that, unlike
the latter, the former might or might not indicate a non-derivative starting-point.
177 For a fuller account of Zeno's argument within the smaller/larger paradox, see Rapp 2006, 178–9, McKirahan
1994, 183–5 and Sedley 2017, 11.
178 Aristotle probably intended the pair of opposites μεῖζον/ἔλαττον as designating a difference merely in size
(rather than, say, in number). Whether Zeno subscribed to a similar thesis is controversial but does not affect
my point, because, as we shall see, in Aristotle's view, Zeno regarded being as being spoken of in only one way.
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‘more’ in a different respect). In other words, a point is not nothing, even if, when added to
something, it does not make that something any larger. In advancing these observations,
Aristotle seems to imply that he would endorse a qualified version of the Zenonian
postulate: (A1) ‘That which neither when added makes a thing larger nor when subtracted
makes it smaller, has no spatial magnitude’. At the same time, he would also endorse the
following more general principle: (A2) ‘That which neither when added makes a thing
greater in any respect nor when subtracted makes it less in any respect, has no being (or: is
nothing).’179 But is Aristotle's correction sufficient to suppose that he is endorsing the
Zenonian principle? I think that some evidence that this is indeed the case comes from a
passage of the Metaphysics which plays a crucial role in Aristotle's treatment of unity and
being. In Γ.2 he provides some arguments in favour of the thesis usually referred to as the
convertibility of unity and being.180
For ‘one man’ and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘man that is’ and ‘man’, and
the doubling of the words in ‘one man and one man that is’ does not express anything
different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in
ceasing to be); and similarly ‘one man that is’ adds nothing to ‘man that is’, so that it is
obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing
apart from being (…). (Met., 1003b26-32; trans. Ross 1963)
In this passage Aristotle states that ‘one’ and ‘being’ are predicates that do not add
anything to that of which they are predicated. Hence, the following expressions mean one
and the same thing:
(i) ἄνθρωπος
(ii) εἷς ἄνθρωπος
(iii) ὢν ἄνθρωπος
179 I have modified Ross' translation of lines 1001b13-14, relying on Alexander's understanding of the clause. I think
that we do not need to understand ἐπειδή here as having the rare meaning of ‘although’, but I place more
emphasis on the following καί, which, I take it, does not introduce a parallel causal clause but rather modifies
ἐνδέχεται, with the implication that the ἐπειδή-clause justifies the idea that we may still use Zeno's argument.
180 Convertibility is studied by, among others, Loux 1973, Halper 1985, Morrison 1993 and Pakaluk 1993. I postpone a
detailed discussion of this passage to chapter 3.
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(iv) εἷς ὢν ἄνθρωπος
Aristotle's claim is thus that unity and being are neutral additions to ‘man’ (we might call
this principle ‘principle of neutrality’). In order to show this, he distinguishes two cases: he
compares (ii) and (iii) first with (i) and then with (iv). The former pair of examples is the
direct application of respectively ‘one’ and ‘being’ to ‘man’:
1. ‘One man’ is the same as ‘man’;
2. ‘Man that is’ is the same as ‘man’.
The second pair of examples represents the case where, even by doubling the predicates,
we do not modify the reference of our initial item:
3. ‘One man’ is the same as ‘one man that is’;
4. ‘Man that is’ is the same as ‘one man that is’.
This means that, even if we predicate both unity and being of a human being, we do not
describe him or her any better. Hence Aristotle's conclusion: ‘one’ and ‘being’ are neutral
additions. From this claim, at 1003b30-31 Aristotle draws the further conclusion that unity is
—at least somehow—the same as being: ‘it is therefore clear that, in these cases, the
addition designates the same thing, and that unity is nothing else than being (ὥστε φανερὸν
ὅτι ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐν τούτοις ταὐτὸ δηλοῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ ἓν παρὰ τὸ ὄν)’.
As Castelli shows, this principle of neutrality is an application of a topos on identity
which Aristotle enunciates in Topics 7.1.181 ‘One’ and ‘being’ are one and the same thing
because, according to the topos ‘from addition and subtraction’, if you add them to (or
subtract them from) x, you get the same result y:
Furthermore, you must note the result of an addition and see whether each added to
the same thing fails to produce the same whole; or whether the subtraction of the same
thing from each leaves the remainder different. Suppose, for example, someone has
stated that a ‘double of a half ’ and a ‘multiple of a half ’ are the same thing; then, if ‘of a
half ’ has been subtracted from each, the remainders ought to signify the same thing,
which they do not; for ‘double’ and ‘multiple’ do not signify the same thing. (Top.,
156b10-17; trans. Tredennick & Forster 1960)
181 Castelli 2010, 54.
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This rule is meant to be useful in cases where we need to verify whether two given items
are the same or are different. Now, when he applies this topos to ‘one’ and ‘being’ in Γ.2,
Aristotle not only shows that they are the same because they have the same effect when
added or subtracted, but he also makes the further claim that their addition and subtraction
are a nil-addition and a nil-subtraction: if you add ‘one’ or ‘being’ to x, the y that you get
coincides with x. This is compatible with two possible explanations: either unity and being
are nothing or each and every thing is already one and being. In the former case, the reason
behind neutrality is their complete lack of referents; in the latter, redundancy. Accordingly,
Aristotle's test seems to show one of the following: (A2') ‘That word which neither when
added to another word makes its referent greater in any respect nor when subtracted makes
it smaller in any respect, has no referent’ or (A2'') ‘That word which neither when added to
another word makes its referent greater in any respect nor when subtracted makes it smaller
in any respect, has no definite referent’. Either way, Aristotle makes use of a test based on
addition and subtraction which, despite some differences, is at least inspired by that devised
by Zeno.
But if Aristotle endorsed at least a qualified version of the Zenonian principle from
addition, why does he mention Zeno by name only in B.4 and not in Γ.2 (or I.2)? I am less
interested in why he does not mention him in Gamma than in why he does mention him in
Beta. In fact, neither place would seem to require an explicit mention by name: in Gamma,
Aristotle is solving a part of the aporiai of Beta, thus suggesting his own solutions; in Beta, he
is indeed dealing with the views of other philosophers, but he can exploit the Zenonian
principle only after adding some qualification. So why bother?
If my reconstruction of Aristotle's general argument in B.4 is correct, it should have
become clear that Aristotle's strategy, in dealing with that difficulty, is to refute Plato from
within Plato's own position. Now, the other aporiai of Metaphysics Beta are not marked by
the naming of participants in the discussion; this suggests that their mention in aporia 11
must matter to the force of the argument. Moreover, concerning this Zenonian principle, we
can note that something like it does appear in the Topics without Aristotle feeling the need
to label its Zenonian ancestry. As I showed above, Aristotle thinks that Plato embraced the
Parmenidean thesis that there is only one being. Once we accept this, Aristotle's turning
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Zeno against Plato proves to be a strategic move quite in line with his general tactics in this
argument. This is true, if Aristotle also regarded Zeno as a supporter of Parmenidean
monism.182
As Sedley remarks, the fact that Aristotle viewed Zeno as a defender of Parmenides'
doctrine emerges clearly from two passages of the Sophistical Refutations. In chapter 10,
Aristotle points out that an argument is used against the thought (and not the word) when it
is applied to the reference which the interlocutor had in mind when he or she made a
concession to his or her questioner. This means that if on the contrary the questioner fails to
pick the same reference of a given word as the one his or her interlocutor was thinking
about, his or her argument will instead be directed against the word:
SE, 170b19-26 (trans. Forster 1955)
εἰ δή τινες πλείω σημαίνοντος τοῦ
ὀνόματος οἴοιντο ἓν σημαίνειν—καὶ ὁ ἐρω-
τῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος (οἷον ἴσως τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ
ἓν πο•ὰ σημαίνει, ἀ•ὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος
καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν [Ζήνων] ἓν οἰόμενοι εἶναι εἰρή-
κασι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἓν πάντα), <ἆρ’>
οὗτος πρὸς τοὔνομα ἔσται ἢ πρὸς τὴν διά-
νοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος; εἰ δέ γέ
τις πο•ὰ οἴεται σημαίνειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς
τὴν διάνοιαν.
If, then, when the word has more than one
meaning, both the questioner and the man
questioned were to think that it had only one
meaning—as, for example, ‘unity’ and ‘being’ have
several meanings but both the answerer answers
and the questioner, Zeno, puts his question on the
supposition that there is only one meaning and
that the argument is that all things are one—the
argument will have been directed against the word
and not rather against the thought of the man
questioned.
Although the mention of Zeno is usually considered to be a later gloss, this passage seems
very much in line with the evidence provided by what Aristotle affirms later on.183 In chapter
33, he makes the point that some fallacies are harder to spot than others, even when dealing
with one and the same ambiguity. The case of fallacies due to homonymy exemplifies this
statement. At times, the equivocation is obvious and can give rise to humorous dialogues, for
182 This has been questioned, in particular, by Palmer 2009; however, Plato explains Zeno's aims at the beginning
of the Parmenides precisely in these terms.
183 See Sedley 2017, 10, who accepts ‘Ζήνων’ in the text on these grounds.
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example: ‘Which of the two cows will calve before (ἔμπροσθεν)?’ ‘Neither, but both from
behind (ὄπισθεν).’ Sometimes, though, it escapes even the notice of the most expert eye:
SE, 182b22-7 (trans. Forster 1955)
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι μάχονται
πο•άκις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον πότερον
ταὐτὸ σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ
ἕν, ἢ ἕτερον· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταὐτὸ ση-
μαίνειν τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος
λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ
πο•αχῶς φάναι τὸ ἓν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν.
A proof of this is that people often dispute about
the terms used, for example, whether ‘being’ and
‘unity’ always mean the same thing or some different
thing; for some people hold that ‘being’ and ‘unity’
are identical in meaning, while others solve the
argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying that
‘unity’ and ‘being’ are used in several senses.
In this passage, Aristotle clearly considers Zeno to be a supporter of the same thesis
propounded by Parmenides and thinks that the same moves will work in diagnosing their
shared error. Moreover, at the end of Physics 1.3 Aristotle states that some thinkers gave in to
two arguments in support of Pamenidean monism, one of which is ‘that from dichotomy’ (τῷ
ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας)—which sounds like a label for a famous Zenonian paradox. 184 As a result, I
suggest that Aristotle mentions Zeno precisely because he was Parmenides' most prominent
defender.185 Since Aristotle has shown that Plato's view on unity and being collapses into
Parmenidean monism, turning Zeno against Plato means pointing to the internal
incoherence of Plato's own position. So the explicit reference to Zeno heaps further
embarrassment on Plato: now that Plato's position has collapsed into the kind of monism
which Plato himself rejected, it is shown that this position is itself subject to difficulties
raised by someone whom Plato recognised as one of its own defenders.
Aporia 11 ends with an appendix which tackles an exclusively Platonic theory, i.e. the
derivation of numbers from the one and the dyad.
Met., 1001b19-25 (trans. Ross 1963)
ἀ•ὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ τις οὕτως ὑπολαμβά-
νει ὥστε γενέσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες,
But even if one supposes the case to be such that,
as some say, number proceeds from unity-itself and
184 Charlton 1970, 63; Phys. 8.8.
185 Against Palmer 2009, 204–5, n. 24.
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ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄ•ου μὴ ἑνός τινος
τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ζητητέον διὰ τί
καὶ πῶς ὁτὲ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέγεθος
ἔσται τὸ γενόμενον, εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ἓν ἡ
ἀνισότης καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἦν. οὔτε γὰρ
ὅπως ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ταύτης οὔτε ὅπως ἐξ
ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς καὶ ταύτης γένοιτ’ ἂν τὰ
μεγέθη, δῆλον.
something else which is not one, none the less we
must inquire why and how the product will be
sometimes a number and sometimes a magnitude, if
the not-one was inequality and was the same
principle in either case. For it is not evident how
magnitudes could proceed either from the one and
this principle, or from some number and this
principle.
In this case, Aristotle's perplexity is due to Plato's lack of clarity with respect to the
production of number. The hypothesis consists in saying that it is a derivation from unity
itself and something else; what is unclear, though, is how these two elements produce
something other than themselves, namely sometimes a number and sometimes a
magnitude.
2.3. Interim conclusions
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an analysis of the eleventh aporia of
Metaphysics Beta. Aristotle defines this aporia as the hardest to investigate as well as the
most necessary for knowing the truth. He then goes on to pin down the thesis which is at
stake and its antithesis; the former corresponds to Plato and the Pythagoreans' view on unity
and being, the latter reflects Empedocles' opinion. In the light of this, I claimed that aporia 11
has a prominent doxographic character and promised to clarify how this specificity ought to
be understood.
At the end of our analysis, the following points should have been made clear: Aristotle
engages in a critical engagement with a Platonic thesis which has its roots in the
Parmenidean assumption of unity and being as substances of all things. He does so by means
of a dilemmatic refutation, in which the arguments against both the thesis and its antithesis
lead us to a condition of deep puzzlement. Aristotle focuses his discussion on the causal role
of unity, which is tackled both—more generally—as a principle of being and—more
specifically—as the principle of number. This leads him to lay more stress on Plato's position
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than on that of the Pythagoreans. However, this ad hominem attack serves the purpose of
showing the contradictions which lurk behind Plato's assumptions.
Accordingly, the kind of argument Aristotle puts forward is dialectical in a very specific
sense, in that it mentions by name the defenders of the thesis in question and reduces their
positions ad absurdum, by means of arguments that tackle their internal coherence. This
might give us the impression that Aristotle is unfairly exploiting this opportunity to criticise
Plato's theory and replace it with his own, as Berti and Cherniss (on different grounds) have
argued. However, I have shown that, in view of the precise difficulty he is facing and in view
of the way he himself introduces the aporiai in Beta, Aristotle should tackle Plato exactly in
the way he does. At this point of the Metaphysics, Aristotle is still dealing with the theories
other thinkers worked out before him. In his confrontation with his predecessors, the
difficulty singled out by aporia 11 is the one that involves the highest level of perplexity
because it divides them into two opposite factions each of which faces important difficulties.
Moreover, since the problem has to do with the two most general objects of knowledge, this
aporia brings out a difficulty which is in things (cf. δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, 995a31)
and is thus the most necessary to solve before moving on. All thinkers predating Aristotle
stumbled over the predication of unity and being—at least on his view. With aporia 11
Aristotle is clearing the way for his own metaphysics.
Once the general structure of Aristotle's confrontation with his predecessors on unity and
being has been laid out, we should ask ourselves what its relevance is in the economy of
Aristotle's Metaphysics. As we saw in the first chapter of this dissertation, Aristotle attacks
the Parmenidean thesis that there is only one being in Physics 1.2-3. In chapter 1, I reflected
on the tight connection between Plato's attack on the Eleatic thinker in his Sophist and
Aristotle's internal critique of Parmenidean monism (1.3)—which are summarised in the
following two diagrams:
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Both in Plato's Sophist and in Aristotle's Physics, the Parmenidean thesis discussed is that
‘being is one’. If we compare the two refutations, we can see that the core of Aristotle's
rejection corresponds squarely to Plato's second argument against Parmenides, which
regards his one being as a thing. If we understand ‘one’ or ‘whole’ as a property of being (as in
b.1.1 and 1.1), then we should posit more than one single being—either (following Plato)
because it has many parts or (following Aristotle) because a property is distinct from the
thing in which it inheres. If we instead understand ‘one’ or ‘whole’ as unity (or wholeness) as
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such (as in b.1.2 (= b.2.1) or 1.2 (= 2.1)), then our being would be either being as such or unity
as such, but could not be both (as in b.2.2 or 2.2). Overall, Aristotle inherits not only the basic
argument against extreme monism but also the very method of dilemmatic refutation. At the
end of chapter 1, we could appreciate how Aristotle's refutation provides us, via negativa,
with a convincing reason for the view that being must, at least in some sense, be manifold
and not one. Accordingly, the positive contribution of that first confrontation with extreme
monism consisted in establishing a necessary condition for any theory of principles: we ought
never to posit too tight a relationship between unity and being. This is the sense in which
Aristotle's discussion of Eleatic monism clears the way for his own physics. In fact, in the first
book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle seems to confirm this reconstruction, when he sidelines
those who posited one and only one principle of being. Given the marginal role of the
Eleatics in the doxography of Alpha Meizon, we might expect the resonance of Plato's
rejection of Parmenides to be limited to the Physics. However, this chapter has shown that
those arguments of Platonic origin are crucial to understanding Aristotle's discussion of the
eleventh aporia. Thus, we are finally in a position to summarise the structural similarities
between Plato's and Aristotle's treatments of previous theories of being and the one. First,
both Physics 1.2-3 and Metaphysics B.1 and B.4 borrow the general shape of the Sophist's
discussion of monism and pluralism: one which starts from the interlocutor's own premises
and forces his or her position into a dilemma. Second, Aristotle's specific arguments against
the two branches of the eleventh aporia are clearly reminiscent of the objections which the
Stranger from Elea levels at the monists and at the pluralists. Lastly, Aristotle inherits and
refines the Sophist's application of internal dialectic to the history of metaphysics, including
Plato himself among his targets.
The different treatments of the Eleatics in Metaphysics Alpha Meizon and in Βeta is a
crucial indication of a different approach to previous theories, which calls for an
explanation. In fact, at the end of my analysis, it is worth considering the three fundamental
characteristics of the book of aporiai in order to clarify in what sense Beta is (I) dialectical,
(II) aporetic and (III) preliminary to the rest of the Metaphysics.
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(I) In the Introduction to his translation and commentary of Beta, Arthur Madigan
compares the dialectic of Beta to that of the Topics.186 He singles out five main features of the
dialectic of the latter: (1) dialectical arguments start from endoxic premises; (2) the problems
addressed are formulated in terms of the four predicables; (3) the theses at stake are tested
by an extended question-and-answer duel; (4) questioner and respondent avail themselves
of certain standard moves, such as collecting a stock of premises, discerning the multiple
meanings of a given term, attending to resemblances and differences; (5) they carry on the
argument with the help of more specialised topoi, which are listed in Topics 2-7. Of these
features, Madigan argues that Beta shares (1), does not share (2), (3) and (5), and only
partially shares (4). In fact, (1) Beta too presents dialectical arguments, although a number of
their premises are views that Aristotle himself, elsewhere, endorses. However, in Beta, (2) the
problems raised are not usually framed in terms of the four predicables, (3) the discussion is
a list of usually refutative arguments rather than a question-and-answer duel, and (5) the
commonplaces of the Topics are not much in evidence. Finally, (4) although Beta relies on a
stock of premises in the fashion that seems to be suggested by the Topics, it does not attempt
to disambiguate terms with multiple meanings or apply other ‘standard moves’.
In the light of my analysis, this picture of Beta can be qualified, at least as far as the
eleventh aporia is concerned. In general, it does not seem to me that, in order for Beta to
match the dialectic of the Topics, it needs to resort to all the stratagems devised there. Rather
than viewing Aristotle's dialectic as a monolithic discipline, we should allow for a more
elastic definition that can be accommodated on a case-by-case basis. This implies that,
although Madigan is right in pointing out the divergences between Beta and the Topics as far
as features (2)-(5) are concerned, the one feature held in common is overall more important
than those which are not in common with the Topics. As for the question of whether or not
Aristotle accepts some of the premises of Beta's arguments, it should be noted that, on my
reading of Beta, Aristotle is not interested in depicting any of the rival theses as more
appealing than its alternative. In other words, although Aristotle will have to solve the
aporiai—and thus eventually accept one of the contradictory theses in each case—this step
falls outside the scope of Metaphysics Beta. At the same time, the method that Aristotle
186 Madigan 1999, xvi–xix.
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adopts for his discussion does not commit him to expressing his own take on the issues in
question, but rather prevents him from doing so. Regardless of whether he would or would
not agree with the premises of Beta's arguments, Aristotle deals with some specific theses
insofar as they have been held by his predecessors. Furthermore, in general, it is this sort of
neutral attitude that can help us opt for one of the two branches of each dilemma as the
more acceptable. However, in the specific case of Beta, it seems that Aristotle cannot solve
yet the difficulties that he raises. This introduces me to the next point to be discussed.
(II) Beta is devoted to working through and exposing problems in a particular—
systematic and aporetic—fashion. In line with Crubellier & Laks 2009, in Beta each question
gives rise to two mutually exclusive theses, which are tested by means of arguments against
each option; moreover, Aristotle does not express his preference regarding any of the options
at his disposal. Two important consequences result from this characterisation. First, Beta's
discussion follows from Alpha Meizon insofar as it is grounded in the exposition of previous
theories of first principles and causes. The ‘history-based’ approach of Alpha Meizon on the
one hand and the ‘problem-focused’ discussion of Beta ought to be seen as two
complementary steps of one and the same strategy—which Aristotle seems to inherit, at
least in part, from Plato.187 Secondly, and more importantly, although the dialectic of Beta can
be defined as ‘examinative’ (ἐξεταστική),188 it does not exhaust the ἐξέτασις of the views which
it takes into consideration: Beta’s discussion does not provide any solution, but only prepares
the ground for it. At the end of chapter 1, I referred to Barney's useful description of the
dialectic of Alpha Meizon as ‘clarification-dialectic’. In Beta, Aristotle seems to deploy a
different kind of dialectic, complementary to that adopted in Alpha. There, Aristotle was
interested in winnowing the theories of other thinkers to see whether any of his
predecessors came up with a cause which does not fit into his four-cause framework. In
contrast, Beta develops a critical analysis of the problems raised by his predecessors in order
to identify and lay out the internal contradictions which lurk at the heart of their positions.
The combination of these two approaches—which we may call ‘immanent dialectic’—
187 It should be noted that the last chapters of Alpha Meizon (A.8-9) can also be regarded as aporetic; my
suggestion, however, is that that discussion is still carried out with a focus on history. It is not until Beta that
Aristotle formulates more general problems that emerge from his engagement with each of his predecessors.
188 Cf. Top., 101b3.
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enables Aristotle not only to test the internal coherence of other accounts of unity and
being, but also, and most importantly, to provide us with a philosophical grounding for the
necessity of undertaking an inquiry into principles starting from different premises. Thus,
what Aristotle seeks to achieve is a solid grounding for his metaphysical inquiries.
As Aristotle states in the Topics, dialectic is useful for distinguishing what is true from
what is not true.189 Therefore, the sense in which surveying the opinions of one's
predecessors and discussing problems that arise from them can help us make headway in
our investigation could be specified as follows. Although dialectic cannot check whether a
given opinion is true or false, it can surely check whether it is internally consistent or not.
This can be expressed in terms of the relationship between consistency and truth:
consistency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth. As a result, on the one hand,
the discussion of an aporia (whether each of its theses entails absurdities or not) should
reasonably be kept distinct from its solution (whether it relies on a true opinion or not); on
the other hand, if a position is internally inconsistent, then it is not true. Against this
background, Metaphysics Beta is aimed at testing whether and how previous views on
principles and causes can contribute to our investigation. This procedure typically involves
having to make a fresh start before embracing one of the alternatives of a given aporia.190 This
leads me to consider the final feature of book Beta that calls for some elucidation.
(III) There is a specific sense in which the book of aporiai is preliminary to the books that
follow in the Metaphysics. As Madigan correctly observes, three issues have been treated in
the secondary literature on Beta: (i) whether we should adopt a developmental or a unitarian
approach to the Metaphysics more generally and to its third book more specifically; (ii)
whether Beta was composed as a programme for the Metaphysics or for some other purpose;
(iii) whether the problems of Beta were difficulties for Aristotle himself or whether he
already knew how to solve them when he formulated them.191 Although a full answer to these
questions would require a much longer analysis, the reading I have suggested offers some
elements towards the following responses. (i) Beta's engagement with Platonic doctrines can
be explained by its diaporetic nature and therefore does not tell in favour of (or against) an
189 Top., 101a34-36.
190 On the connection between the resolution of an aporia and dialectic see Rossi 2017.
191 Madigan 1999, xxii–vii.
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earlier origin of the book, closer to a more Platonising phase of Aristotle's thought. This
disallows some objections to a unitarian reading of the Metaphysics.192 (ii) Since Beta follows
from Alpha Meizon's doxography in the sense discussed above, the search for a solution of its
aporiai seems to be a primary step in Aristotle's metaphysical investigation. This suggests
that Beta could be regarded as a programme for the rest of the Metaphysics193 rather than
either a list of general perplexities194 or a battery of arguments in support of Aristotle's theory
of the four causes.195 (iii) Finally, given the dialectical nature of Beta, Aristotle undoubtedly
regards the aporiai as real difficulties for his predecessors and, by so doing, defines the status
quæstionis of metaphysics up to his own time. Accordingly, in the economy of the
Metaphysics, readers too ought to regard these difficulties as real.196 This does not exclude the
possibility that Aristotle already had their solutions in mind at the time of composition;
however, even in this case, Aristotle still needs to show why he became interested—and why
we should be interested—in these difficulties and not others. Furthermore, not in all cases
will Aristotle's solution to a given aporia amount to picking one of the two options at stake
without qualification. At least in the case of aporia 11, we shall see in the next chapter that
things are more complicated.
In fact, once we accept the analysis that I have suggested in this chapter, we can read
aporia 11 in a new light. Aristotle reduces all previous accounts of unity and being to a
divergence between two different conceptions of the relationship of unity to being. He then
shows not only that Plato's account is unsatisfactory, but also that the alternative position is
likewise not a viable option from a Platonic perspective. This implies that the ‘best theory on
the market’ regarding unity and being—that is, Plato's position—can be rejected using not
only Plato's own arguments but also his very method of dealing with the views of other
thinkers. It is because of this move that Aristotle shows the necessity of exploring the
relationship between unity and being on a new basis.
192 Jaeger 1934, 195–202.
193 Menn in progress, Iβ1.
194 Düring 1966, 270–3.
195 Owens 1951, 212, 232–4, 256–8.
196 Menn in progress, Iβ1.
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Against this background, the conclusions we can draw from his treatment of the
arguments pro et contra the substantiality of unity and being can be summarised as follows.
Not only does Aristotle find no previous account of unity and being satisfactory, but he also
gives positive indications in the direction of a correct account of this relationship. In
particular, from my analysis of aporia 11 a list of four desiderata emerges which will play a
role in Aristotle's own account of the one and being: (1) the one and being need be distinct,
no matter what exactly they turn out to be and no matter how tight their mutual relation
turns out to be; (2) ‘one’ and ‘being’ are not univocal, but said in more than one way; in
particular, (3) we must allow for a sense in which unity and being are attributes of some
other underlying thing; (4) unity is primarily a principle of number and should be analysed
as such. It is on this new grounding that Aristotle will build his account of unity and being.
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3. Aristotle's Last Word on Aporia 11
Introduction
In the second chapter I analysed the dilemma which is, in Aristotle's own words, the
hardest as well as the most necessary to discover the truth. In line with Beta's overall
dialectical strategy, Aristotle discusses the options at stake without expressing any
preference. In this third and last chapter, I shall reconstruct how Metaphysics Iota 2 resolves
the difficulties raised by the aporia. Overall, Aristotle does not return to the aporia until he
has developed some fundamental tenets—particularly in parts of Zeta and in the first
chapter of Iota—which enable him to opt for the alternative of the physicists against the
view of Plato and the Pythagoreans. Throughout my analysis, I shall distinguish between two
conjuncts which the text does not explicitly keep apart but which can help us define the
ontological status of the one: the one is not a substance; it is not the substance of anything. I
shall begin by outlining where and how Aristotle resumes the discussion he had set out in
Beta (section 3.1). I shall then reconstruct Aristotle's rejection of the thesis that the one is a
substance in I.2 (sections 3.2) by considering the two claims of which his refutation consists:
universals are not substances (section 3.2.1) and the one is not a genus (section 3.2.2). After a
brief recapitulation (section 3.3), the second half of this chapter will focus on Aristotle's
positive answer to the dilemma (sections 3.4-5), which will settle all the points raised by the
aporia. My analysis will enable me to suggest, on the one hand, a close relationship between
I.2 and Aristotle's refutation of universals as candidates for substances in Z.13-16 and, on the
other, a tight continuity between Aristotle's preliminary discussion of the dilemma in B.4
and his definition of the one in I.1. Finally, in these concluding steps of aporia 11 too, the
Eleatics will again play an important role.
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3.1. Resuming aporia 11
As we saw, the eleventh aporia is formulated first at 996a5-9 and in more detail shortly
after:
Met., 1001a4-19 (trans. Ross 1963, slightly modified)
Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ
Πυθαγόρειοι (A) οὐχ ἕτερόν τι
τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἀ•ὰ τοῦτο
αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης
τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι
καὶ ὄντι· οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (B) ὡς εἰς γνωρι-
μώτερον ἀνάγων λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν
ἐστιν· δόξειε γὰρ ἂν λέγειν
τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία
γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἓν εἶναι
πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ’ ἀέρα
φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ
ὄν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὄντα εἶναί τε καὶ
γεγονέναι. ὣς δ’ αὔτως καὶ οἱ
πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι· ἀ-
νάγκη γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα
λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν ὅσας περ
ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν.
The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most
necessary for knowledge of the truth is (A) whether being and
unity are the substances of things, and each of them, without
being anything else, is unity and being, or (B) whether we must
inquire what being and unity are, as if there were some other
underlying nature. For some people think they are of the
former, others think they are of the latter character. Plato and
the Pythagoreans thought (A)  being and unity were nothing
else, but this was their nature, their essence being unity and
being. But the natural philosophers take a different line; e.g.
Empedocles—(B) as though reducing it to something more
familiar—says what unity is; for he would seem to say it is love:
at least, this is for all things the cause of their being one. Others
say this unity and being, of which things consist and have been
made, is fire, and others say it is air. A similar view is expressed
by those who make the elements more than one; for these also
must say that unity and being are precisely all the things which
they say are principles.
Following a pattern which he also observes in the rest of Beta, Aristotle presents two
mutually exclusive theses and then argues against both. We could either share Plato and the
Pythagoreans' view (A) that being and the one are the substances of all things or instead
agree with Empedocles and the physicists (B) that being and the one are attributes of
something else which underlies them. Note that, consistently with what we saw in 2.2.3, here
too Empedocles stands out as the only thinker who (for Aristotle) was specifically concerned
with the cause of unity. As the second half of the passage points out, if we opt for thesis (A),
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then our search for substance has reached its end: the substance of being and the one is
going to be nothing other than being and the one. Instead, if we pick option (B), the question
requires further scrutiny—which is expressed in terms of a reduction to something more
familiar (γνωριμώτερον). This emphasis on how to proceed once we accept (B) is also found
in the two passages of the Metaphysics where Aristotle seems to return to aporia 11:
respectively in Z.16 and I.2.
Met., 1040b16-
30
(tr. Ross 1963,
modified)
Met., 1053b9-16 (tr. Castelli 2018a, slightly
modified)
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ
ἓν λέγεται ὥσ-
περ καὶ τὸ ὄν,
καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ
τοῦ ἑνὸς μία,
καὶ ὧν μία ἀρι-
θμῷ ἓν ἀριθμῷ,
φανερὸν ὅτι (A)
οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε
τὸ ὂν ἐνδέχεται
οὐσίαν ε ἶναι
τῶν πραγμά-
των, ὥ σ π ε ρ
οὐδὲ τὸ στοι-
χείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἀρ-
χῇ· ἀ•ὰ ζητοῦ-
μεν τίς οὖν ἡ
ἀρχή, (B) ἵνα
εἰς γνωριμώ-
τερον ἀναγά-
γωμεν.
Since the term
‘unity’ is used like
the term ‘being’, and
the substance of that
which is one is one,
and things whose
substance is nu-
merically one are
numerically one,
evidently (A) neither
unity nor being can
be the substance of
things, just as being
an element or a
principle cannot be
the substance, but
we ask what, then,
the principle is, (B)
so that we may
reduce the thing to
s o m e t h i n g m o re
familiar.
Κατὰ δὲ τὴν οὐ-
σίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν
ζητητέον ποτέρως
ἔχει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς
διαπορήμασιν ἐπ-
ήλθομεν τί τὸ ἕν ἐστι
καὶ πῶς δεῖ περὶ
αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν, (A)
πότερον ὡς οὐσίας
τινὸς οὔσης αὐτοῦ
τοῦ ἑνός, καθάπερ οἵ
τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι
πρότερον καὶ Πλά-
των ὕστερον, (B) ἢ
μᾶ•ον ὑπόκειταί τις
φύσις καὶ προσδεῖ
γνωριμωτέρως λεχ-
θῆναι καὶ μᾶ•ον ὥσ-
περ οἱ περὶ φύσεως·
ἐκείνων γὰρ ὁ μέν τις
φιλίαν εἶναί φησι τὸ
ἓν ὁ δ’ ἀέρα ὁ δὲ τὸ
ἄπειρον.
And we must investigate
how it is with respect to
substance and nature, as we
did in presenting the difficul-
ties, when we approached the
issue of what the one is and
how we ought to think of it:
(A) whether we should think
of it assuming that some sort
of substance is the one itself,
as first the Pythagoreans and
then Plato maintained; or (B)
whether it is rather the case
that some nature of some
sort underlies it and it would
still need to be spoken of in a
more familiar way and rather
as the philosophers of nature
did – for one of them says
that the one is love, another
says that it is air and another
that it is the infinite.
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The point is particularly prominent in the Iota passage, where I read προσδεῖ at line
1053b14 with codex Parisinus graecus 1853 (belonging to the α-text)197 and the Arabic
translator.198 This emphasis plays an important role in the solution of Aristotle's dilemma,
which will follow the Empedoclean path. In fact, it implies that, in order to settle the
question formulated in the aporia, Aristotle will not only have to rebut the Platonic
alternative, but also to reduce being and the one to something more comprehensible. This
has an important consequence regarding the relationship between Z.16 and I.2 as well as the
argument itself.
The very fact that Aristotle goes back to the eleventh aporia in two distinct places raises
the question of how these two loci are related to each other. As will become clear in the
second part of this chapter, Z.16 and I.2 not only address the same aporia, but also rely on the
same basic claims: that nothing that is common is substance and that being and one are the
most universal predicates of all. Hence, they yield, at least prima facie, the very same answer.
Why this repetition?
Despite these similarities, the Iota passage differs from its cousin in Zeta in three
important ways. First, unlike Z.16, I.2 does not deal with both being and the one but is
exclusively focused on τὸ ἕν. Second, the beginning of I.2 explicitly refers back to Beta,
labelled as the book of διαπορήματα, but there is no corresponding explicit back-reference in
Zeta. Finally, in the lines which follow our passage, Iota explicitly borrows the premise of its
argument in favour of (B) from Zeta—while Zeta does not return the favour. As a result, I
take it that Aristotle assumes that the reader of Iota will be familiar both with Beta and with
at least part of Zeta. Moreover, if, as we said, choosing (B) over (A) amounts to investigating
further what being and the one are, then Z.16 and I.2 carry out the same overall job, but
specialise in two different tasks. Although they both reject (A), their division of labour
consists in reducing εἰς γνωριμώτερον respectively being on the one hand and the one on the
other. In what follows, I shall dwell on how I.2 drives home its rejection of the Platonic-
Pythagorean branch of aporia 11, while postponing Aristotle's positive account of unity to
section 3.5.
197 Primavesi 2012a.
198 Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1266.4 wa-yanbaġī maʿa hāḏā (…), ‘and it is necessary, on top of this, (…)’.
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3.2. The one is not a substance
Having set out once again the dilemma of aporia 11 in terms that repeat the choice
presented in the discussion in Beta, including the allocation of each horn of the dilemma to
a particular set of thinkers, Aristotle proceeds first by rejecting the first alternative—the one
maintained by the Pythagoreans and Plato. This first argument in the chapter can be divided
into two subordinate claims: the one is (1) neither a substance (1053b16-21) (2) nor a genus
(b21-24). As will become clear, (1) and (2) amount to showing that the one is neither a
separate substance nor the substance of anything. Overall, Aristotle revisits the first branch
of our known dilemma with new artillery, namely his rejection of universals as candidates
for substances in Metaphysics Zeta.
The Greek of this passage is fairly controversial. Here, for now, is Laura Castelli's
translation; once we have set out the general shape of the passage and noted the syntactical
difficulties, I shall suggest a minor alteration at one point of the Greek text and then explain
how this alters our construal of the argument.
Met., 1053b16-24 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
(I) εἰ δὴ μηδὲν τῶν καθόλου δυνατὸν
οὐσίαν εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ οὐσίας
καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἴρηται λόγοις, οὐδ’
αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσίαν ὡς ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πο•ὰ
δυνατὸν εἶναι (κοινὸν γάρ) ἀá’ ἢ
κατηγόρημα μόνον, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ ἕν·
τὸ γὰρ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν καθόλου κατηγορεῖται
μάλιστα πάντων. (II) ὥστε οὔτε τὰ γένη
φύσεις τινὲς καὶ οὐσίαι χωρισταὶ τῶν
ἄ•ων εἰσίν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν γένος ἐνδέχεται
εἶναι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας δι’ ἅσπερ οὐδὲ
τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν.
(I) If in truth it is not possible that any of the
universals be substance, just as we said in the
discourses about substance and being, nor is it
possible that this very thing be substance as
something one over and above the many, for it is
common—unless it is only something predicated—it
is clear that the one cannot be substance either: for
one and being are predicated most universally of all
things. (II) So that neither are genera determinate
natures and substances separate from other things nor
can the one be a genus for precisely the same reasons
that neither being nor substance can.
The reconstruction of Aristotle's argument depends on what we take to be the antecedent
of αὐτὸ τοῦτο at b18. As Castelli points out, ‘this very thing’ can be either any of the universals
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(b16) or being (b17). In the former case, the argument mainly rests on the premise that (1) no
universal can be a substance (b16-17); in the latter, it also relies on the following two
additional assumptions: (2) that being is something universal (b18-20) and (3) that one and
being are the most universal predicates (b20-21).199 The former option is grammatically more
plausible and is confirmed by the Arabic; however, as Castelli correctly highlights, the
difficulty with this reading is that, if ‘this very thing’ does not refer to ‘being’, then it is not
clear what the remark at b20-21 (‘for one and being are predicated most universally of all
things’) is supposed to explain.200 In order to provide a solution to this difficulty, in the rest of
this section (3.2) I shall show how I think we should reconstruct Aristotle's argument.
On my reading, the basic structure of the argument consists of two premises and a
straightforward consequence: if ‘it is not possible that any of the universals be substance’
(b16-17) and if unity, like being, is a universal (b20-21), then ‘the one cannot be substance
either’ (b20). In this form, part (I) of the I.2 passage should sound familiar to a reader of the
Metaphysics up to this point. This is how, in his discussion of aporia 11 in B.4, Aristotle had
argued against Empedocles and the physicists:
Met., 1001a19-24 (trans. Ross 1963)
 (B) συμβαίνει δέ, εἰ μέν τις μὴ θήσεται
εἶναί τινα οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, μηδὲ τῶν
ἄ•ων εἶναι τῶν καθόλου μηθέν (ταῦτα γάρ
ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι
τι ἓν αὐτὸ μηδ’ αὐτὸ ὄν, σχολῇ τῶν γε ἄ•ων
τι ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα καθ’ ἕκαστα).
(B) If we do not suppose unity and being to be
substances, it follows that none of the other
universals is a substance; for these are most
universal of all, and if there is no unity-itself or
being-itself, there will scarcely be in any other case
anything apart from what are called the individuals.
After reminding us of the Empedoclean branch of the aporia, at a20, Aristotle builds an a
fortiori argument that runs as follows: if (i) being and the one are the most universal things
(a21-22) and if (ii) the most universal things (i.e. being and the one) are not substances (a20-
21), then (iii) no universal can be a substance (a21). Now, this argument seems to be the
converse of that which we find in I.2, where Aristotle claims that, since (iii) no universal can
be a substance, then (ii) the most universal things are even more surely not substances. More
199 Castelli 2018a, 69.
200Castelli 2018a, 69.
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precisely, in I.2 Aristotle first draws the conclusion that the one is not a substance insofar as it
is a universal (1053b20) and then reminds us that this is the case because (i) being and the
one are the most universal of all things (b20-21).
If we keep in mind that, unlike Beta, Iota aims to solve the eleventh aporia, it should not
surprise us that Aristotle replicates part of the refutation he had set out in B.4. However, why
is he attacking Plato and the Pythagoreans by reversing an argument he had used to their
advantage—rather than, say, corroborating an argument he had set out against them? What
has changed between B.4 and I.2 is that Aristotle, in Metaphysics Zeta, has found a criterion
for establishing whether something is a substance. I shall devote the rest of this section to
showing how this addition emerges from the two parts of Aristotle's argument in I.2. This will
enable me to claim that lines 1053b20-21 reveal Aristotle's overall strategy in our passage.
Specifically, lines b20-21 mention both being and the one because they provide the general
premise which allows Aristotle to extend the conclusions at which he had arrived in the case
of being in Z.13-16 to the case of the one.
3.2.1. Universals are not substances
So far, I have suggested that Aristotle's argument has two explicit premises: if (3) ‘one and
being are predicated most universally of all things’ and if (1) ‘it is not possible that any of the
universals be substance’, then ‘the one cannot be substance either’.
The main textual difficulty of the passage as a whole has to do with the syntax of lines
1053b18-19, which are problematic in two respects. First, although it would be tempting to
read the clause ‘οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο… μόνον’ before δῆλον at b20 as the continuation of the
hypothesis introduced by εἰ δὴ μηδέν (b16), Jaeger warns us that the negation οὐδέ cannot be
used in place of μηδέ in this syntactical context.201 To avoid this problem, he inserts a
declarative ὅτι before οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο at b18, which would remind the reader of what has been
201 Met. , ad loc. There is one case in which οὐ-negations are indeed found in dependent clauses which would
normally require a μή-negation: namely, when what is negated is not a full clause but only a phrase in it—the
overall thought of the sentence being affirmative, see Kühner & Gerth 1898, II, 188, §511, 4(a). However, this rule
does not seem to be reflected in Aristotle's usage, cf. in particular the εἰ-clauses at Post. An., 74a15-16, 85b6 and
Met. 1003a30-31.
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said (εἴρηται, b18) in Aristotle's discussions of substance and being. Second, as Castelli
remarks, the ‘ἀ•᾽ ἤ (‘unless’)’ transmitted by the extant manuscripts hardly fits in the
grammatical context of the sentence.202
With respect to Jaeger's point, it should be noted that, although ‘οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο… μόνον’
cannot be read as a protasis in syntactical terms, it can surely introduce the premise of an
argument in a declarative form. After all, the εἰ-clause at b16 itself expresses a condition that
Aristotle considers himself to have exhaustively clarified in Zeta and is therefore tantamount
to a causal clause. In other words, although the sentence beginning with οὐδ(έ) cannot be a
protasis, it can indeed carry on the hypothesis introduced at b16: ‘nor is it possible that this
very thing be substance as something one over and above the many…’.
The greatest difficulty represented by the rest of the sentence is that what we read in the
Greek manuscripts can be translated as ‘unless it is only a predicate’—which makes the
whole sentence quite obscure. To shed some light on its overall meaning, I shall suggest that
we should read ‘ἀ•᾽ ᾗ’ instead of the conjunction ‘ἀ•᾽ ἤ’; this slight change yields the
translation ‘but only insofar as it is a predicate’. I shall adduce two reasons in support of this
reading: first, it is suggested by the Arabic translation of I.2; second, this minor change
enables us to appreciate better the main thrust of Aristotle's rejection of Platonic substances.
In Averroes' Long Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, two alternative readings of
lines b18-19 are reported. The version of lines b16-21 (by Usṭāṯ) upon which Averroes
comments reads as follows:
202Castelli 2018a, 71–2.
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Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1268.11-1269.2
wa-lākinna in kāna lā yumkinu an
yakūna šayʾun mina l-kulliyyāti ǧawharan
ka-mā qīla fī aqāwīli l-ǧawhari wa-llatī qīlat
fī l-huwiyyati fa-iḏā hāḏā bi-ʿaynihi laysa bi-
ǧawharin ayḍan fa-innahu lā yumkinu an
yakūna šayʿan ġayra l-kaṯrati fa-innahu
muštarakun bal ka-annahu maqūlun faqaṭ
fa-bayyinun annahu laysa ǧawharun [sic]
ka-mā laysa l-wāḥidu ayḍan.
However,203 if it is not possible that any of
the universals be a substance, as was said in the
discussions of substance and in those about
being, and if this in itself is also not a substance,
because it is not possible that it be something
different from the many, because it is common,
but rather as if it merely is a predicate, then it is
clear that it is not a substance as the one is not
<a substance>.
This text provides some interesting evidence in favour of the construal I am proposing. In
fact, the Arabic expression which corresponds to the Greek ἀ•’ἤ is not illā, as we might إل
expect.204 What we find, instead, is bal, ‘but (rather)’), followed by the preposition) بل ,ka) ك
‘as, like’), which also translates the ὡς at line b18.205 This implies that the ἀ•’ of line b18 was
not taken together with the following ēta (ἀ•᾽ ἤ, ‘unless’), but simply as the conjunction
ἀ•ά. Thus, we can reasonably infer that the diacritics on the ēta after ἀ•ά should be
changed to the conjunction ᾗ, ‘insofar as’. Given that  bal in Arabic is mostly used to correct
one's statement after a negation—much like the German sondern—Averroes reads it as
introducing an alternative understanding of οὐσία: universals are not substances as
‘something different from the many’, but they are substances only in the sense that they are
predicates. Indeed, he takes Aristotle to be saying that, since universals are mere predicates,
they exist only in the soul.206 The alternative Arabic translation of b18-20 (probably by Isḥāq)
reported by Averroes is remarkably different (both in vocabulary and in grammar) but seems
to confirm the general meaning of the passage: ‘Then207 it is not possible that this be a
203The conjunction used in the Arabic (wa-lākinna) suggests that the translator read δέ, as in Ab.
204See e.g. Z.9, 1034b18-19: ‘ποιὸν δ᾽ἢ ποσὸν οὐκ ἀνάγκη [προϋπάρχειν, b17] ἀç᾽ἢ δυνάμει’ is rendered as: wa-ammā
anna takūna kayfiyyatun aw kammiyyatun fa-laysa bi-iḍṭirārin illā bi-l-quwwati, ‘as for the fact that there
[already] be a quality or a quantity, it is not necessary other than (unless) potentially’.
205To be precise, the Arabic displays a conjunction (ka-anna) which is a compound of ‘as’ (ka) and ‘that’ (anna).
206Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1271.4–8.
207Possibly supporting δή instead of δέ.
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substance insofar as it is something one different from the many, i.e. it is only <a substance>
as the cause in its predication’.208 Lexical divergences apart, on this reading too, Aristotle is
restricting the way in which we can regard the one as a substance.
One major difficulty with this reading is that it is not clear how Aristotle could be
claiming that something can be a substance ‘as something predicated’. On the one hand, we
would expect substance to be the subject of which attributes are predicated—rather than
being itself something predicated; on the other, accepting a sense in which universals are
substances would weaken Aristotle's overall point, especially in a context where he is
reminding the reader of Zeta's rejection of universals. Upon closer inspection, this problem
depends less on the translation than on Averroes' interpretation. Indeed, once we change
ἀ•᾽ἤ to ἀ•᾽ᾗ, we face two possibilities, depending on what we take ἀ•᾽ᾗ to correct. On one
reading (as it were, following Averroes), at lines 1053b18-20, Aristotle would be opposing two
different ways for a universal to be considered a substance: as a one over many on the one
hand and as a mere predicate on the other.
οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσίαν ὡς ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πο•ὰ δυνατὸν εἶναι (κοινὸν γάρ), ἀ•’ ᾗ
κατηγόρημα μόνον
… nor is it possible that this very thing [sc. a universal] be substance like something
one over and above the many (for it is common), but rather insofar as it is only
something predicated
 On this reading, we should take ὡς and ᾗ to be used with two different nuances, the
former to express manner, the latter, cause. My different translations of the two particles try
to emphasise a contrast between the way of looking at universals which Aristotle would be
rejecting (introduced by the adverb ὡς, ‘like/taken as’; expressing a comparison) and the
explanation which he would accept (introduced by the conjunction ᾗ, ‘insomuch as/given
that it is’; expressing certainty). Indeed, in places where ὡς and ᾗ occur together, they seem
either to work as roughly interchangeable (cf. Phys. 195a6-8) or, instead, to convey these two
different nuances, as appears in the following passage from Iota 9. To clarify why a female
animal is not different in species from a male animal despite ‘male’ and ‘female’ being
208Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1271.6–7: fa-laysa yaḥtamilu an yakūna hāḏā ǧawharan ka-annahu šayʾun wāḥidun ġayru l-kaṯrati
wa-ḏālika annahu ka-l-ʿillati fī l-ḥamli faqaṭ.
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contraries, Aristotle states that ‘this is a difference of animal in its own right, and male and
female belong to it not like (ὡς) paleness and darkness, but insofar as (ᾗ) it is animal’. 209 In
other words, we should not conceive of the opposition male/female in the same manner as
we consider paleness and blackness to be contraries. Hence, in a fashion similar to what
happens in Iota 2, here too ὡς would introduce a comparison which is denied in favour of the
right viewpoint, which would be introduced, in contrast, by ᾗ.210
On the alternative possibility, ἀ•᾽ᾗ does not qualify how we understand universals to be
substances, but the phrase κοινὸν γάρ. Accordingly, if we slightly modify the punctuation of
the Greek, we can read:
οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσίαν ὡς ἕν τι παρὰ τὰ πο•ὰ δυνατὸν εἶναι (κοινὸν γάρ, ἀ•’ ᾗ
κατηγόρημα μόνον)
… nor is it possible that this very thing [sc. a universal] be substance as something
one over and above the many (for it is common, but only insofar as it is something
predicated)
If we accept this correction, Aristotle is not granting a sense in which universals are
substances; instead, he is clarifying that being something common does not imply being a
separate substance. Thus, this reading not only improves the syntax of the Greek but also
makes Aristotle's rejection of Platonic universals more straightforward. This is why this
reconstruction of the text seems philologically and philosophically preferable:
(1) I f however (δέ) it is not possible that any of the universals be substance, just as
we said in the discourses about substance and being, nor is it possible that this very
thing be substance like something one over and above the many (for it is common, but
(ἀá᾽) only (μόνον) insofar as (ᾗ) it is something predicated), it is clear that the one
cannot be substance either: for one and being are predicated most universally of all
things.
209Met., 1058a32-34: καίτοι καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῦ ζῴου αὕτη ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ οὐχ ὡς λευκότης ἢ μελανία ἀ•’ ᾗ ζῷον καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ
τὸ ἄρρεν ὑπάρχει.
210 Unlike the passage in I.2, in the lines of I.9 the Arabic marks the contrast with two different translations: ‘wa-
laysa ka-l-bayāḍi wa-l-sawādi bal al-unṯà wa-l-ḏakaru bi-annahu ḥayawānun’ (lit. ‘and not like (ὡς) whiteness
and blackness, but rather the female and the male are insofar as (ᾗ) it is an animal’; Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1373.5).
141
According to this reading of the Greek, Aristotle's compressed argument at lines 1053b18-
20 revolves around his different understanding of κοινόν from Plato's. That ‘being common’ is
central for establishing whether or not something is a substance is indeed clear from Zeta.
The following passage from Z.13 should elucidate Aristotle's move in Iota. After discussing
the hypothesis that universals might be considered to be substances, Aristotle concludes that
this is not true and provides a reason in support of his argument which sheds light on our
Iota passage, too:
Met., 1038b34-1039a2 (trans. Ross 1963)
ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερὸν ὅτι
οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί,
καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγο-
ρουμένων τόδε τι, ἀ•ὰ τοιόνδε. εἰ δὲ μή,
ἄ•α τε πο•ὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος
ἄνθρωπος.
If, then, we view the matter from these
standpoints, it is plain that no universal attribute is
a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that
no common predicate indicates a ‘this’, but rather a
‘such’. If not, many difficulties follow and especially
the ‘third man’.
The way in which this passage clarifies our argument is that it excludes universals from
substances in view of a specific criterion, namely whether or not they indicate a determinate
something (τόδε τι). Now, Aristotle does agree that there are some terms which are
predicated of multiple things, but he does not agree that this implies that universals too
indicate a τόδε τι. In fact, he warns—albeit briefly—against the risk of incurring the
absurdities of the third man argument. It is absurd to think that universals are separate
entities over and above particulars. Accordingly, when I.2 points out that universals are
simply predicates, it aims to prevent a Platonic move which Aristotle had already rejected in
Z.13. Universals do not indicate something determinate; on the contrary, Aristotle believes
that universals only indicate something of a certain sort (τοιόνδε τι); therefore, universals are
attributes, not substances. Note, however, that, at this point in the argument, Aristotle's view
does not yet exclude any sense whatsoever in which universals can be said to be substances.
For example, the universal ‘animal’ is not a substance in the sense of being a one over many;
however, it is the substance of, e.g., ‘human being’. Thus, it should be pointed out that
Aristotle here has not yet completed his rejection of the Platonic view of the one. I shall
follow Aristotle's final step in the next paragraph. 
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3.2.2. The one is not a genus
As was remarked above, the argument in I.2 against Plato and the Pythagoreans consists
of two parts. From the lines we have just analysed, Aristotle draws a further conclusion,
which he formulates as follows:
Met., 1053b21-24 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
(II) ὥστε οὔτε τὰ γένη φύσεις τινὲς καὶ
οὐσίαι χωρισταὶ τῶν ἄ•ων εἰσίν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν
γένος ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας δι’
ἅσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν.
(II) So that neither are genera determinate
natures and substances separate from other things
nor can the one be a genus for precisely the same
reasons that neither being nor substance can.
The first question which arises regarding this passage is why Aristotle treats this point
separately, if it results from the very same argument against universals. My answer to this
question will involve a last look back at Zeta. In the previous section of this chapter, I argued
that the first part of Aristotle's refutation of the Platonic-Pythagorean view relies heavily on
Zeta's exclusion of universals as candidates for substances. In this section, I shall complete
my argument by suggesting that its second part too restates a tenet which had been
defended in Z.13-16.
Aristotle's argument in Z.13-16 consisted of two distinct parts, as is confirmed by the
concluding lines of Z.16: ‘It is clear, then, that (i) none of the things said universally is a
substance, and that (ii) no substance is out of substances’ (1041a3-5). Already in Zeta,
Aristotle rejects not only the more general thesis that universals are substances, but also the
more specific one that parts of substances are themselves substances.211 Against this thesis,
he defends the view that substance has no actual substances as its parts; a claim which is
also composed of two subparts, depending on what counts as ‘part’ of a substance. In the
lines which precede my last quotation from Z.13, Aristotle makes this point with reference to
the genus ‘animal’:
211 See Lewis 2013, 191–270; Menn in progress, IIδ.
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Met., 1038b30-34 (trans. Ross 1963)
ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν
τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηδενὸς οὐσίαν
μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδ’ ἐν
ἄ•ῳ, λέγω δ’ οἷον οὐκ εἶναί τι ζῷον
παρὰ τὰ τινά, οὐδ’ ἄ•ο τῶν ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις οὐδέν.
And in general it follows, if man and such things are
substance, that none of the elements in their formulae
is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from
the species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that
no ‘animal’ exists apart from the particular kinds of
animal, nor does any other of the elements present in
formulae exist apart.
Now, despite the lack of any explicit mention in Z.13, there is quite clear evidence that
Aristotle believed that Plato's one and being were supposed to work as γένη τῶν ὄντων. The
first passage in order of appearance is a brisk remark at A.9, 992b9-13, where Aristotle
laments the fact that Plato fails to show that all things are one. The problem with his attempt
is that Plato is wrong in applying the method of ekthesis to the one. In fact, ekthesis does not
work for all universals, but only for genera. Despite its brevity, this passage counts as a hint of
Plato's use of the one as a genus. The second passage is found within Aristotle's discussion of
aporia 6 in B.3. The sixth aporia wonders whether the elements and principles are genera or
rather the primary immanent entities of which each thing is constituted. In B.3, Aristotle
explicitly mentions Empedocles as a defender of the latter horn of the dilemma and
discusses some absurdities which stem from his stance. Immediately after, at 998b9-11, he
introduces the discussion of the partisans of the opposite view, by saying that ‘some’ (τινες)
use being, the one, the great and the small as genera (ὡς γένεσιν). Given the principles which
Aristotle lists and the now familiar contrast between Empedocles on one side of the dispute
and his former teacher on the other, it is fair to assume that he has in mind Plato and his
followers.
If we now go back to Zeta, this opposition could shed light on why Aristotle treats
separately the question of whether parts of substances are themselves substances. In fact,
this is a problem which applies not only to Plato but also to philosophers who, in Aristotle's
opinion, held a radically different view of what is a substance, such as Empedocles. This
brings to the fore a fundamental difference between I.2 and Z.13-16. While, as we saw, Z.13
tackles the Platonic ‘parts’ of substance, at the beginning of Z.16 Aristotle explains that parts
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of animals and natural elements are substances only potentially (but not actually). Hence,
Zeta seems to cover both cases. Instead, in our passage from I.2, Aristotle's task is specifically
to rebut the Platonic-Pythagorean branch of aporia 11. Therefore, the addition of part (II) of
his refutation seems to be aimed at attacking a specific Platonic tenet, namely that the one
could be a substance not qua universal, but, more precisely, qua genus.
The rest of (II) confirms Aristotle's conclusions on the subject of unity as a substance,
although with a different wording. Here, genera are said not to be determinate natures and
separate substances. I take it that this phrasing elucidates what emerges as a crucial
opposition: between being a predicate on the one hand and being a separate substance on
the other. In turn, this distinction clarifies why Aristotle needs to make two distinct claims in
his resolution of aporia 11. Although the one is not a separate substance as a one over many,
before lines 1053b21-24, there is still room for the view that the one might be the substance of
something as its genus. On the contrary, Aristotle's conclusion involves what Frank Lewis has
recently formulated as the principle of Mutual Exclusivity: ‘If an entity is universal to many
things, then it is not the substance of any of them’.212 On the basis of the opposition between
being a predicate and being a separate substance, it is possible to suggest a restricted
formulation of Mutual Exclusivity, according to which if an entity is universal to many
things, then it is not a separate substance. This is the criterion for being (or not being) a
substance which, I submit, enables Aristotle to solve the eleventh aporia.
As for the shape of Aristotle's argument, the final lines of our passage make it clear that
Aristotle's general strategy in this portion of I.2 consists in extending the consequences of his
previous analysis of being and substance to the case of the one. As a result, lines 1053b20-21
(‘for one and being are predicated most universally of all things’) parallel b23-24 (‘for
precisely the same reasons that neither being nor substance can’). The one is not a
substance, because being and the one behave in the same way and it has already been said,
in dealing with ‘being and substance’ (b16-17), that being is not a substance.
212 Lewis 2013, 203.
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3.3. From Beta to Iota through Zeta
In this section, I have analysed Aristotle's argument against the view that the one is a
substance in Metaphysics I.2, which I quote again for the sake of clarity:
(I) If however (1) it is not possible that any of the universals be substance, just as we
said in the discourses about substance and being, (2)' nor is it possible that this very
thing be substance like something one over and above the many (for it is common, but
only insofar as it is something predicated), it is clear that the one cannot be substance
either: (3) for one and being are predicated most universally of all things. (II) So that
neither are genera determinate natures and substances separate from other things nor
can the one be a genus (3)' for precisely the same reasons that neither being nor
substance can.
On the reconstruction I suggested, the argument has two premises: (1) no universal can be
a substance and (3) being and the one are the most universal things of all. Before drawing his
conclusion, Aristotle prevents a possible objection: (2)' the one-over-many argument is not
an option, because universals are merely predicates, not separate natures. Consequently, (1)
and (3) yield the conclusion that the one cannot be a substance. From this conclusion,
Aristotle further infers that, since (3)' being and substance cannot be genera, the one cannot
be a genus either. Hence, on the whole, Aristotle agrees with Plato that being and the one are
the most universal predicates; however, contrary to Plato, he believes that, if something is
common, it is only a predicate and this excludes the very possibility that it is a separate
substance.
To summarise, Aristotle formulates aporia 11 in Metaphysics Beta, where he discusses it
only through arguments pro et contra. He returns to it only when he has the tools to solve it,
i.e. after Z.13. However, while in Z.16 the one, alongside being, is taken into consideration qua
substance, in I.2 it is studied qua one. This indicates that it is only after Z.13-16 that Aristotle
can express his last word on aporia 11. Starting from a different reading of lines 1053b18-20,
what I have tried to show is that I.2 reproduces, albeit in a very compressed form, the very
same argument of Z.13-16.
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Before moving on to the second half of Aristotle's argument it is worth pointing out how
my reconstruction of Aristotle's refutation can interact with current interpretations of
Aristotle's agenda in Metaphysics Zeta 13-16. Specifically, scholars are divided between two
alternatives regarding the problem of the universality of form: if Aristotle rejects universals
as candidates for substances, how can he still claim that form is a substance? According to
some interpretations Aristotelian substantial forms are not universals, but particulars.213 On
the alternative interpretation, forms are indeed universals but represent an exception to
Aristotle's rejection.214 Finally, Mary Louise Gill suggests an aporetic reading of Z.13 and
argues that, while it challenges whether substantial forms are regarded as universals or as
particulars, it reaches conclusions which Aristotle does not accept.215 Against this
background, we should keep in mind that the objects of inquiry in Iota 2 are extremely
universal items, namely items at a higher level of universality than species (say, human
being) or even genera (animal). As a result, there Aristotle formulates an argument against
the substantiality of anything that might be thought to be more general than species and
genera. In other words, on the one hand, the argument in I.2 works irrespective of the view
of Aristotelian substantial forms with which we side, for any argument that accepts or
dismisses universals at a lower level of generality will apply a fortiori to the one. As we can
appreciate after reading the first half of the argument, the force of this move should not be
underestimated: in attacking Platonic substances, Aristotle is questioning the specific point
that the one should be a substance precisely because it is the most universal thing.
Overall, Aristotle's general strategy here consists in granting Plato that there are universal
predicates, but disallowing the implication that universality implies separate existence. We
shall see Aristotle apply a similar dialectic in the following passages of Iota 2—perhaps the
most puzzling of the whole book.
213 For example, Frede & Patzig 1988, I.36-58, II.241-63; Irwin 1988, sect. 140; Witt 1989, 155–62.
214 For example, Loux 1991, chapter 6; Lewis 1991, chapter 11; Wedin 2000, chapter 9; Lewis 2013.
215 Gill 2001.
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3.4. Explaining unity away
In the previous section of this chapter I have shown how Aristotle returns to the Platonic-
Pythagorean branch of aporia 11 with a new weapon, i.e. Zeta's criterion for substantiality. In
the present section I shall analyse the rest of Aristotle's argument in Iota 2, which takes into
consideration the one qua principle of number. This gives Aristotle the occasion to
corroborate his rejection of the Platonic-Pythagorean branch of aporia 11, while at the same
time making room for his own view. Specifically, Aristotle embraces the alternative option of
the aporia but also pre-empts a possible Pythagorean objection. Accordingly, the greatest
difficulty of this section of Iota 2 lies in unravelling two distinct claims to the same effect: (1)
the main line of argument (1053b24-28) strengthens the conclusion—from his refutation of
Plato—that the one is not itself a substance but must be reduced to something ‘more
familiar’ (γνωριμώτερον), namely, the indivisible thing which counts as a unit of
measurement for a given kind—as I.1 has shown; (2) the rest of the section (1053b28-1054a9)
is an offshoot of Aristotle's rejection of the wrong alternative, this time specifically aimed at
the Pythagoreans. Although such a procedure might look unnecessarily convoluted at first
sight, in truth it enables Aristotle to hammer home his conclusion, which can now be
formulated in these terms: not only is the one not a substance, but it is not even the
substance of anything. As we shall see, this part of Iota 2 too puts to use some important
points which Aristotle has made clear before (in Iota 1) and that need to be presupposed
throughout the argument. Specifically, he relies upon: (i) a name/thing distinction (1052b1-
14); (ii) the definition of ‘one’ as ‘unit of measurement’ (1052b18-19); (iii) the view that one is
not itself a number (1053a27-30) but is the principle of number (1052b23-24). Thus, Aristotle
does not resolve the eleventh aporia until he has developed his own conceptual tools to
settle the question. In the following paragraphs I shall consider points (1) and (2) of
Aristotle's argument, and in the second half of this chapter I shall return to its premises.
3.4.1. Aristotle pro the physicists
The conclusion of the first half of Aristotle's argument in Iota 2 is that the one cannot be a
substance but, instead, is a determinate thing for any given kind of beings. In the lines that
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follow, Aristotle starts from this conclusion, thus assuming that the one is the predicate of
some underlying thing. What he needs to prove now is that the one must be reduced to
something ‘more familiar’ (γνωριμώτερον). For Aristotle's argument demonstrates that, even
if the one is a predicate, it does not express the substance (οὐσία) of that of which it is
predicated. This will clarify why he compresses two moves into one argument: since the
Pythagoreans too would agree that the one (as well as number) is not separate from things,
Aristotle needs to make a case for why their view is unsatisfactory and his own is preferable.
Both the structure and the aim of Aristotle's argument give rise to important difficulties. I
shall therefore begin by elucidating its general shape, before focusing on the details. The
argument in Iota 2 can be divided into three steps (α, β, γ), which depend on two general
premises (I, II).216
Met., 1053b24-28 (trans. Castelli 2018a, slightly modified)
 ἔτι (I) δ’ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων ἀναγ-
καῖον ἔχειν· (II) λέγεται δ’ ἰσαχῶς τὸ ὂν
καὶ τὸ ἕν· ὥστ’ ἐπείπερ (α) ἐν τοῖς ποιοῖς
ἐστί τι τὸ ἓν καί τις φύσις, (β) ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποσοῖς, (γ) δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
ὅλως ζητητέον τί τὸ ἕν, ὥσπερ καὶ τί τὸ
ὄν, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὸν ὅτι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις
αὐτοῦ.
Furthermore, (I) it is necessary that things be
similar in all cases: and (II) one and being are said in
the same number of ways. So that, if (α) it is true that in
qualities the one is something and some nature, and
(β) similarly in quantities too, (γ) it is clear that we
must investigate what the one is in general, as also
what being is, assuming that it is not enough to say that
this very same thing is its nature.
The argument is clearly introduced as an addition to the first part of the chapter, based on
the assumptions that (I) things hold similarly in all cases and that (II) the one is spoken of in
as many ways as being. The way the two premises relate to each other to yield the conclusion
can be explained as follows. Premise (I) is stated in a very general form, which does not make
any explicit reference to the categories. This means that Aristotle's point is supposed to hold
for all kinds of things, regardless of whether they do or do not fall under one and the same
category. Instead, (II) appeals to an exact match between the senses of ‘one’ and those of
216 I adopt the division suggested in Castelli 2018a, 76, which closely follows the Greek. In Averroes' commentary
the text is split into two sections at 1053b24, possibly suggesting we should read a full stop before λέγεται at
1054b25.
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‘being’ and thus focuses the scope of the argument at the level of the categories. As Castelli
correctly observes, Aristotle's argument would seem not to require categorial difference,
because his point holds good not only for kinds within one single category but also—and a
fortiori—for items across different categories. However, this reference to the categories
appears necessary if we instead emphasise that the specific aim of the argument is to prove
that the one is not the substance of anything—which is made explicit in the recapitulation of
lines 1054a4-9.217
Met., 1054a4-9 (trans. Castelli 2018a, slightly modified)
ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄ•ων
γενῶν, ὥστ’ εἴπερ (i) καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποσοῖς καὶ
ἐν κινήσει ἀριθμῶν ὄντων καὶ (ii) ἑνός
τινος ἐν ἅπασιν (iii) ὅ τε ἀριθμὸς τινῶν
καὶ τὸ ἓν τὶ ἕν, ἀ•’ οὐχὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡ
οὐσία, (γ) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνάγκη
ὡσαύτως ἔχειν· (I) ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ἐπὶ
πάντων.
The same account applies to the other genera too,
so that, given that (i) there are numbers and (ii) there
is something one in affections, qualities, quantities and
motion, if218 it is true that (iii) in all things the number
is of things of a certain kind and the one is a one of a
certain kind, and yet this is not its219 substance, then (γ)
it is necessary that in the case of substances, too, things
be in the same way: (I) for things are similar in all
cases.
Comparing the opening and the close of the argument thus enables us to isolate its gist,
which I provisionally summarise as follows: if the one in qualities, in quantities and in other
kinds refers to a certain quality, quantity, etc., but is not the definition of that quality,
quantity, etc., then, likewise, the one in substances refers to a certain substance, but is not
the definition of that substance. As Aquinas correctly remarked, Aristotle's argument
217 This remark should answer the perplexity voiced in Castelli 2018a, 77. The argument requires categorial
difference because it aims to tackle the case of substances setting out from quantities and qualities. However, it
leaves open the question why Aristotle talks explicitly only about quantities and qualities and whether his
reticence on the other six categories (excluding substance) should be a worry in the first place. I shall sketch an
answer to these points in the second half of my chapter.
218 Castelli's reading is confirmed by the Arabic (fa-iḏ), which would support the reading εἴπερ (in pseudo-
Alexander's paraphrase).
219 The Arabic rendering here is unclear (fī ǧawharin).
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proceeds by means of comparison (similitudine);220 therefore, the adverb ὁμοίως plays a
pivotal role. However, the main difficulty of the argument consists precisely in establishing
whether and to what extent these comparisons hold. To begin with, ὁμοίως can have a strict
sense (‘in the same fashion’) as well as a looser meaning (‘in a similar fashion’). Given that
Aristotle replaces it with ὡσαύτως (‘just so’) in the final lines of the argument (1054a9), we
can assume that he has in mind the stricter sense, at least as far as the extension to the case
of substances is concerned. However, it is far from clear how the different cases Aristotle
takes into consideration are supposed to work ‘in exactly the same manner’. In what follows I
shall first quote points (α) and (β) of Aristotle's argument and then attempt to shed light on
the single cases.
Met., 1053b28-1054a4 (trans. Castelli 2018a, slightly modified)
(α) ἀ•ὰ μὴν ἔν γε χρώμασίν ἐστι τὸ
ἓν χρῶμα, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, εἶτα τὰ ἄ•α
ἐκ τούτου καὶ τοῦ μέλανος φαίνεται
γιγνόμενα, τὸ δὲ μέλαν στέρησις λευκοῦ
ὥσπερ καὶ φωτὸς σκότος [τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ
στέρησις φωτός]· ὥστε εἰ τὰ ὄντα ἦν
χρώματα, ἦν ἂν ἀριθμός τις τὰ ὄντα,
ἀ•ὰ τίνων; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι χρωμάτων, καὶ
τὸ ἓν ἦν ἄν τι ἕν, οἷον τὸ λευκόν.
(β) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ μέλη τὰ ὄντα ἦν,
ἀριθμὸς ἂν ἦν, διέσεων μέντοι, ἀ•’ οὐκ
ἀριθμὸς ἡ οὐσία αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ ἓν ἦν ἄν τι
οὗ ἡ οὐσία οὐ τὸ ἓν ἀ•ὰ δίεσις. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φθόÕων στοιχείων ἂν ἦν
τὰ ὄντα ἀριθμός, καὶ τὸ ἓν στοιχεῖον
φωνῆεν. καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα,
σχημάτων ἂν ἦν ἀριθμός, καὶ τὸ ἓν τὸ
(α) The one in colours, at any rate, is a colour, e.g.
the white, and accordingly the others clearly come to
be from this and the black, and the black is privation of
white, as darkness, too, is privation of light;221 so that if
things that are were colours, things that are would be a
certain number, but of some things,222 hence it is clear
that they would be a certain number of colours, and
that the one would be a one of a certain kind, e.g. the
white.
(β) Similarly, if things that are were tunes, they
would be a number, but a number of semitones; but
their substance would not be number; and the one
would be something whose substance would not be the
one, but a semitone. And similarly, in the case of
articulate sounds, too, things that are would be a
number of vocal elements, and the one would be a
sounding vocal element. And if beings were rectilinear
220Thom., In Met., 470, §1967.
221 The text secluded by Bonitz at b31-2 seems absent also from the Arabic.
222 Reading τινῶν with Christ and Jaeger and the Arabic (li-l-ašyāʾi, lit. ‘for (the) things’).
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τρίγωνον. figures, they would be a number of figures, and the one
would be the triangle.
Aristotle proceeds by applying the same argument to different cases. He first states that
there is a ‘one’ in colours and then clarifies that this does not imply that colours are numbers.
The formulation of the argument in hypothetical terms calls for some explanation.223 In fact,
it is at this point of the argument that the two perspectives I outlined above intertwine. On
the one hand, Aristotle explains—although in somewhat unclear terms—why the white is
the one in the case of colours; this suggests that he is presenting his own views on colours.
On the other hand, the thought experiment that covers the rest of the argument starts from a
premise which can hardly be Aristotelian: the things that are are restricted to a certain
narrow group (colours, tunes, etc.). Despite its extremely condensed form, the argument
seems to run as follows:
(a) white is the one of colours and colours are a certain number,
(b) but this does not mean that the one is the substance of white or that
number is the substance of colour;
(c) if we imagined that all beings were colours,
(d) then—because of (a)—we would say that beings are a certain
number;
(e) however, not in the sense that number is their substance—as they
would be a certain number of colours.
This reconstruction brings to the fore the fact that points (c)-(e) are specifically targeted
against someone who believes not only that beings are numbers in some sense, but also that
this is a sufficient reason for claiming that numbers are substances. While the former could
well describe Aristotle himself (number is an attribute of beings), the latter can only
describe the Pythagoreans—at least on Aristotle's interpretation of them.224 Hence, the
223 Ross translates the whole period as a counterfactual in the past tense: ‘Therefore if all existent things were
colours, existent things would have been a number, indeed (…)’. However, while Aristotle does not accept the
starting assumption, he does accept its consequence.
224 Aristotle sees the Pythagoreans' conception of numbers as something which clearly distinguishes them from
Plato. Specifically, they think not only that numbers are substances (as at least some Platonists), but also that all
beings are numbers and made out of numbers, see in particular Met. A.6, 987b22-31; M.6, 1080b16-18; N.3,
152
argument shows that the Pythagorean assumption is not a reason in support of their thesis.
As I anticipated above, Aristotle's argument will work in the very same way in which his
argument against Plato worked in the first half of Iota 2. This time, what Aristotle grants the
Pythagoreans is that things (or at least some of them) are numbers; however, he will disallow
the implication that this makes numbers the substance of all things.
3.4.2. Aristotle contra the Pythagoreans
In the previous paragraph of this chapter I put forward the idea that the second half of
Iota 2's argument is targeted at the Pythagoreans rather than at Plato or, more generally, at
any other propounder of the substantiality of the one. I shall defend this claim in three steps.
I shall begin by reflecting on the vocabulary used at lines 1053b28-1054a9; I shall then track a
plausible source of Aristotle's connection between Pythagoreanism and Platonic philosophy,
namely the Philebus; finally, I shall suggest that Plato's dialogue can also provide us with a
fundamental hint as to how to understand the premise, in Aristotle's argument, that the unit
of measurement of colours is white.
The first chapter of Iota is devoted to clarifying the meaning of ‘one’ and establishing how
to search for a unit of measurement in all kinds of things. 225 Aristotle affirms that his analysis
extends to cases outside the category of quantity; however, his remarks concerning such
cases are too brief to grant us a clear idea of how to identify, specifically, the unit of colours
—which is the only case discussed in any detail in the argument of Iota 2. Moreover, the
examples introduced in Iota 1 only partially match those mentioned in the following chapter:
Aristotle talks about length (μῆκος), width (πλάτος), depth (βάθος), weight (βάρος), speed
(τάχος) and, shortly after, lines (γραμμαί), number (ἀριθμός), motion (κίνησις), music
(μουσική) and vocal sound (φωνή).226 While the semitone (δίεσις) is used as an example in
both chapters, Aristotle indicates the unit of vocal sound (i.e. a vocal element) as στοιχεῖον in
I.1 and, more precisely, as στοιχεῖον φωνῆεν in I.2. Finally, colours do not appear in the list of
1090a20-23, 29-30.
225 I discuss this claim and the difficulties it entails in the second half of this chapter, which is not included in this
extract.
226Met., 1052b26-1053a30.
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examples of I.1. We should therefore look somewhere else in the Corpus Aristotelicum if we
want to get a better grasp of these lines of Iota 2.
Aristotle's most extensive account of colours is found in the short treatise on senses and
sensible objects (De sensu), contained in the so-called Parva naturalia. After surveying some
previous theories of vision, in chapter 3 Aristotle distinguishes five objects of perception
which he will subsequently investigate: colour (χρῶμα), sound (ψόφος), smell (ὀσμή), flavour
(χυμός) and touch (ἁφή).227 As in Iota 2, here too colours are discussed in connection with
light and darkness. Aristotle says that ‘just as in air we have light and darkness, so in bodies
we have white and black’.228 Moreover, when he speaks of colours other than white and black,
Aristotle discusses different explanations concerning how they are produced and concludes
—as we would expect coming from Iota 2—that they are a mixture (μίξις) of black and
white:
DS, 440a31-b25 (trans. Hett 1935)
εἰ δ’ ἔστι μίξις τῶν σωμάτων μὴ μόνον τὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἴονταί τινες, παρ’
ἄ•ηλα τῶν ἐλαχίστων τιθεμένων, ἀδήλων δ’
ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀ•’ ὅλως πάντη
πάντως, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ μίξεως εἴρηται
καθόλου περὶ πάντων (ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ
μείγνυται ταῦτα μόνον ὅσα ἐνδέχεται διελεῖν
εἰς τὰ ἐλάχιστα, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπους <ἢ>
ἵππους ἢ τὰ σπέρματα· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων
ἄνθρωπος ἐλάχιστον, τῶν δ’ ἵππων ἵππος· ὥστε
τῇ τούτων παρ’ ἄ•ηλα θέσει τὸ πλῆθος
μέμεικται τῶν συναμφοτέρων· ἄνθρωπον δὲ
ἕνα ἑνὶ ἵππῳ οὐ λέγομεν μεμεῖχθαι· ὅσα δὲ μὴ
διαιρεῖται εἰς τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τούτων οὐκ
ἐνδέχεται μίξιν γενέσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
But if a mingling of bodies occurs, it is not
merely in the way in which some people think,
when very small coloured objects are placed side
by side, which are not obvious to the sense, but
generally everywhere and in every way, as has
been said in our discussion of mixtures in
general. In that case mixture is only possible in
the case of those things which can be divided
into the infinitely small, such as men, horses and
seeds; for man is the smallest unity of men, and a
horse of horses; so that by the placing of these
side by side, the whole number becomes a
mixture of both; but we cannot speak of one man
being mixed with one horse. But with things
which are not divided into their smallest units
227 DS, 439a6-12.
228 DS, 439b16-18 (trans. Hett 1935): ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν φῶς τὸ δὲ σκότος, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐÕίγνεται τὸ λευκὸν
καὶ τὸ μέλαν.
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ἀ•ὰ τῷ πάντη μεμεῖχθαι μίξιν γενέσθαι τὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον ἀ•ὰ τῷ πάντη μεμεῖχθαι, ἅπερ
καὶ μάλιστα μείγνυσθαι πέφυκεν· πῶς δὲ τοῦτο
γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ μίξεως εἴρηται
πρότερον)—ἀ•’ ὅτι ἀνάγκη μειγνυμένων καὶ
τὰς χρόας μείγνυσθαι, δῆλον, καὶ ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ πο•ὰς εἶναι χρόας ,
ἀ•ὰ μὴ τὴν ἐπιπόλασιν μηδὲ τὴν παρ’ ἄ•ηλα
θέσιν· οὐ γὰρ πόρρωθεν μὲν ἐÕύθεν δ’ οὒ
φαίνεται μία χρόα τῶν μεμειγμένων, ἀ•ὰ
πάντοθεν. πο•αὶ δ’ ἔσονται χρόαι διὰ τὸ κατὰ
πο•οὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεσθαι μείγνυσθαι
ἀ•ήλοις τὰ μειγνύμενα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς
τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν μόνον. Καὶ τἆ•α δὴ τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ ἐπὶ τῶν παρ’ ἄ•ηλα
τιθεμένων χρωμάτων ἢ ἐπιπολῆς, ἐνδέχεται
λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν μειγνυμένων. Διὰ τίνα δ’
αἰτίαν εἴδη τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα καὶ
οὐκ ἄπειρα, καὶ χυμῶν καὶ ψόφων, ὕστερον
ἐπισκεπτέον.
there can be no mixture in this sense, but only a
complete mingling, which is the most natural
sense of mixture. How this can occur has been
discussed previously in our discussion of
mixture. But it is clear that colours must be
mixed when the substances in which they occur
are mixed, and that is the real reason why there
are many colours; it is not due either to
overlaying or to placing side by side; for it is not
that from a distance and not from nearby there
appears to be one colour from the mixture, but
from all distances. But there will be many
colours, because it is possible for the mixed
element to be combined in various ratios, some
being numerical and some merely an excess of
one over another. In the case of mixtures all that
can be said of colours put side by side or overlaid
applies; but why the possible forms of colour are
limited and not unlimited, which is also true of
flavours and sounds, we will discuss later on.
This passage is helpful in two ways: first, here too, Aristotle describes colours as a
composition of white and black; second, the point is made that colours are mixed only when
the substances of which they are colours are mixed. The former claim is in line with the
concise remarks on colour which we find in Iota 2. Furthermore, the De sensu seems to cast
some light on the sense in which colours can be measured at all. In fact, when comparing
them with sounds in chapter 4, Aristotle observes:
DS, 442a12-17 (trans. Hett 1935, slightly modified)
ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ
μέλανος μίξεώς ἐστιν, οὕτως οἱ χυμοὶ ἐκ
γλυκέος καὶ πικροῦ, καὶ κατὰ λόγον δ’ ἢ τῷ
μᾶ•ον καὶ ἧττον ἕκαστοί εἰσιν, εἴτε κατ’
Just then as colours are a mingling of white and
black, so flavours are a mixing of sweet and bitter.
And each pair, in some greater or smaller ratio, is
either with definite numerical values and
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ἀριθμούς τινας τῆς μίξεως καὶ κινήσεως, εἴτε
καὶ ἀορίστως, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦντες
μειγνύμενοι, οὗτοι ἐν ἀριθμοῖς μόνον.
movements in the mixture, or without definite
limits. But only those which when mingled give
pleasure are in numerical ratios.
In both of these passages, Aristotle seems to regard colours as composed of different
combinations of white and black in ratios that either can or cannot be expressed in (natural)
numbers. This introduces us to an interpretative problem to which I shall devote greater
attention in the second half of this chapter. In fact, as Castelli points out, Aristotle's remarks
on how to measure colours (and the other kinds he mentions) might reflect one of the
following two explanatory models, neither of which is free from difficulties.229 According to
the first model, given any countable item K, one counts Ks by taking a K as a unit. On this
model, the operation Aristotle has in mind would be better described as ‘counting’ (rather
than measuring). What one needs to do in order to measure a kind of things is to choose the
right sortal and then discover how many Ks there are. For example, in the case of colours,
one ought to establish what constitutes the one in colours and then discover that, say, on this
page there are only two colours (black and white). According to the second model, instead,
in order to measure objects of kind K, one needs to discover a specific K' which is the
constitutive principle of all the other Ks (in a sense that has to be determined). 230 For
example, to measure the items that belong to the kind ‘colour’, we have to analyse colours
into degrees of white and then ascribe a number to the colours other than white. Despite
some important difficulties, which I shall spell out later on, the passages read so far strongly
tell in favour of the latter model, not the former.
As for the claim that colours are always found in a body, again in the Parva Naturalia,
Aristotle explicitly contrasts the Pythagoreans, to whom however he seems to grant the merit
of a partially correct intuition:
DS, 439a30-b1 (trans. Hett 1935)
τὸ γὰρ χρῶμα ἢ ἐν τῷ πέρατί ἐστιν ἢ πέρας
(διὸ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν χρόαν
For colour is either in the limit or else is
the limit itself. This is why the Pythagoreans
229Castelli 2018a, 79–80.
230This line is explored by Halper 2007, discussed in Castelli 2018a, 80.
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ἐκάλουν)· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος πέρατι,
ἀ•’ οὐ τὸ τοῦ σώματος πέρας, ἀ•ὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
φύσιν δεῖ νομίζειν ἥπερ καὶ ἔξω χρωματίζεται,
ταύτην καὶ ἐντός.
call the visible surface of a body its colour.
Colour lies at the limit of the body, but is not
its limit; but it is fair to suggest that the same
nature which causes its colour outside, also
exists within.
These passages also seem to solve a perplexity which Castelli points out in her
commentary, namely that, if black is privation of white,231 then Aristotle defines colours as a
mixture of something and its privation.232 The De sensu suggests that the privation of white
would still be a characteristic present in a given body, thus implying that Aristotle might
have in mind a surface or a body of a sort which lacks (or has lost) some or any degree of
white, while still being a surface or a body. Although this perspective would not settle all
matters, it would make Aristotle's account of colours less counterintuitive. In fact, colours
are not a composition of white and its absence. Rather, they are varying, but not total,
deprivations of white; black is the colour of a surface completely lacking white.233 The final
point from the De sensu that is worth mentioning is the contention ‘that every sensible
object is a magnitude, and that no sensible object is indivisible’, which is found at the very
end of the treatise.234 Overall, in the light of these passages we can infer a more precise
picture both of Aristotle's view on colours and of how he evaluated the Pythagorean
definition of colour. Specifically, while on Aristotle's theory too colours no doubt involve
numbers or ratios, according to the Pythagoreans colours would be identical to the surfaces
of which they are colours—which is a view that Aristotle does not share. In other words,
these passages seem to confirm points (c)-(e) above. What, however, they do not provide is a
parallel to Aristotle's explicit discussion of colours in terms of the one/many opposition.
There is a crucial passage of the Metaphysics where Aristotle does instead focus on such a
division; a passage which again deals with the doctrines of the Pythagoreans:
231 As is confirmed at DS, 442a26.
232 Castelli 2018a, 84.
233 Cf. DS, 439b14-18.
234 DS, 449a20-21: ὅτι δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστι μέγεθος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, δῆλον.
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Met., 986a15-26 (trans. Ross 1963)
φαίνονται δὴ καὶ οὗτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν
νομίζοντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ ὡς ὕλην τοῖς οὖσι
καὶ ὡς πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις, τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ
στοιχεῖα τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, τούτων
δὲ τὸ μὲν πεπερασμένον τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον, τὸ δ’
ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τούτων (καὶ γὰρ
ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν), τὸν δ’ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ
τοῦ ἑνός, ἀριθμοὺς δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν
ὅλον οὐρανόν. 
—ἕτεροι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ἀρχὰς
δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν
λεγομένας, πέρας [καὶ] ἄπειρον, περιττὸν
[καὶ] ἄρτιον, ἓν [καὶ] πλῆθος, δεξιὸν [καὶ]
ἀριστερόν, ἄρρεν [καὶ] θῆλυ, ἠρεμοῦν [καὶ]
κινούμενον, εὐθὺ [καὶ] καμπύλον, φῶς [καὶ]
σκότος, ἀγαθὸν [καὶ] κακόν, τετράγωνον
[καὶ] ἑτερόμηκες.
Evidently, then, these thinkers also consider
that number is the principle both as matter for
things and as forming both their modifications and
their permanent states, and hold that the elements
of number are the even and the odd, and that of
these the latter is limited, and the former
unlimited; and that the One proceeds from both of
these (for it is both even and odd), and number
from the One; and that the whole heaven, as has
been said, is numbers.
Other members of this same school say there
are ten principles, which they arrange in two
columns of cognates—limit and unlimited, odd
and even, one and plurality, right and left, male
and female, resting and moving, straight and
curved, light and darkness, good and bad, square
and oblong.
As emerges from this passage, Aristotle thinks that the Pythagoreans regarded numbers as
constituents of natural beings; moreover, since the elements of numbers are the limited and
the unlimited or the even and the odd, these will also be the principles of natural beings.
Finally, among the oppositions to which all beings can be traced back, the Pythagoreans
would list not only one and plurality but also light and darkness. For the purpose which I set
myself at the beginning of this paragraph, this evidence from A.5235 is important because it
confirms that the Pythagoreans would endorse the premise that natural things are made out
of the limited and the unlimited (or the even and the odd). 236 Accordingly, if we read this
chapter in connection with the De sensu, it is reasonable to deduce that, on Aristotle's
interpretation, the Pythagoreans would endorse the premise that colours are numbers and
235 On which see Schofield 2012 and Primavesi 2017.
236Aristotle offers a picture of Pythagoreanism which is particularly indebted to his understanding of Philolaus of
Croton, see Burkert 1972/1962, chapters 1.2 and 3.
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would indeed draw the consequence that number is the substance of colour. Before
reflecting on this point in greater detail, I shall take the last step of my argument in this
section: I shall show that, in Iota as in Alpha, Aristotle is relying upon a very specific source
for his reading of the Pythagoreans.
Thus far, the parallels taken into consideration have confirmed either a connection
between the oppositions: light/darkness and one/many (Metaphysics) or a Pythagorean
account of colours (De sensu). However, on the one hand the passages from the De sensu did
not express the explanation of what colour is in terms of unity; on the other, the Metaphysics'
previous presentation of the Pythagoreans did not explicitly refer to colours or to any of the
other cases mentioned in Iota 2. I should like to suggest that, while writing his argument
specifically against the Pythagoreans, Aristotle had in mind principally Plato's Philebus.
Within the investigation of pleasure, the Philebus shares some fundamental questions
regarding the opposition one/many, which Aristotle explores in Metaphysics Iota. We come
across the first occurrence of this problem at 12e, where Socrates prompts Protarchus to
compare precisely colours (χρώματα) and shapes (σχήματα) as cases in which one
respectively can and cannot infer that opposite things belong to one and the same genus.
While the use itself of the words χρῶμα and σχῆμα does not tell particularly in favour of a
connection with Iota, the Philebus passage prepares the ground for a longer inquiry into
opposition, which is framed by Socrates in very general terms:
Phil., 15d4-8 (trans. Fowler 1975)
ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πο•ὰ ὑπὸ
λόγων γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ’
ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί, καὶ πάλαι καὶ
νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε
ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀ•’ ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ
φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ
ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν.
Soc. We say that one and many are identified
by reason, and always, both now and in the past,
circulate everywhere in every thought that is
uttered. This is no new thing and will never cease;
it is, in my opinion, a quality within us which will
never die or grow old, and which belongs to reason
itself as such.
This passage presents a striking consonance with the passage in the Sophist in which the
Stranger from Elea warned Theaetetus of the difficulty of their inquiry into what is and what
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appears to be false.237 Moreover, it is even followed by an historical consideration, as
happened in the Sophist too:
Phil., 16c5-17a5 (trans. Fowler 1975)
ΣΩ. Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε
καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά
τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ
οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐÕυτέρω
θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς
ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πο•ῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ
λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν
αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς
τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν
περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν—
εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν—ἐὰν οὖν μεταλά-
βωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ
δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄ•ον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν
ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν
τὸ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πο•ὰ καὶ
ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀ•ὰ καὶ ὁπόσα·
τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ
προσφέρειν πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ
πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ
τοῦ ἑνός, τότε δ’ ἤδη τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν
πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν. οἱ
μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν
παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ
διδάσκειν ἀ•ήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πο•ὰ
θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος,
μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσα
αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει—οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε
Soc. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was
tossed down from some divine source through the
agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming
fire; and the ancients, who were better than we
and lived nearer the gods, handed down the
tradition that all the things which are ever said to
exist are sprung from one and many and have
inherent in them the finite and the infinite. This
being the way in which these things are arranged,
we must always assume that there is in every case
one idea of everything and must look for it—for
we shall find that it is there—and if we get a grasp
of this, we must look next for two, if there be two,
and if not, for three or some other number; and
again we must treat each of those units in the
same way, until we can see not only that the
original unit is one and many and infinite, but just
how many it is. And we must not apply the idea of
infinite to plurality until we have a view of its
whole number between infinity and one; then, and
not before, we may let each unit of everything pass
on unhindered into infinity. The gods, then, as I
said, handed down to us this mode of
investigating, learning, and teaching one another;
but the wise men of the present day make the one
and the many too quickly or too slowly, in
haphazard fashion, and they put infinity
immediately after unity; they disregard all that lies
237 Soph., 236e1-5.
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διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς
ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀ•ήλους τοὺς λόγους.
between them, and this it is which distinguishes
between the dialectic and the disputatious
methods of discussion.
These opening lines of Socrates' narrative are usually read as a reference to the
Pythagoreans238 and—in the light of Metaphysics A239—were, I think, read as such by
Aristotle.240 This is particularly relevant for our purposes, when we look at the following
pages of the dialogue, where Socrates propounds the claim that knowing things amounts to
knowing how (ὁποῖα) and how many (ὁπόσα) they are. The example that Socrates discusses is
precisely sound (φωνή but, later, φθόÕος), which is first analysed as a combination of high
and low pitch and then with reference to vowel sounds (φωνήεντα) as its units:241
Phil., 17d11-e6 (trans. Fowler 1975)
ΣΩ. Ἀ•’, ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ
διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς
φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ
ὁποῖα, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ
τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν—ἃ
κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς
ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας, ἔν
τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα
τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ δι’
ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασι ῥυθμοὺς
καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς
οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πο•ῶν
σκοπεῖν—ὅταν γὰρ αὐτά τε λάβῃς οὕτω,
τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄ•ο τῶν ἓν
ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἕλῃς, οὕτως
Soc. But, my friend, when you have grasped the
number and quality of the intervals of the voice in
respect to high and low pitch, and the limits of the
intervals, and all the combinations derived from
them, which the men of former times discovered
and handed down to us, their successors, with the
traditional name of harmonies, and also other such
internal affections which are produced in the
movements of the body, which they say are
measured by numbers and must be called rhythms
and measures—and they say that we must also
understand that every one and many should be
considered in this way—when you have thus
grasped the facts, you have become a musician, and
then by considering it in this way you have obtained
238 In particular, Prometheus is identified with Pythagoras, mainly because of the mention of ἀπειρία and πέρας, of
the link between this method and numbers and of the later references to music, see Delcomminette 2006, 93.
239 Cf. the language used in particular at Met., 986a1-6.
240On the method described in the Philebus see Kahn 2010; Benson 2010; Gill 2010 and Crivelli forthcoming.
241 On the later account of sounds at 50e-53c see Warren forthcoming.
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ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας· τὸ δ’ ἄπειρόν
σε ἑκάστων καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις πλῆθος ἄπειρον
ἑκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ
ἐ•όγιμον οὐδ’ ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ
φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐ•όγιμον οὐδ’ ἐνάριθμον,
ἅτ’ οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ
πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.
a grasp of any other unity of all those which exist,
you have become wise in respect to that unity. But
the infinite number of individuals and the infinite
number in each of them makes you in every
instance indefinite in thought and of no account
and not to be considered among the wise, so long as
you have never fixed your eye upon any definite
number in anything.
As we can see, in this passage Plato establishes a tight connection between knowledge
and the action of measuring. In the economy of my general argument, it confirms the idea
that the Pythagoreans regarded numerical ratios as the explanatory principles of all things,
which is shown in the Philebus through the example of sound, perhaps because the
Pythagoreans themselves indeed used just that illustration. Interestingly, the passage also
emphasises the necessity of taking into consideration the plurality of items which make up
the kind we are looking at. This general point is explained in a more detailed way a few lines
later, once again with specific reference to the case of sound. It is in this passage that the
occurrence of τὰ φωνήεντα as units for sounds reveals its importance for the passage of
Aristotle's Metaphysics from which we started:
Phil., 18b6-d2 (trans. Fowler 1975)
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν
εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος—ὡς
λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι
λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ
κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀ•ὰ πλείω, καὶ
πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόÕου δὲ
μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων
εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο
τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
διῄρει τά τε ἄφθοÕα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς
ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ
Soc. When some one, whether god or godlike
man—there is an Egyptian story that his name was
Theuth—observed that sound was infinite, he was
the first to notice that the vowel sounds in that
infinity were not one, but many, and again that
there were other elements which were not vowels
but did have a sonant quality, and that these also
had a definite number; and he distinguished a third
kind of letters which we now call mutes. Then he
divided the mutes until he distinguished each
individual one, and he treated the vowels and
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τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν
ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύμπασι στοιχεῖον
ἐπωνόμασε· καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ’
ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν
μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς
ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα
μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν
τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.
semivowels in the same way, until he knew the
number of them and gave to each and all the name
of letters. Perceiving, however, that none of us
could learn any one of them alone by itself without
learning them all, and considering that this was a
common bond which made them in a way all one,
he assigned to them all a single science and called
it grammar.
Socrates expounds a step-by-step process through which Protarchus can derive a
correspondence between sounds and numbers. This process seems to involve the choice of
an appropriate unit to get to know the plurality of items which forms a group of things.
Within the explanation of this operation, Socrates talks about vowels (τὰ φωνήεντα)
alongside letters which, despite having some sound, have no vocal sound (τὰ ἄφωνα); all of
them, in his narrative, are given a specific name by Theuth. If we accept the parallel with the
lines of Iota 2 which mention sound, this passage could explain why Aristotle talks
specifically about στοιχεῖον φωνῆεν and not simply στοιχεῖον: Plato and the Pythagoreans
would consider τὰ φωνήεντα to be the specific units of measurement of vocal sounds
(στοιχεῖα).242
Before summarising my reconstruction of Aristotle's argument, I should like to call
attention to a final passage from the Philebus which, I submit, suggests a way to understand
the second half of the argument in Iota 2. While trying to discover an adequate definition of
pleasure and knowledge, at 52e-53c Socrates formulates a criterion to analyse them in their
purest form, asking: ‘What kind of thing is most closely related to truth? The pure (τὸ
καθαρόν) and unadulterated (τὸ εἰλικρινές), or the violent, the widespread, the great, and the
sufficient?’. He begins precisely from the case of whiteness (τὸ λευκόν):
242The Philebus passage also mentions semi-vowels and consonants—cf. Poetics, 1456b25-30; see also Met. 1016b21-
22. However, if the compact argument at Met. 1054a1-2 is supposed to work as the case of colours, then we can
imagine that consonants and semi-vowels are respectively total and partial deprivations of vowels as black and
intermediate colours are different degrees of privation of white.
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Phil., 53a5-b7 (trans. Fowler 1975)
ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης
ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ
τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμία
μοῖρα ἄ•η μηδενὸς ἐνείη;
ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ’ εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.
ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ὦ
Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κά•ιστον τῶν λευκῶν
πάντων θήσομεν, ἀ•’ οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ
μέγιστον;
ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατά γε.
ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν
μεμειγμένου πο•οῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα
καὶ κά•ιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν
γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς.
ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
Soc. How can we have purity in whiteness,
and what purity? Is it the greatest and most
widespread, or the most unmixed, that in which
there is no trace of any other colour?
Pro. Clearly it is the most unadulterated.
Soc. Right. Shall we not, then, Protarchus,
declare that this, and not the most numerous or
the greatest, is both the truest and the most
beautiful of all whitenesses?
Pro. Quite right.
Soc. Then we shall be perfectly right in saying
that a little pure white is whiter and more
beautiful and truer than a great deal of mixed
white.
Pro. Perfectly right.
Besides having some resonance in Aristotle's own account of colours and—more
generally—measures, this passage can suggest the reason Aristotle in Iota specifically
mentions white and the case of colours. Among the examples that Aristotle could have come
up with, the role of white as a unit for colours is not only acceptable from his own
perspective (in that it constitutes the beginning of the spectrum of colours) but is also the
most evident case with which Aristotle's adversaries could agree.
The mention of τὸ λευκόν introduces me to the last step of my reconstruction of the
second half of Iota 2's argument against the substantiality of the one, which will see the
return of some form of Eleaticism lurking behind these Pythagorean doctrines.
3.4.3. Eleatic predication
Thus far, I have suggested that the second half of Iota 2 starts with a Pythagorean view but
argues against an inference that the Pythagoreans mistakenly make: colours (sounds, shapes,
etc.) are numbers but not in the sense that the definition of each colour is a number. To
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appreciate this move fully, I should like to compare this passage of Iota with the argument
Aristotle levels against Parmenides in Physics 1.3, which I analysed in section 1.4.2.2 of this
dissertation.
And the same sorts of arguments apply to Parmenides too, even if certain other
arguments are specific [to him]. The solution [to Parmenides' argument] is partly that it
is false, and partly that it does not establish its conclusion. It is false because it assumes
that being is said in a single way, when in fact it is said in many ways. And it is
inconclusive because if the white things were assumed to be the only things, and if the
white signifies one thing, nevertheless the white things will be many and not one. For
the white will not be one by continuity, nor in account. For to be white and to be the
thing that has received [it] will be different—and there will not be anything separate
beyond the white; for it is not by being separate but in being that the white and that to
which it belongs are different. But Parmenides did not yet see this. ( Phys., 186a22-31;
trans. Clarke 2019)
The two refutations rely on a similar thought experiment; however, what is crucial for
understanding the Iota passage is that the premise of this thought experiment is, in both
cases, a monistic assumption. While this is explicitly stated in the Physics, it cannot be
appreciated in the Metaphysics until we draw a fully-fledged parallel. As we saw in the first
chapter of this dissertation, Aristotle's rejection of Parmenides' monism tackles his view of
being, which Aristotle insists must be spoken of in many ways. However, in the lines of
Physics 1.3 just quoted, Aristotle provisionally endorses a Parmenidean-style premise; he
imagines a world in which there is only one being, namely the white. His argument there is
to the effect that, even on this assumption, we would need to draw a distinction between
being white and being a white thing; which implies that in truth there turn out to be not one
but at least two beings, that is, as many as there are white things (in this case, one) plus the
colour white. As I explained in greater detail, the distinction which Parmenides failed to
appreciate is, to Aristotle's mind, that between essential and accidental predication.
In the Metaphysics too, although within a different context, Aristotle begins by granting
the assumption which he wants to reject as absurd. This move should give us important
information with respect to two points: what Aristotle's specific polemic target is and what
165
the underlying assumption is that gives rise to their absurd view. As in the case of Physics 1,
the if-clause of Aristotle's argument contains the thesis that he wants to reject, namely, that
beings are numbers and that being is one. Now, while Aristotle's Plato would endorse the
tenet that being is one, it is rather the Pythagoreans who (again, on Aristotle's
reconstruction) defended the view that beings are numbers. Hence, here too Aristotle is
clearly applying the dialectical strategy which he had deployed in his rejection of
Parmenides. However, he is also doing more than this: in Iota 2, Aristotle is replaying a
version of his argument against Parmenidean monism to embarrass not only Plato but also
the Pythagoreans. In other words, the Pythagoreans too are shown to relapse into some form
of the fault diagnosed in the case of Parmenides in view of their naïve conception of
predication. In the case of the Pythagoreans, the absurd consequence of granting that beings
are numbers is not that being would therefore involve plurality (Pythagoreans were not strict
monists). Rather, even on the assumption that being is a number, Aristotle tries to show that
being is not a number in the sense that number is the definition of being. However, taking
this parallel to its ultimate conclusion, Pythagorean ontology too turns out to rest on the
assumption that being is spoken of in only one way. On the basis of Aristotle's discontent
with Parmenides, we can say that the Pythagoreans, just like Parmenides, failed to grasp
precisely the distinction between accidental and essential predication. This is made explicit
in the final section of Alpha's survey of Aristotle's predecessors (A.5), which I shall use to
summarise my reconstruction of the argument:
Met., 987a13-27 (trans. Ross 1963)
οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι δύο μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν εἰρήκασι τρόπον, τοσοῦτον
δὲ προσεπέθεσαν ὃ καὶ ἴδιόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν,
ὅτι τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον [καὶ τὸ
ἓν] οὐχ ἑτέρας τινὰς ᾠήθησαν εἶναι φύσεις,
οἷον πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ἀ•’
αὐτὸ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν οὐσίαν εἶναι
τούτων ὧν κατηγοροῦνται, διὸ καὶ ἀριθμὸν
εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν πάντων. περί τε τούτων οὖν
But the Pythagoreans have said in the same way
that there are two principles, but added this much,
which is peculiar to them, that they thought that
finitude and infinity were not attributes of certain
other things, e.g. of fire or earth or anything else of
this kind, but that infinity itself and unity itself were
the substance of the things of which they are
predicated. This is why number was the substance
of all things. On this subject, then, they expressed
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τοῦτον ἀπεφήναντο τὸν τρόπον, καὶ περὶ
τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἤρξαντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὁρί-
ζεσθαι, λίαν δ’ ἁπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν.
ὡρίζοντ ό τε γὰρ ἐπιπολαίως, καὶ ᾧ πρώτῳ
ὑπάρξειεν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος, τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὴν
οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ εἴ
τις οἴοιτο ταὐτὸν εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ τὴν
δυάδα διότι πρῶτον ὑπάρχει τοῖς δυσὶ τὸ
διπλάσιον. ἀ•’ οὐταὐτὸν ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι
διπλασίῳ καὶ δυάδι· εἰ δὲ μή, πο•ὰ τὸ ἓν
ἔσται, ὃ κἀκείνοις συνέβαινεν.
themselves thus; and regarding the question of
essence they began to make statements and
definitions, but treated the matter too simply. For
they both defined superficially and thought that the
first subject of which a given definition was
predicable was the substance of the thing defined,
as if one supposed that ‘double’ and ‘2’ were the
same, because 2 is the first thing of which ‘double’ is
predicable. But surely to be double and to be 2 are
not the same; if they are, one thing will be many—a
consequence which they actually drew.
In this passage Aristotle attributes to Plato and to the Pythagoreans the same view of
substance. Crucially, he phrases the latter's tenet in a manner which brings to the fore the
source of their mistake: the Pythagoreans claim that number is the substance of all things
because they think that the infinite and the one are the substances of the things of which
they are predicated.243 This suggests that, on Aristotle's interpretation, the Pythagoreans
thought that, if x is predicated of y, then x is the substance of y—which is precisely the
assumption against which Aristotle argues in the passages of Iota in question. Moreover,
Aristotle also emphasises that the Pythagoreans' search for definitions was rudimentary, by
pointing to an example (number two and being double) and an absurd consequence: several
different things end up having one and the same essence and definition (e.g. two).244
Keeping in mind the Aristotelian account of Pythagoreanism, we can finally appreciate
Aristotle's argument in Iota 2 as part of his broader discussion of aporia 11. The objection
Aristotle levels against the Pythagoreans here is one that starts from Pythagorean premises
and reveals their weakness. At this point of the argument, the assumption that the one is the
substance of all things has been seriously undermined. The second half of the argument
completes the refutation by showing that granting that assumption does not commit us to
drawing the conclusion the Pythagoreans drew. If this reconstruction is correct, Aristotle is
243As Z.11 emphasises, this is also the position of some Platonists, see Met., 1036b13-20.
244Alexander ad loc. makes the following example: the same number was regarded as the essence of both critical
time (καιρός) and of Athena. The parallel passage in Z.11 refers to number two and being double, too.
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here deploying a dialectical tactic similar to that we found in the Physics, which aims at
resolution (λύσις). In turn, this approach differs from the dialectic of Beta: while there
Aristotle mainly focused on Plato's position, in Iota the Pythagoreans receive a considerable
amount of attention. Finally, this section of Aristotle's argument contributes to the
resolution of the aporia in a further sense. In fact, unlike the Physics, the second half of Iota
2's argument starts from a premise that Aristotle himself would endorse, namely that there is
a sense in which beings—or at the very least the kinds of being he mentions in the argument
—are numbers.
As I observed at the beginning of this section, the second half of Aristotle's solution relies
upon the results of his own inquiry into the one in the previous chapter of Iota. Specifically,
(i) a name/thing distinction (1052b1-14); (ii) the definition of ‘one’ as ‘unit of measurement’
(1052b18-19); (iii) the view that one is not itself a number (1053a27-30) but is the principle of
number (1052b23-24). In the next section I shall clarify each of these points.
3.5. Aristotle's definition of the one
The first chapter of Metaphysics Iota constitutes Aristotle's lengthiest account of the one.
In its opening lines, Aristotle begins by reminding the reader that the one is spoken of in
many ways, as is stated ‘in the works which distinguish in how many ways things are said’—
in all likelihood Delta. When compared with Δ.6, I.1 narrows down its analysis to the
understandings per se of ‘being one’,245 which Aristotle recapitulates as follows:
Met., 1052a34-1052b1 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
λέγεται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν τοσαυταχῶς, (1a)
τό τε συνεχὲς φύσει καὶ (1b) τὸ ὅλον, καὶ
(2a) τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον καὶ (2b) τὸ καθόλου,
πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἓν τῷ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι τῶν
μὲν (1) τὴν κίνησιν τῶν δὲ (2) τὴν νόησιν ἢ
τὸν λόγον.
The one, then, is said in these many ways: (1a) the
continuous by nature and (1b) the whole, and (2a)
the particular and (2b) the universal; and all these
things are one because, in the former case, (1) their
motion, in the latter cases, (2) their thought or their
account is indivisible.
245Castelli 2018a, 24–5.
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The common element of this fourfold definition is indivisibility: something is one if it is
indivisible either in motion or in thought and account. The idea that, generally speaking,
unity equals indivisibility is endorsed in different places in the Aristotelian corpus. 246
However, as we shall see shortly, Aristotle also refers to a more specific understanding of
‘being one’, i.e. ‘being a unit of measurement’. To prepare the ground for this further
characterisation, he introduces an important distinction which will require some
clarification:
Met., 1052b1-14 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
 —δεῖ δὲ κατανοεῖν ὅτι οὐχ ὡσαύτως
ληπτέον λέγεσθαι ποῖά τε ἓν λέγεται,
καὶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ
λόγος. λέγεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοσαυ-
ταχῶς, καὶ ἕκαστον ἔσται ἓν τούτων, ᾧ
ἂν ὑπάρχῃ τις τούτων τῶν τρόπων· τὸ δὲ
ἑνὶ εἶναι ὁτὲ μὲν τούτων τινὶ ἔσται, ὁτὲ
δὲ ἄ•ῳ ὃ καὶ μᾶ•ον ἐÕὺς τῷ ὀνόματί
ἐστι, τῇ δυνάμει δ’ ἐκεῖνα, ὥσπερ καὶ
περὶ στοιχείου καὶ αἰτίου εἰ δέοι λέγειν
ἐπί τε τοῖς πράγμασι διορίζοντα καὶ τοῦ
ὀνόματος ὅρον ἀποδιδόντα. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ
ὡς στοιχεῖον τὸ πῦρ (ἔστι δ’ ἴσως καθ’
αὑτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἤ τι ἄ•ο τοιοῦτον),
ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὔ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πυρὶ καὶ
στοιχείῳ εἶναι, ἀ•’ ὡς μὲν πρᾶγμά τι
καὶ φύσις τὸ πῦρ στοιχεῖον, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα
σημαίνει τὸ τοδὶ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ,
ὅτι ἐστί τι ἐκ τούτου ὡς πρώτου
ἐνυπάρχοντος.
One ought to understand also that saying what sort
of things are said to be one and what it is to be one and
what its account is should not be taken as the same. For
the one is said in these many ways, and each of those
things to which one or other of these ways belongs is
one; but being one sometimes will be being in one or
other of these ways, but sometimes it will be being
something else which is rather close to the name—
while those are rather close to its [sc. the name's]
power. This is the same as in the case of element and
cause, if one had to speak by defining them with
reference to things and by giving the definition of the
name. For in a way fire is an element (and perhaps also
the infinite and something else of this kind is <an
element> in its own right), but in a way it is not: for
being fire and being an element are not the same.
Rather, fire is an element as a certain thing and nature,
whereas the name signifies that this feature belongs to
it, namely that something is made out of it as a primary
constituent.
Aristotle draws attention to the fact that (I) saying what sort of things are Xs is different
from saying (II) what X is and what the definition of X is. Specifically, it is one thing to speak
246See 1.4.1.2, where I surveyed the descriptions of τὸ ἕν in the Corpus Aristotelicum.
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of X with reference to things (i.e. ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι διορίζοντα), another thing is to provide the
definition of the name X (i.e. τοῦ ὀνόματος ὅρον ἀποδιδόντα). At first sight, Aristotle is thus
formulating a basic name/thing distinction, according to which names (or words) do not
coincide with the things (or objects) that they define and are, as such, different from them.
However, the details of this distinction are far from straightforward. Specifically, Aristotle
bases his distinction upon the puzzling opposition between a name and its power: δύναμις. I
shall deal with two problems connected with the notion of ‘δύναμις of a name’: first, how we
should understand it in this context and, second, how this notion clarifies the point made in
Iota 1.
Surely, the first meaning of δύναμις one would think of in Aristotle's Metaphysics is that of
potentiality, as opposed to actuality.247 However, such a meaning would raise two problems.
First, it is hard to accommodate this technical use to our context. Second, as Castelli
emphasises, the form with the definite article, ‘τῇ δυνάμει’, can hardly be understood as
equivalent to the adverbial use of the dative ‘δυνάμει’ (‘potentially’).248 As such, δύναμις here
should not be understood in the technical sense. Further, Aristotle is contrasting the δύναμις
of a name with something ‘rather close to the name’. This suggests that we should not intend
δύναμις in a sense opposed to actuality but instead in one opposed to ὄνομα. What could such
a sense be?
Ross translates ἡ δύναμις in this context as ‘the power [of a name]’ and understands it as
the force or application of a given word: extension as opposed to intension or denotation as
opposed to connotation. As Castelli warns, this reading needs some qualifications. In fact,
the first four characterisations of ‘one’ which we have encountered so far are general
descriptions, not things.249 That said, an understanding along the lines suggested by Ross can
be supported by two parallels, respectively from Plato's Cratylus and from Aristotle's Prior
Analytics:250
247On which see Makin 2006, xxii–vii.
248Castelli 2018a, 45. The Arabic has bi-l-quwwati, which preserves the ambiguity of the Greek, in that it means
either ‘potentially’ (lit. ‘by the capacity’) or ‘[closer] to the power’.
249Castelli 2018a, 46.
250See Ademollo 2011, chapter 4.
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Crat., 394a4-b6 (trans. Ademollo 2011)
ΣΩ. (…) κλητέον δὴ ταὐτὰ ὀνόματα.
ποικί•ειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς συ•αβαῖς, ὥστε
δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι
ἀ•ήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν
ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ ὀσμαῖς
πεποικιλμένα ἄ•α φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα,
τῷ δέ γε ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρ-
μάκων σκοπουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ
οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων. οὕτω
δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων
τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ-
πλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετά-
κειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄ•οις παντά-
πασιν γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος
δύναμις.
 Soc. (…) So we must call them by the same
names. But variation in syllables is possible, so that
names which are really the same might seem to the
uninitiated to be different from each other – as the
physician’s drugs, if they are prepared so as to vary
in colour and smell, appear different to us even
though they are the same, whereas to the physician,
who considers the power of drugs, they appear the
same, and he is not perplexed by the additives. In
the same way, I think, the one who knows about
names too considers their power and is not
perplexed if some letter is added or transposed or
has been subtracted, or even if the name’s power is
embodied in completely different letters.
APr, 49b3-9 (trans. Jenkinson 1984)
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν ἃ τὸ αὐτὸ
δύναται, ὀνόματα ἀντ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ
λόγους ἀντὶ λόγων καὶ ὄνομα καὶ λόγον,
καὶ ἀεὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τοὔνομα λαμβάνειν·
ῥᾴων γὰρ ἡ τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσις. οἷον εἰ
μηδὲν διαφέρει εἰπεῖν τὸ ὑποληπτὸν τοῦ
δοξαστοῦ μὴ εἶναι γένος ἢ μὴ εἶναι ὅπερ
ὑποληπ-τόν τι τὸ δοξαστόν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ τὸ
σημαινόμενον), ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ
λεχθέντος τὸ ὑποληπτὸν καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν
ὅρους θετέον.
We ought also to substitute terms which have the
same value, word for word, and phrase for phrase,
and word and phrase, and always take a word in
preference to a phrase; for thus the setting out of the
terms will be easier. For example if it makes no
difference whether we say that the supposable is not
the genus of the opinable or that the opinable is not
identical with a particular kind of supposable (for
what is signified is the same), it is better to take as
terms the supposable and the opinable in preference
to the phrase suggested.
The Cratylus passage is particularly interesting because it explicitly mentions the δύναμις
of a name. However, Socrates is explicitly drawing an analogy with the powers of drugs, so
we cannot be sure that the passage witnesses a common usage of the word δύναμις with
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reference to ὀνόματα. By contrast, in the Aristotelian passage, the verb δύναμαι is clearly used
in the sense of ‘to signify’. Thus, these passages suggest that the distinction Aristotle has in
mind in Iota 1 could be encapsulated by the opposition word/reference. As such, Aristotle is
drawing attention to the fact that sometimes we talk about unity by indicating a feature
which belongs to a thing, while at other times we give the definition of the word ‘one’. Before
focusing on this newly introduced characterisation of τὸ ἕν, let us see how this
understanding of δύναμις clarifies the passage from which we began.
By following a pattern similar to that of Z.1, I.1 commences with a list of four fundamental
senses in which we predicate ‘one’ in its own right. Next, Aristotle emphasises that, although
every thing to which one of these four senses applies is going to be ‘one’, there is a sense of
‘being one’ which is closest to the definition of the word ἕν and which signifies the four
understandings seen above. In other words, on my reconstruction of the passage, Aristotle
distinguishes two ways in which we can speak of ‘one’: (I) if we focus on what the word ‘one’
signifies—that is, on its δύναμις—then we will define as ‘one’ every πρᾶγμα which has the
property of being indivisible; (II) if instead we focus on the definition of the ὄνομα ‘one’, what
we yield is the sense of ‘unit of measurement’. Once this distinction has been clarified, the
example of element and fire is a direct application of it. As is confirmed by Δ.3, the definition
of the noun ‘στοιχεῖον’ is ‘being the first component’ out of which each thing is made; what
the noun then signifies (σημαίνει, 1052b13) is that the thing ‘fire’ has precisely this property.
Thus, we say that fire is an element because of the sense of the word ‘element’, but this does
not imply that element and fire are the same thing. When we define what an element is, we
also capture some features that fire happens to have, but being an element and being fire are
still clearly distinct. So, Aristotle is not distinguishing between extension (fire, the infinite,
etc.) and intension (‘first component’), nor is he saying that ‘element’ denotes ‘first
component’ but connotes fire. Unfortunately, though, the case of ‘one’ involves a further
complication, which I shall consider in the next section: what is the relationship between
‘indivisible’ and ‘unit of measurement’?
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3.5.1. Being one, being indivisible, being a measure
In order to reconstruct Aristotle's point, I shall now consider the most puzzling passage of
the whole chapter,251 where Aristotle seems to elucidate the relationship between
indivisibility and measure. Here is Castelli's translation, which I shall slightly modify on the
basis of the Arabic translation (provided below).
Met., 1052b14-20 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ αἰτίου καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν
τοιούτων ἁπάντων, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι τὸ
ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι, ὅπερ τόδε ὄντι καὶ
ἀχωρίστῳ ἢ τόπῳ ἢ εἴδει ἢ διανοίᾳ, ἢ
καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ διωρισμένῳ, μάλιστα δὲ
τῷ μέτρον εἶναι πρῶτον ἑκάστου γένους
καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ
ἐπὶ τὰ ἄ•α ἐλήλυθεν.
This is the case also with reference to cause and one
and all such things. For this reason, too, being one is
being indivisible, which is precisely being a this and
being inseparable either in place or in form or in
thought, or also with respect to what it is to be a
determinate whole, and most of all by being the
primary measure of each genus and, in the strictest
sense, of quantity: for from this case it has been
extended to the other things.
Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1243.2–7
wa-ka-ḏālika l-anniyyatu ayḍan wa-l-
wāḥidu wa-ǧamīʿu llatī fī miṯli hāḏihi wa-li-
ḏālika anniyyatu l-wāḥidi hiya bi-annahu lā
yutaǧazzaʾ wa-huwa lammā kāna hāḏā l-
šayʾa wa-kāna ġayra muftariqin bi-makānin
aw ṣūratin aw wahmin wa-kāna kullan wa-
maḥdūdan ayḍan ṣāra lahu bi-anna yakūna
akṯara min ġayrihi mikyālun awwalun li-kulli
ǧinsin wa-li-l-kammiyyati l-musawwadati
ǧiddan wa-min hāhunā ṣāra ilà l-ašyāʾi l-uḫari
And the same applies to essence [sic] too
and to the one and to all those things which are
like these. And for this reason the essence of
the one is insofar as it is undivided, namely
since it is this thing and [since] it is unsplit in
space or form or imagination and [since] it is
whole and determinate, also,252 it belongs to it
[sc. the one] insofar as there is, above all else, a
first measure in each genus and in the
predominant253 quantity [sic]: from here it
extended to the other things.
251 Castelli 2018a, 257.
252 In the Arabic it is not clear whether ‘also’ modifies the sentence before or after.
253 The Arabic translates κυριώτατα quite literally, but as an adjective which agrees with ‘quantity’.
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Despite some oddities, the Arabic makes good sense of the text and suggests the following
reading of lines 1052b14-20:
διὸ καὶ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι τῷ ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι, ὅπερ τόδε ὄντι καὶ ἀδιαχωρίστῳ ἢ τόπῳ ἢ εἴδει
ἢ διανοίᾳ, ἢ καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ διωρισμένῳ, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ μέτρον εἶναι πρῶτον ἑκάστου γένους
καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ.
The Arabic translation confirms Castelli's reading of τῷ instead of τὸ at b17, of διωρισμένῳ
instead of ἀδιαιρέτῳ at b17-18 and of τῷ μέτρον εἶναι πρῶτον (with all manuscripts) at b18.
However, the translator (Usṭāṯ) does not regard the dative τῷ as expressing the respect with
reference to which something can be inseparable, but as a further explanation of ‘being
indivisible’. As such, something is indivisible insofar as it is a ‘this’ without internal divisions
or insofar as it is a determinate whole. Interestingly, Usṭāṯ also reads τῷ (instead of τὸ) at
b16,254 which suggests the following translation:
For this reason, being one too is <one> by being indivisible,255 which is precisely
being a this and being unsplittable either in place or in form or in thought, or also
being what is a whole and a determinate thing, but, most of all, by being a primary
measure of each genus and, in the strictest sense, of quantity.
Finally, there is another point in which the Arabic suggests a reading of the Greek
different from Castelli's, which, however, corroborates her interpretation. At b17, instead of
either ἰδίᾳ χωριστῷ or ἀχωρίστῳ, the Arabic is unmistakably a translation of ‘ἀδιαχωρίστῳ’. In
fact, the word muftariqun is the participle of the verb مفترق iftaraqa, which means ‘to إفترق
be or become separated or disunited’; if Usṭāṯ had read ἀχωρίστῳ, we would have expected
the verb faraqa, which means, quite generally, ‘to make a separation, a distinction or فرق
difference between two things’. To be sure, the meanings of the words ἀδιαχώριστος and
ἀχώριστος overlap, at least partially, in many contexts; after all, they are both compounds of
the same verb, χωρίζω, ‘to divide’. This is confirmed by the only occurrence of ‘ἀδιαχώριστος’
in the Aristotelian corpus:
254This is witnessed by E, which corrects τῷ to τὸ.
255 Paralleled by Met., 1052a36, where τῷ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι is translated into Arabic precisely as bi-annahā lā
yutaǧazzaʾ, ‘insofar as they are undivided’ (Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1237.4).
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EE, 1219b32-36 (trans. Rackham 1981)
διαφέρει δ’ οὐδὲν οὔτ’ εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ
οὔτ’ εἰ ἀμερής, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις δια-
φόρους καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ
καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδια-
χώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· καίτοι
τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, ἀ•ὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
It makes no difference if the soul is divided into
parts or lacks parts, as it certainly has distinct
capacities, including the ones mentioned—just as
in a curve the concave and convex are inseparable,
and the white and the straight may be, though the
straight is not white, except incidentally, and not in
its own nature.
In fact, here, the kind of separation Aristotle is talking about is a disjunction of the
concave from the convex belonging to one and the same curve. As such, in this passage,
ἀδιαχώριστον is best understood as disjoined from something else, rather than split into more
basic components. However, the other occurrences of words derived from διαχωρίζω do testify
a more restricted meaning;256 of these I shall consider only the clearest case for our purposes.
When, in the Generation of Animals, Aristotle wonders why some animals generate
numerous offspring from one single act of coition, he observes:
GA, 723b12-16 (trans. Peck 1943)
μίαν γὰρ ἀπόκρισιν ἀπὸ μιᾶς
ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι συνουσίας καὶ
μιᾶς διακρίσεως. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὑστέραις
χωρίζεσθαι ἀδύνατον· ἤδη γὰρ ὥσπερ
ἀπὸ ζῴου, οὐ σπέρματος εἴη ἡ δια-
χώρισις.
One act of coition, and one effort of segregation,
ought necessarily to give rise to one secretion and no
more. That it should get divided up in the uterus is
impossible, for by that time the division would be made
as it were from a new plant or animal, not of semen.
Here Aristotle is clearly talking about a process of division by using first the verb χωρίζω
and then a substantive that stems from διαχωρίζω. As such, the passage confirms that, while
χωρίζω might carry a broader or a narrower meaning, in Aristotle's corpus διαχωρίζω can also
mean ‘to split one whole into two parts’.
Although the text preserves a great deal of obscurity, Usṭāṯ's version sheds some light on
these lines. In particular, not only does it emphasise that the most precise description of
256GA, 744b1 (διαχωρίζεσθαι); Met., 1023a23 (διαχωρισθέντα).
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‘one’ for Aristotle is ‘unit of measurement’, but it also introduces the question of its
relationship with the description of the one as ‘being indivisible’. In this section I shall show
t hat the one is a unit of measurement because it is indivisible, not vice versa. This
reconstruction is suggested by some important details that Aristotle adds in the remainder
of Iota 1. First, he points out that in all cases of measurement what we seek as a unit is
something one and indivisible (ἕν τι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, 1052b32, b34), which is identified with
what is simple either in quality or in quantity (τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἢ τῷ ποιῷ ἢ τῷ ποσῷ, b35).
Specifically, in all cases we take as a unit of measurement that to which it seems impossible
to add anything and from which it seems impossible to subtract anything (δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι
ἀφελεῖν ἢ προσθεῖναι). Accordingly, it is because unit (τὴν μονάδα) is taken to be indivisible in
all respects (τιθέασι πάντῃ ἀδιαίρετον) that it is the most precise measure. This description
clarifies that measuring always involves some degree of arbitrariness; however, a measure is
most precise when our unit has the highest degree of indivisibility, at least with respect to
perception (κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, 1053a5). Second—and more interestingly—Aristotle points
out that measure is not always one in number. For example, semitones are one with respect
to hearing but are two in their ratios. Accordingly, a semitone is one insofar as it is the
smallest unit of sound which we are able to perceive, despite it being further divisible into
two (smaller semitones). In other words, genuine indivisibility is a sufficient but not
necessary condition for being a unit of measurement. While all that is genuinely indivisible
is a unit of measurement of the kind to which it belongs, not all units of measurement are
indivisible in all respects. This means that some units of measurement are not indivisible
without qualification, but only insofar as they are taken as units of measurement. On this
reconstruction, this is precisely the sense of the concluding lines of Iota 1, which read as
follows:
Met., 1053b3-8 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι μάλιστά
ἐστι κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ἀφορίζουσι μέ-
τρον τι, καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ,
εἶτα τοῦ ποιοῦ, φανερόν· ἔσται δὲ
τοιοῦτον τὸ μὲν ἂν ᾖ ἀδιαίρετον
It is evident then that, for those who define in
accordance with the name, to be one is most of all a certain
measure and, in the strictest sense, of quantity, and then of
quality; and, in one case, that which is indivisible in
quantity, in the other case that which is indivisible in
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κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τὸ
ποιόν· διόπερ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ ἓν ἢ
ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ ἕν.
quality will be of this sort. And it is precisely for this reason
that the one is indivisible either without qualification or as
one.
It is now clear that the nominal definition of one is ‘unit of measurement’ and that, as
such, τὸ ἕν always indicates an indivisible thing, whether or not that corresponds to
something which is genuinely indivisible. This passage also sheds some light on how the
example of fire is helpful in understanding the distinction between the two senses of ‘one’
which were outlined at 1052b15-19. On the one hand, fire is indeed an element in the sense
that it is a thing (πρᾶγμα) of which we predicate ‘first component’. However, on the other,
being fire is not being an element, because the name (ὄνομα) ‘element’ means something
other than the name ‘fire’. In short, being fire is sufficient but not necessary for being an
element. Likewise, on the one hand, each indivisible thing is one in the sense that we say
that it is ‘indivisible in quantity or in quality’; however, on the other hand, the name ‘one’
means something other than the name ‘indivisible’, for it means ‘unit of measurement’. In
other words, while, qua thing, the one is always something indivisible, the name ‘one’
signifies that that indivisible thing is a unit of measurement.257
There is a final notion that we should bear in mind before returning to the very last step
of the resolution of aporia 11: what it means to measure.258 At 1053a18-21, Aristotle draws the
following conclusion from his discussion of μέτρον. The reason that the one is the measure of
all things is that we know what the substance of something is made up of (ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ
οὐσία) precisely by dividing on the basis of quantity (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν) or on the basis of form
(κατὰ τὸ εἶδος). Crucially, he then explains that, therefore, the one is indivisible because what
is primary in each case (τὸ πρῶτον ἑκάστου) is indivisible. Thus, Aristotle works with a notion
of measurement which consists in discovering the compositionally basic element of each
kind of things and, consequently, expressing all the other items of that kind as somehow
standing in a ratio with that unit. Since we arrive at what is primary as a result of progressive
divisions, the unit of a kind K is always going to be the most indivisible element belonging to
257 Accordingly, unlike Morrison 1993, 151–2, I do not think that ‘measure’ is the original, but metaphysically
inadequate concept of unity.
258On which see Sattler 2017.
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K. It is in this sense that the one is a unit of measurement insofar as it is indivisible and not
vice versa. What is crucial, then, is that every μέτρον is a μέτρον by being the most indivisible
item of a kind K. This is precisely what grounded Aristotle's rejection of the Pythagorean one:
everything is one by being one thing.
3.5.2. The convertibility of being and the one
As we have seen throughout this chapter, in Iota 2 Aristotle expresses his last word on the
hardest aporia of those formulated in Beta 1. He will not return to his argument in the rest of
the book but will instead proceed to examine the one/many opposition; nor will he mention
this discussion in the remaining books of the Metaphysics. That Aristotle thinks he has
settled the question of being and the one is also confirmed by the lines which end Iota 2's
argument:
Met., 1054a9-19 (trans. Castelli 2018a)
—ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν ἐν ἅπαντι
γένει ἐστί τις φύσις, καὶ οὐδενὸς
τοῦτό γ’ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις τὸ ἕν, φανερόν,
ἀ•’ ὥσπερ ἐν χρώμασι χρῶμα ἓν
ζητητέον αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν
οὐσίᾳ οὐσίαν μίαν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν· ὅτι δὲ
ταὐτὸ σημαίνει πως τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν,
δῆλον (ι.1) τῷ τε παρακολουθεῖν ἰσα-
χῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐν
μηδεμιᾷ (οἷον οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ τί ἐστιν οὔτ’
ἐν τῇ ποῖον, ἀ•’ ὁμοίως ἔχει ὥσπερ
τὸ ὄ ν ) κα ὶ (ι.2) τῷ μὴ προσ-
κατηγορεῖσθαι ἕτερόν τι τὸ εἷς
ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἄνθρωπος (ὥσπερ
οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τὸ τί ἢ ποῖον ἢ
πόσον) καὶ (ι.3) <τῷ εἶναι> τὸ ἑνὶ
εἶναι τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι.
It is therefore evident, on the one hand, that the one in
each genus is a certain nature and that this very same
thing, i.e. the one, is not the nature of anything, but as in
colours the one itself must be investigated as one colour, so
in substance, too, the one itself has to be investigated as
one substance. On the other hand, that the one in some
sense signifies the same as being, is clear (ι.1) in virtue of
the fact that it follows the categories in the same number
of ways and that it is in none of them (e.g. it is neither in
the category of the what-it-is nor in the category of of-
what-quality, but it behaves in the same way as being), and
(ι.2) in virtue of the fact that ‘one human being’ does not
add anything else in predication to ‘human being’ (as
being, too, is nothing over and above being a certain
something or of a certain quality or of a certain quantity),
and (ι.3) in virtue of the fact that being one is being for
each thing.
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While these lines belong together syntactically, how they relate to the argument of Iota 2
is not wholly transparent. Specifically, while lines 1054a9-13 clearly hammer home the
general conclusion of Aristotle's discussion, the remainder of the passage seems to elaborate
on a point which had been touched upon only briefly at 1053b25. As a result, it is not clear
whether Aristotle is simply rehashing the two premises of the second half of his resolution of
aporia 11 or whether he is instead framing Iota 2's argument in a broader metaphysical
picture. As Castelli points out, these alternatives need not be regarded as mutually
exclusive.259 Aristotle is most probably returning to the fundamental results of his argument
precisely to elaborate on how they should be understood. However, what needs further
analysis is how we should read this ending in the economy of Aristotle's metaphysical
investigation. In what follows I shall emphasise how lines 1054a13-19 explicitly reconnect
Metaphysics Iota to the research programme that Aristotle had outlined in Gamma.
One striking feature of Iota that has emerged in this chapter is the specific way in which it
draws on the results of previous books of the Metaphysics. Iota explicitly mentions Beta,
Delta and Zeta and is connected, although less explicitly, with Alpha Meizon. In this section I
shall reflect on an argument which we find not only in Iota, but also in Gamma. As we shall
see, in this case too Iota reiterates the familiar pattern according to which previous tenets are
compressed and adapted to serve the purpose of an inquiry into the nature of the one.
Below is how Gamma 2 had introduced the idea that ‘one’ and ‘being’ are somehow one
and the same thing. It is difficult to make sense of the Greek, which, also in this case, differs
from the readings which we find in Averroes' Long Commentary. For the time being, I limit
myself to a general comparison between the Gamma passage and its cousin in Iota; but I
shall discuss the relevant differences in more detail when I analyse the single properties
mentioned in the two texts.
Met., 1003b22-34 (trans. Ross 1963)
εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ταὐτὸν καὶ μία
φύσις (γ.1) τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀ•ήλοις ὥσ-
περ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον, ἀ•’ οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ
δηλούμενα (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν οὐδ’ ἂν
If, now, being and unity are the same and are one
nature (γ.1) because they follow one another as
principle and cause do, not as if they were explained
by the same definition (though it makes no difference
259Castelli 2018a, 88–9, 93–4.
179
ὁμοίως ὑπολάβωμεν, ἀ•ὰ καὶ πρὸ ἔργου
μᾶ•ον)· (γ.2) ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος
καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι δηλοῖ κατὰ
τὴν λέξιν ἐπαναδιπλούμενον τὸ εἷς
ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ὢν ἄνθρωπος ((γ.3)
δῆλον δ’ ὅτι οὐ χωρίζεται οὔτ’ ἐπὶ
γενέσεως οὔτ’ ἐπὶ φθορᾶς), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ
πρόσθεσις ἐν τούτοις ταὐτὸ δηλοῖ, καὶ
οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ ἓν παρὰ τὸ ὄν, ἔτι (γ.4)
δ’ ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία ἕν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι· —
ὥσθ’ ὅσα περ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ
τοῦ ὄντος.
even if we suppose them to be like that—in fact this
would even strengthen our case); (γ.2) for ‘one man’
and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’
and ‘man’, and the doubling of the words in ‘one man’
and ‘one existent man’ does not express anything
different ((γ.3) it is clear that the two things are not
separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be);
and similarly in the case of unity, too, so that it is
obvious that the addition in these cases means the
same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being; and
(γ.4) if, further, the substance of each thing is one in
no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very
nature something that is:—all this being so, there must
be exactly as many species of being as of unity.
At this point of Gamma, Aristotle is resolving a doubt which he had voiced in the book of
aporiai: whether a metaphysical investigation ought to study being only or whether instead it
should also deal with unity and other related notions.260 This means that, unlike in Iota, here
Aristotle is not talking about the one in its own right, but seeks to demarcate the domain of
his inquiry into being qua being. In response to that aporia, Aristotle lists a series of
arguments to the effect that metaphysics should indeed include not only being but also all
such notions as unity, sameness, equality, etc. In a nutshell, he claims that, given that ‘one’
and ‘being’ are convertible predicates, the metaphysician will have to say something about
both. As we saw, Gamma backs up the premise of this reasoning by appealing to four
properties of τὸ ἕν and τὸ ὄν: (γ.1) ‘being’ and ‘one’ follow each other, even though they do not
have the same definition (co-implication); (γ.2) when ‘being’ and ‘one’ are predicated of
something, they do not add any information to that of which they are predicated
(neutrality); (γ.3) all that comes to be or ceases to be does so as something one and as
something that is (inseparability); (γ.4) the substance of each thing is necessarily both one
and something that is (co-incidentality).
260This aporia is first formulated at B.1, 995b18-36 and reprised at B.2, 997a25-34.
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If we compare this list with the properties mentioned in Iota, we can remark some slight
differences, which are worth exploring. As we saw at the beginning of this section, Iota
provides the following reasons in support of the convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’: (ι.1) the
one follows from the categories in the same number of ways as being and, as being, is in
none of them (transcategoriality); (ι.2) when ‘one’ is predicated of something, it does not add
any information to that something (neutrality); (ι.3) being one is the same as being each
thing (co-incidentality).
Two general remarks emerge from this comparison. On the one hand, Iota reproduces
only three of the four properties that were presented in the Gamma passage.261 On the other,
it places remarkably greater focus on the one than on being; this can be seen in three clear
instances: (i) the whole argument explicitly starts from the one and draws a comparison with
being (cf. 1054a16: ὁμοίως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν and 1054a17: ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι); (ii) it provides
only one example in support of neutrality (‘one human being’ vs. ‘human being’); (iii) it
mentions co-incidentality only in the case of ‘being one’. We can summarise this brief
comparison in the following table:
γ.1 ι.1 γ.2 = ι.2 γ.3 γ.4 = ι.3
co-implication
trans-
categoriality
neutrality inseparability
co-
incidentality
Gamma 2 ✔ ✘ ✔ ✔ ✔
Iota 2 ✘ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔
As this scheme makes clear, there is a significant overlap between the two lists of
properties. However, while Gamma does not mention transcategoriality, Iota does not
discuss co-implication nor inseparability. Upon closer inspection, though, this slight
divergence is justified by the different contexts to which the convertibility argument is
applied. In fact, as I shall shortly show, transcategoriality is merely a more explicit
formulation of co-implication. As for the absence of inseparability in Iota, it should be noted
that in Gamma this property bolsters convertibility only indirectly, namely as a reason in
261 (ι.1) is clearly a different formulation of (γ.1); we shall see shortly what their relationship is.
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support of neutrality. As a result, this time it is Gamma that provides more detail on a
property—neutrality—which, to be sure, appears in both places.
3.5.2.1. Co-implication and transcategoriality
The first property that Aristotle mentions both in Gamma and in Iota in support of
convertibility corresponds to the general idea that ‘one’ and ‘being’ follow each other:
ἀκολουθεῖν (1003b23), παρακολουθεῖν (1054a14).262 The way in which it is formulated, however,
is slightly different in the two passages. While Gamma 2 expresses it in quite generic terms,
Iota 2 specifically refers to the categories. In other words, Iota makes the point that ‘one’ and
‘being’ are somehow contained in the list of categories, so that each and every category is (as
it were) by default ‘one’ and ‘being’. Thus, the important contribution of Iota in this respect is
that it justifies somewhat more extensively what this property amounts to: the reason that
‘one’ follows ‘being’ is that not only does it apply to all the figures of predication of ‘being’,
but, exactly like ‘being’, it is also not contained in any of them. These conjuncts need some
explanation, especially the second; for, if there are different units in different kinds of things,
how can we say that the one is not in any category? This general obscurity is exacerbated by
the obscurity of the Greek, which is also reflected in the Arabic translation:
262Scholarly opinion diverges on whether these verbs should be understood in a strictly logical sense (‘to follow
from’, hence ‘to be implied by’)—as Kirwan and Ross respectively translate—or in a looser sense (‘to follow’,
hence ‘to occur together with’)—as Halper prefers. Here, I shall stick to the latter option to leave all possibilities
open.
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Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1278.7–10 Greek original
(a) fa-inna anwāʿa mu-
tābaʿatihā li-l-maqūlāti mu-
tasāwiyatun (b) wa-bi-anna an-
niyyatahā laysat wāḥidatan (c)
wa-lā aḥaduhā wāḥidatan (d)
m i ṯ l a mā laysa wāhidun li-l-
maqūlati llatī tuqālu mā hiya
wa-lā li-l-kayfiyyati wāḥidun bal
hiya mutašābihatun miṯla l-
huwiyyati
(a ) for the ways in which they
follow each other in the categories
are <of> equal <number>, and (b)
because their essence is not one (c)
nor is any of them one,263 (d) just as
there is no one in the category
which is called what-it-is nor is
there a one in quality, but they [sc.
the ‘ones’] are similar, like <in the
case of> being.
(a) τῷ τε πα-
ρακολουθεῖν ἰσαχῶς
ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ
(b) μὴ εἶναι ἓν (c)
μηδὲ μίαν264 ((d) οἷον
οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ τί ἐστιν
οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ ποῖον, ἀ•’
ὁμοίως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὸ
ὄν)
In reading this convoluted translation, Averroes refers points (b)-(c) to the categories
rather than to being and the one,265 thus introducing two additional properties: categories do
not have one and the same definition and are not one in number. However, if my
reconstruction of the Greek behind the Arabic is correct, we should rule out this
interpretation, as there is at least one important difficulty with the syntax of the text. Given
that the list of examples after οἷον at 1054a15 ought to exemplify what precedes, it is hard to
see how the fact that there is no ‘one’ in the category of substance could illustrate the idea
that no category is itself one—whatever this obscure claim might mean. However, the Arabic
can still be a useful witness for a different manuscript reading—at the very least insofar as it
is based on a lectio difficilior of the Greek. In particular, we could correct the reading ἓν μηδὲ
μίαν to ἐν μηδεμιᾷ μίαν (which is what we find in manuscript J), yielding the following
translation:
τῷ τε παρακολουθεῖν ἰσαχῶς ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐν μηδεμιᾷ <μίαν> (οἷον
οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ τί ἐστιν οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ ποῖον, ἀ•’ ὁμοίως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν)
263 There is an agreement problem in the Arabic: while ‘any’ is in the masculine form, ‘one’ is in the feminine.
264This reading seems to bear some relation to the α-family: E has ἓν μηδὲ μιᾷ, J has ἐν μηδεμιᾷ μίαν (with μίαν
expunged).
265Averr., Tafsīr 3, 1280.12-1281.3.
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… in virtue of the fact that it closely follows the categories in the same number of
ways and that it [sc. the one] is not <one [sc. category]> in any of them (e.g. it is neither
in the category of the what-it-is nor in the category of of-what-quality, but it behaves in
the same way as being)
This minor change might improve the overall meaning of the passage—although it comes
at the cost of complicating the syntax. On the usual reading of this phrase, Aristotle seems to
contradict himself when he says that the one is not in any category; for, as we saw in section
3.4.2, the one does indeed span the whole range of categories. To save Aristotle from this
imprecision, we need to qualify the negation and assume that what he really means is that
the one is not exhausted by any of the categories. In other words, the remark at 1054a14-15
would be an elliptical reminder of the idea that the one is not limited to (or exclusively in)
any category. Instead, on the alternative—admittedly speculative—reading, Aristotle would
be saying that, while the one follows from each and every category, it is not itself any of the
categories. We saw an example of the idea that ‘one’ applies to all categories at lines 1053b28-
1054a4, where Aristotle had embraced the Empedoclean branch of the eleventh aporia. In all
categories, ‘one’ refers to a specific item of that category or kind; however, the point of
Aristotle's critique of Plato and the Pythagoreans was precisely that the essence of ‘one’
should not be identified with any of these items. In this sense, the one is not an item of any
category. For example, when referring to a quality, the one follows that quality (the one in
colours is one colour, namely white), but its essence is not ‘being that quality’. In other
words, the fact that white is the one of colours does not entail that the definition of ‘one’ is
‘being white’, let alone ‘being a colour’: the definition of ‘one’ is ‘unit of measurement’,
although this comes to indicate different things in different categories. Once it has been
established that the definition of ‘one’ is ‘unit of measurement’ and that quantity only
exemplifies the case where the definition is met in the most precise sense, it is clear that
‘one’ is not in any category in the sense that it is not any of them. I take it that an advantage
of this speculation is that it makes this point more explicit.
3.5.2.2. Neutrality
The second property mentioned in both Gamma and Iota is that when we predicate ‘one’
and/or ‘being’ of some X, we do not add anything to X. Gamma provides considerably more
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detail on neutrality than Iota. However, also in this case, the manuscript transmission shows
important divergences, to which the Arabic translation adds a testimony. I shall first produce
the full text and then compare the different readings in a table.
Averr., Tafsīr 1, 310.5–11
(…) li-anna qawla l-qāʾili insānun
wāḥidun aw insānun huwa aw insānun
hāḏā yadullu ʿalà šayʾin wāḥidin wa-lā
yadullu ʿalà ašyāʾa muḫtalifati iḏā karrarahā
fa-inna l-kalimata266 llatī taqūlu insānun
huwa aw insānun wāḥidun lā tadullu ʿalà
ašyāʾa muḫtalifati iḏ lā fariqa bayna qawli l-
qāʾili insānun huwa aw insānun lā fī l-
kawni wa-lā fī l-fasādi wa-ka-ḏalika l-qawlu
fī l-wāḥidi ayḍan fa-maʿlūmun anna l-
ziyādata fī hāḏihi tadullu ʿalà šayʾin
wāḥidin wa-lā yadullu l-wāḥidu ʿalà šayʾin
aḫarin ġayri l-huwiyyati 
(…) because the expression of somebody
saying ‘one man’ or ‘man that is’ or ‘this man’
indicates something one and does not indicate
different things if it repeats them, because the
word which says ‘man that is’ or ‘one man’ does
not indicate different things since it does not
distinguish between the expression of somebody
saying ‘man that is’ and ‘man’ either in coming to
be or in corruption and likewise also with the
one. Therefore, it is clear that the addition in
these cases indicates one thing and that the one
does not indicate anything different from being.
Ross Jaeger Arabic trans. (?)
1003b25-27
εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὢν
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄν-
θρωπος
εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ἄνθρωπος
εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ
ἄνθρωπος ὅδε
τὸ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ
εἷς ἄνθρωπος
1003b27-28 τὸ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ
εἷς ὢν ἄνθρωπος
τὸ εἷς ἐστὶν ἄνθρω-
πος καὶ ἔστιν εἷς ὢν
ἄνθρωπος
τὸ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ἄνθρωπος
As this quick comparison shows, it is hard to imagine what the most plausible reading of
these lines is. However, the general idea, clearly enough, is that ‘one’ and ‘being’ are neutral
additions to ‘man’, because they do not change what we mean by the following expressions:
‘one man’, ‘man that is’, ‘man that is one’, ‘man that is and that is one’. As in the case of
266Correcting the textus with the lemma reported at Averr., Tafsīr 1, 312.13.
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transcategoriality, the property does not depend on any specific understanding of being, as
‘being’ and ‘one’ are precisely those elements which do not change the references of the
expressions to which they are added. Notice that, as I remarked in section 2.2.5 of this
dissertation, this thesis is compatible with either of the following options: (1) ‘one’ and
‘being’ do not signify anything; (2) ‘one’ and ‘being’ are redundant, i.e. they do not add any
new property to the referents of which they are predicated. Accordingly, neutrality does not
entail the idea that ‘one’ and ‘being’ bear no meaning whatsoever.
3.5.2.3. Co-incidentality
The last property that is mentioned by Gamma and Iota is that each and every thing is by
default one and something that is. What Iota 2 has shown is that this, by itself, does not tell
us anything about what that given thing is. Rather, being and the one must be reduced to
something more familiar.
Overall, this, as well as the remaining two properties, relies heavily on Aristotle's
definition of τὸ ἕν in the previous chapter of Iota. Thus, it is not surprising that different
construals of the relationship between indivisibility and ‘being a unit of measurement’ have
resulted in different views of the convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’. In fact, there seems to be a
tension between the claim that one and being are in none of the categories and the
definition of ‘one’ as being above all the unit of measurement of quantities. It is this contrast
which has given rise to the traditional distinction between ‘one’ as a principle of number
(principium numeri) and the one which is convertible with being (unum quod convertitur
cum ente). In fact, reacting against Avicenna's interpretation of the relationship between
unity and being, first Averroes and then Aquinas make a sharp distinction between what
‘one’ means in quantities and what it means in all the other categories.
When Avicenna discusses the convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’, he states that ‘being’ and
‘one’ are convertible insofar as they are common accidents of every thing: that is, they never
indicate the nature of something, but always indicate something else which is added to its
nature. However, Averroes and Aquinas think that he fails to appreciate that sometimes ‘one’
does indicate a certain nature—namely, when it refers to discrete quantities. Accordingly,
taken as principle of number, the ‘one’ does not span all the categories, but is limited to a
specific kind of beings. According to Averroes, Avicenna believes that convertibility also
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works for the one as principle of number, because he confuses the expression ‘one’ ( ismu l-
wāḥidi) q u a principle of number (mabdāʾu l-ʿadadi) and the sense of ‘one’ which is
‘synonymous with “being” (al-murādifu li-ismi l-mawǧūdi) ’. Taking this criticism a step
further, Aquinas charges Avicenna with a more specific mistake. What Avicenna is not aware
of is the distinction between common things (communia) and accidents (accidentia). In fact,
even though neither is a this (hoc aliquid), common predicates signify the same nature as
their subjects (ipsam naturam suppositorum)—e.g. ‘animal’ with reference to ‘human being’;
by contrast, accidents indicate some other nature which is added to that of which they are
predicated (aliquam naturam additam)—e.g. ‘laughing’ with reference to ‘man’. Both
Aquinas and Averroes regard the one qua principle of number as indicating a discrete
quantity. On the contrary, the one which is convertible with being simply indicates that that
of which it is predicated is indivisible.
Regardless of whether Averroes' and Aquinas' criticisms of Avicenna are fair or
contentious, this medieval debate still informs contemporary scholarship. In particular,
Aquinas' position is explicitly endorsed by Stephen Makin, who in turn imputes to Aristotle a
lack of clarity in the use of three distinct notions of unity: (1) the unity convertible with
being; (2) the unity which is the principle of number; (3) the unity explicable in terms of
identity. According to (1), ‘A is one’ means that it is a unified whole, as opposed to a divided
collection of components; according to (2), ‘A is one F’ means that it is countable as one F as
opposed to two or more Fs; (3) ‘A and B are one’ means that A and B are the same F as
opposed to different Fs.267 Given that, in discussing convertibility, Aristotle is only
considering one-place predicates, (3) is not of consequence for the present purposes.
However, Makin thinks that Aristotle's convertibility of ‘one’ and ‘being’ conflates two
distinct meanings of unity.268 Indeed, when in Iota 2 he says that in the case of colours τὸ ἕν is
a colour, Aristotle ‘must be using a notion of ἕν different from that which explicates ὄν/ἕν
convertibility’. For any colour will be one in sense (1), but only white can serve as a unit for
measuring colours (sense (2)). More recently, Castelli too has claimed that these two senses
ought to be kept distinct and that convertibility functions only for sense (1),269 whereas Menn
267Makin 1988, 86.
268Makin 1988, 96.
269For a similar view, see also Crager 2018.
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thinks that convertibility works for both (1) and (2). At the end of this chapter, I should like
to situate myself within this complex debate, since Iota 2's special focus on the categories
can be of great help.
Let us begin from Makin's explanation of the confusion underlying Aristotle's example of
colours. On the interpretation I defended earlier in this chapter, Aristotle provides two
definitions of ἕν in appearance only. In fact, indivisibility is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for a thing to be a unit of measurement. However, the most accurate definition of
‘one’ is ‘being a μέτρον’. In turn, the most precise unit for a kind of objects K is that item K
which is maximally indivisible. Accordingly, it is not true that any colour can be the one of
colours. Any colour is (or can be taken to be) indivisible, but not every colour is
compositionally the most basic colour. If this is correct, then Aristotle here is not using two
distinct senses of unity, but very much the one sense that he had picked out as its definition.
The greatest difficulty raised by Aristotle's discussion of convertibility is that it is hard to
imagine how exactly one can talk about measuring in categories other than quantities.
However, Aristotle explicitly works on the assumption that we can know something if and
only if we know its compositionally basic unit. While this notion is best exemplified by what
happens in the case of quantities, this does not imply that unity is itself a quantity. In fact, if
that were the case, then Aristotle would fall prey to the very same mistake of which he
accuses the Pythagoreans, and would even do so immediately after accusing them himself.
Instead, at the end of Aristotle's long critique of previous metaphysical accounts of τὸ ἕν, the
following points seem non-negotiable: first, it is true that ‘one’ and ‘being’ are universal
predicates, but this does not imply that they designate some separate entity; second, ‘one’
and ‘being’ always indicate something determinate but are themselves nothing other than
that something.
Returning to the medieval roots of the debate, it is thus possible to score a point for
Avicenna. Pace Averroes and Aquinas, it is not true that there is a specific case, i.e. in
quantities, where the one is the substance of something. The one is neither a substance nor
the substance of anything. Therefore, Avicenna would be right to believe that Aristotle
makes no sharp division between ‘being indivisible’ and ‘being a unit of measurement’. For
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Aristotle, the word ‘one’ means ‘unit of measurement’, but always signifies something
indivisible, whether arbitrarily or truly so.
3.6. Aristotle beyond Eleatic monism
The final chapter of this dissertation has addressed Aristotle's solution of the eleventh
aporia. Against Plato and the Pythagoreans, Aristotle shows that the one is not a substance.
This claim was divided into two sub-claims to the effect that not only is it not a substance,
but it is not the substance of anything either. Specifically, on the one hand, Iota relies on
Zeta's rejection of universals as substances to disallow the implication that the universality
of the one entails its substantiality; on the other, Iota's definition of the one in terms of
indivisibility makes room for a sense in which the universality of the one is compatible with
its being merely an attribute. As a result, every thing is necessarily one; however, this does
not tell us anything about what that thing is.270 For, much like being, unity always refers to a
single item in one of the categories—and, ultimately, to substance—without being itself any
of them. It is in this sense that Aristotle can follow Empedocles and the physicists in
reducing being and the one to something more familiar (γνωριμώτερον), without however
giving up any sense whatsoever in which universals exist. As such, Aristotle overcomes the
metaphysical dilemma into which Parmenides had forced previous philosophers, thus
succeeding, with Plato's help, where—in Aristotle's view—Plato himself had failed.
270This is why Aristotle's inquiry into being cannot coincide with the inquiry into the one, contra Couloubaritsis
1983, Couloubaritsis 1990, Couloubaritsis 1992, Morrison 1993 and Gloy 1985.
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4. Conclusions
In the introduction to this dissertation I borrowed Myles Burnyeat's metaphor to define
Metaphysics Iota as the K2 of ancient philosophy. While the greatest area of this mountain
has been left unexplored, this thesis has beaten a path to one of its peaks. Thus, it is now
worth taking a moment to recall the stages of this journey and to reflect on how it affords us
a different look on Aristotle's magnum opus.
The first chapter examined how the one makes its first appearance in the Metaphysics,
namely as a principle of being in the theories of monist thinkers. It also identified Physics 1.2-
3 as Aristotle's reference point for his rejection of the extreme form of monism propounded
by the Eleatics, elucidating his debt to Plato's parricide of Parmenides in the Sophist. The
second chapter showed how the eleventh aporia epitomises Beta's use of Alpha Meizon's
doxography to spot and bring to the fore the most urgent problems with which his
metaphysical investigation needs to deal. Crucially, it suggested that Aristotle draws heavily
upon the Sophist for his rejection of both alternatives of the dilemma. Accordingly, Sophist
242b-e turns out to be the locus princeps for discussing monism in ancient philosophy.
This chapter concluded what can be regarded as the pars destruens of Aristotle's main
line of argument. The third, by contrast, elicited its pars construens, making the point that,
when Aristotle revisits the eleventh aporia in Metaphysics Iota, he does not limit himself to
rehashing his previous rejection of Plato, but also clarifies how his own account of the one is
immune to what—in his eyes—is the hardest of all metaphysical dilemmas.
This overall picture has some important consequences for our understanding of at least
three broader issues concerning Aristotle's thought, namely (4.1) his dialectical method of
inquiry, (4.2) his engagement with his predecessors and (4.3) the place of Iota in the
economy of the Metaphysics.
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4.1. Aristotle's dialectical method
As was pointed out in the interim conclusions of chapter 2, in the Metaphysics Aristotle
uses at least two different kinds of dialectic, namely one aimed at clarification, the other at
preparing the ground for his own inquiry. These two kinds of dialectic were grouped together
under the label ‘immanent dialectic’ and contrasted with the confutative dialectic
epitomised by Aristotle's rejection of Parmenidean monism in Physics 1.3. It is now worth
developing a fully-fledged comparison between these three kinds of dialectic.
Overall, this dissertation has shown that, while all uses of Aristotle's dialectic are rooted
in the Topics, dialectic should not be regarded as monolithic, but rather as a plastic tool that
can be moulded to serve diverse purposes. Hence, my suggestion is not that we ought to
suppose a development in Aristotle's dialectic across different works, but rather that the
dialectic of the Topics should be regarded as nothing more than a blueprint for successful
argumentation. This, however, makes dialectic all the more interesting, because, while
respecting its instrumental nature, it also emphasises its potential to be sharpened to suit
any specific target. In this sense, the discrimen between different uses of dialectic does not
lie in the preference of given (groups of) topoi over others, but in its aim within a specific
context. Broadly speaking, this dissertation has explored both the destructive and the
constructive uses of dialectic in Aristotle's inquiry into being.
What is distinctive of the Physics passages is that they carry out a knockdown argument.271
Aristotle needs to attack the Eleatic position—even though that discussion falls outside the
scope of a physical investigation—because it undermines the very possibility of investigating
change. This justifies Aristotle's care in bringing to the fore the absurdities upon which their
views rest. However, while Physics 1.2 is written for an audience that would accept
Aristotelian distinctions, the arguments of 1.3 start from Eleatic premises. Thus, the two
chapters display respectively an external and an internal dialectic. However, these two
perspectives cooperate to produce a robust rejection of the Eleatics: not only are Melissus'
271 A s Quarantotto 2019 emphasises, Aristotle carries out first a refutation and then a resolution (λύσις) of the
Eleatic theses.
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and Parmenides' assumptions false but, even if we were to grant their monistic assumptions,
their arguments would not hold.272
The picture in the Metaphysics is quite different. In Alpha Meizon Aristotle expounds a
history of previous theories of the principles of being, trying to describe them in terms of his
own four causes. In so doing, he deploys a kind of dialectic which Rachel Barney has defined
as clarification-dialectic.273 However, Aristotle does not limit himself to reporting the
doctrines of his predecessors, but rather carries out two operations: he organises them
according to how many principles they posit and analyses them in continuity with one
another. The result is a sort of imagined dialogue with and between different metaphysical
positions. Specifically, Alpha Meizon collects reputable opinions on the principles of being
and organises them in a continuous narrative in which every thinker contributes something
to the progress of metaphysics.274 In A.7 Aristotle, thinks that, as a whole, his predecessors
discovered or had an inkling of all of the four causes singled out in his Physics 2 and of no
others; hence, that is the number of causes to be investigated in the Metaphysics. A.8-9,
instead, marks a change of tone, from a history-based to a problem-oriented approach. In
fact, Aristotle moves from his doxography to a critical evaluation of the doctrines of its
protagonists. This is where a first list of aporiai appears—which I called A-aporiai—different
from those listed in B. While A.8-9—much like Physics 1.2—displays external criticisms, what
we find in Beta is a much more systematic dialectical examination, consisting of internal
criticisms directed to two rival views. Specifically, a crucial common trait of Beta with the
Physics is its dilemmatic procedure; however, while in Physics 1.3 Aristotle's target is Eleatic
monism, B.4 also attacks the alternative metaphysical position, identified with pluralism.
This broader application of internal dialectic reflects Aristotle's different aim at the
beginning of the Metaphysics, therefore putting book Beta itself in a different perspective. In
fact, Aristotle here utilises dialectic to take part in an ongoing metaphysical debate on the
principles of being—for it is not by chance that on this point we can draw a close parallel
272 This suggestion places emphasis on a dialectical strategy familiar from other Aristotelian loci, most notably
Politics 2.2-5, and is compatible with Crubellier 2019's explanation that a true conclusion can be drawn from
false premises.
273 Barney 2012, 99–104.
274 Cf. Met. α.1, 993a30-b16.
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with Plato's Sophist. As such, there are two ways in which the discussion of the eleventh
aporia acquires an historical resonance. Not only does Aristotle allocate the two opposite
views at stake in aporia 11 to philosophers whom he had introduced in Alpha Meizon but,
more generally, he also endeavours to resume the investigation of being from the point at
which they had left off. In other words, Aristotle inherits—through the mediation of Plato—
a problem which previous metaphysics had left unresolved; hence, the Metaphysics takes up
the challenge launched by the Sophist and suggests an escape route out of the greatest
aporia.275
The label ‘immanent dialectic’ is supposed to capture precisely this use of dialectical
strategies for the benefit of metaphysical progress. It is immanent insofar as it starts from
views that have been expressed historically and makes them interact with one another. In
fact, much like the Eleatic Stranger's imagined dialogue with early thinkers, immanent
dialectic is articulated in two moments. Its starting-point is an outline of how many
principles were historically posited by earlier philosophers, which involves an attempt to
clarify their metaphysical doctrines (clarification-dialectic). Once this preliminary
discussion has been concluded, Aristotle engages in a critical examination of these views
(diaporetic phase), either by expressing his disagreement with their premises (external
dialectic) or through a reductio ad absurdum of their assumptions (internal dialectic). Unlike
Physics 1.3, in Beta the aporiai are often abstracted from specific thinkers. However, in this
respect the eleventh aporia is uniquely well connected to its historical background. This is
why its solution marks one of Aristotle's major contributions to the history of Greek
metaphysics and shows that Aristotle himself wants to present it as such.
There is furthermore a final way in which this dissertation has explored Aristotle's use of
dialectic, namely by showing how it also provides a positive contribution to his metaphysical
investigation. In fact, B.4's discussion does not confine itself to indicating by way of exclusion
which paths cannot be pursued. On the contrary, Aristotle takes great pains to spot what
philosophical conviction has given rise to the mistake of his predecessors. This awards him
the key to forestalling an impasse, when he offers his own metaphysical theory about being
275 As I mentioned in chapter 2, the aporia language is prominent in the central passages of Plato's Sophist. In
particular, a difficulty about being and the one/many problem is flagged as the greatest and first of aporiai (τῶν
ἀποριών ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη) at 238a2.
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and the one in Zeta and Iota. Aristotle believes that the capital mistake shared by
Parmenides, Plato and the Pythagoreans has to do with predication, for being and the one
are not univocal, but said in many ways. This is what grounds Aristotle's solution to the
eleventh aporia: insofar as they are the most universal predicates, being and the one are
neither substances themselves nor the substances of anything, but necessary accidents of
any determinate substance.
4.2. Aristotle's engagement with his predecessors
Once we allow ourselves a close inspection of Aristotle's dialectical strategies, his
relationship with previous thinkers appears in a different light than is usually believed.
Specifically, my analysis of aporia 11 constitutes a counterexample to Harold Cherniss' view
of Aristotle’s relation to his predecessors for three reasons.
First, I have shown that Aristotle’s arguments against his predecessors follow a specific
dialectic, combining an historical perspective with external and internal criticisms.
Accordingly, Aristotle does not ‘wilfully misrepresent previous theories for the particular
purpose of his argument’;276 on the contrary, precisely because of his philosophical method,
Aristotle needs to start from premises which his interlocutor would be willing to grant. This
attitude is particularly clear when we look at the internal dialectic deployed in Physics 1.3,
which depends on a close reading of Parmenidean passages.277
Second, in the case of B.4, Cherniss emphasises that Aristotle accuses Plato of a fallacy
that Plato himself had already demonstrated in the Sophist—an accusation which he regards
as a clear sign of Aristotle’s neglect or bad faith.278 Contrary to this perception, chapter 2 has
shown that this step of Aristotle’s argument is in reality a strategic move to refute Plato
starting from Plato’s own premises. As such, it represents an additional case where the very
kind of argument put forward by Aristotle depends on a tight engagement with the text.
276Cherniss 1935, 352.
277 As has been recently shown by Clarke 2019, 189–92, too.
278 Cherniss 1944, 93.
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Finally, contrary to Cherniss’ reconstruction,279 the importance of the Eleatic school is far
from neglected in Aristotle’s investigation of being. Besides the great deal of attention which
they receive in the Physics, the Eleatics acquire a central role in the discussion of the
eleventh aporia as well. Moreover, in that connection, chapter 2 even identified the influence
of Zeno of Elea on an Aristotelian argument. Thus, overall, my reading shows that Aristotle
regards Parmenides’ doctrine as a landmark in the history of philosophy, to the extent that
his own metaphysics is, at least in part, a response to a Parmenidean problem.
4.3. The place of Iota in Aristotle's Metaphysics
As was pointed out in the introduction, the role of Iota within the Metaphysics has
recently attracted scholarly attention.280 Although this topic would deserve a far lengthier
account than that which I can accord it here, I should like to conclude by indicating how this
thesis can contribute to the debate about Iota's relation to the rest of the Metaphysics. I shall
begin by proposing in the following table an overview of how Iota is connected to six other
books:
Kind of connection Book of the Metaphysics
direct
and explicit Β Δ Ζ
but implicit Γ
indirect Α Λ
The books which are not included in the table show no connection with Iota and can be
divided into two categories. In the cases of α, Ε, Η and Θ, there is no obvious reason to expect
a connection with Iota. On the contrary, Κ, Μ and Ν deal with subjects that appear to be
connected with the argument of Iota, yet we do not get any clear indications that a
connection was ever intended. In the following paragraphs I shall briefly review the evidence
I have gathered on the relationship between I.1-2 and the other books of the Metaphysics and
279 Cherniss 1935, 384.
280Centrone 2005; Castelli 2018a.
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set up a few questions about how this evidence can provide a starting point for some
reassessment of the place of Iota as a whole within the Metaphysics. 
4.3.1. The opening books of the Metaphysics
A) Iota's connection with Alpha Meizon is indirect. Their relation is mediated by Beta,
which, I suggested in section 2.1.3, follows on from Alpha Meizon and even shows some
linguistic continuity with its final lines. Moreover, the eleventh aporia presupposes a book
like Alpha Meizon, given that it ascribes the two alternatives of the dilemma to some of the
protagonists of Aristotle's doxography.
B) Iota's connection with Beta is direct and explicit (ἐν τοῖς διαπορήμασιν, I.2, 1053b10).
Although this thesis has only considered the eleventh aporia, Iota is tightly linked to another
aporia, which is formulated at 995b18-37 (B.1): whether Aristotle's investigation should study
only substances or also its per se accidents. While Gamma provides an answer, it is Iota that
carries out the metaphysical inquiry into unity, sameness, equality, similarity and
contrariety.281 Thus, if Beta sets the agenda for Aristotle's Metaphysics in the sense that was
defended in chapter 2, then Iota complies with it in two fundamental respects: it solves the
eleventh aporia and it investigates the notions around which revolves the aporia formulated
at 995b18-37.
Γ) Iota's connection with Gamma is direct but implicit. As was pointed out in chapter 3,
Iota adapts Gamma's arguments for the sameness of ‘one’ and ‘being’ to the context of its
inquiry into the one.282 By itself, such proximity of Gamma to Iota is compatible with two
possibilities: either Gamma and Iota share a common source (weaker claim) or one depends
on the other (stronger claim). However, two reasons can be adduced in support of the
stronger claim. First, in the final chapter of this dissertation the point was made that Iota's
specific relation to previous books of the Metaphysics consists in recasting their arguments
to serve its specific purposes. Accordingly, the fact that Iota and Gamma share a stretch of
281 On this point see in particular Burnyeat 2001, 137 and Castelli 2011.
282 Moreover, both books refer to the same Aristotelian work, now lost, dealing with the contraries (cf. ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ
τῶν ἐναντίων, Γ.2, 1004a1 and ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων I.3, 1054a30); on this work see Berti 1973, Rossitto 1977
and Guariglia 1978.
197
argument suggests that Gamma should be regarded as an additional reference alongside
Beta, Delta and Zeta. Second, as was recalled above, in studying the notions listed in the fifth
aporia, Iota carries out the programme prepared for by Gamma. These observations suggest
that Iota is specifically reminding the reader of Gamma, rather than more generally relying
on the same logical background.283 One might also remark that, while Beta, Delta and Zeta
can be easily identified by shorthand descriptions such as ‘book of aporiai’, ‘book of
definitions’ and ‘book of substance’, Gamma has perhaps no analogous characterisation.
4.3.2. The book of definitions
Δ) Iota's connection with Delta is direct and explicit (cf. ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς
διῃρημένοις, I.1, 1052a15-16).284 Because both books discuss the one and some related notions,
they have been regarded as good candidates for the solution of the fifth aporia. In
summarising the rival parties in the debate, Castelli observes that a reason in favour of Iota is
that it shows a more systematic approach to the notions which are also presented in Delta.285
This dissertation provides two additional reasons that tend in this direction. To begin with,
Iota does not limit itself to providing a definition of τὸ ἕν. On the contrary, its crucial
contribution to the study of the one consists in providing a metaphysical grounding for the
definition of the one as ‘unit of measurement’: the one is a μέτρον because it is always
something indivisible. Furthermore, on this reconstruction, Delta displays the same relation
to Iota as to Epsilon, Zeta and Theta, all of which contain an uncontroversial reference to
that book.286 Therefore, it seems plausible that, as ΕΖΗΘ revisits Delta's description of τὸ ὄν,
Iota revisits Delta's definition of τὸ ἕν. Note that, if we accept Iota, and not Delta, as the place
where Aristotle discusses the notions mentioned in the fifth aporia, Delta is left with a rather
283 This implies that, in the economy of the Metaphysics Iota comes after Gamma and not vice versa. Note that this
suggestion is compatible with the idea that Iota comes  logically before Gamma; my focus here is on the
Metaphysics as a work; hence, what matters is the order in which Gamma and Iota should be presented to the
reader.
284Centrone 2005, 38 mentions another two references to Delta at 1055b6-7 and 1056b34-5. He also reports a
further reference at 1055a2, on which, however, there is no consensus.
285Castelli 2018a, xix–xx.
286E.2, 1026a33-b2; Z.1, 1028a10-1; Θ.1, 1046a4-6;  Θ.10, 1051a34-b2.
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different role in the economy of the Metaphysics, namely to provide a preliminary—but not
definitive—description of terms which are central to a metaphysical inquiry. In fact,
although Delta does offer some attempts at a unified description of some notions,287 it does
not offer arguments, but is limited to a list of more-or-less precise characterisations. Thus,
whenever Aristotle returns to notions described in Delta, he neither corrects nor simply
rehashes that discussion; instead, he deepens his analysis providing a metaphysical account
of them. As such, Delta is a sort of stepping stone for Aristotle's later inquiry.288 From this
perspective, the case of τὸ ἕν in Iota exemplifies precisely this relation: while Aristotle there
does not add a new definition, he grounds Delta's nominal definition (‘unit of measurement’)
in a necessary characteristic of things (indivisibility).
4.3.3. The central books
Ζ) Iota's connection with Zeta is direct and explicit (cf. ἐν τοῖς περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος
εἴρηται λόγοις, I.2, 1053b17-8). In fact, chapter 3 has already clarified how Iota borrows Zeta's
conclusions to return to the eleventh aporia with new weapons against Plato's conception of
being and the one. However, there are at least two additional ways in which Zeta and Iota are
connected. Not only are the opening lines of the two books strikingly similar,289 but I.1 seems
to follow a development analogous to Aristotle's discussion of substance. Both I.1 and Z.1
start from a group of objects which are generally acknowledged to be respectively ‘one’ and
‘substance’ and then focuses on the characteristics in virtue of which these objects are
thought to be such.290 In the light of this parallel, since Iota deals not with substances, but
with its per se attributes and given that it resolves the eleventh aporia relying on Zeta, Iota
can be regarded as the counterpart of Zeta.
287 For example, Δ.1 on ‘ἀρχή’, Δ.3 on ‘στοιχεῖον’, Δ.6 on ‘ἕν’.
288On the overall function of Delta within the Metaphysics, see Menn in progress, Iγ1b.
289Compare Z.1, 1028a10-1 (‘Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πο•αχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς’) with I.1,
1052a15-6 (‘Τὸ ἓν ὅτι μὲν λέγεται πο•αχῶς, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς διῃρημένοις εἴρηται πρότερον’).
290Castelli 2018a, 52–3.
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4.3.4. The case of Kappa
K) Although Iota has no clear connection with Kappa, we would perhaps expect the
contrary. In fact, in summarising the previous books of the Metaphysics, Kappa quotes the
eleventh aporia; however, it does so in a way which significantly detaches itself from Iota.
First, Kappa's presentation of the eleventh aporia is cursory and, though mindful of Zeta,
seems to ignore Iota. More precisely, at 1060a36-b6, K.2 presents the aporia as concerning
being and the one qua unmoved principles. If they are not something determinate and a
substance, being and the one are not going to be separate, which contradicts their being
eternal and primary in relation to anything else (K.2, 1060a37-b2). If they are instead
something determinate and a substance, given that they are maximally universal, everything
is going to be a substance (1060b2-6). Such a summary shows that Kappa ignores the fact
that Iota has resolved the eleventh aporia. In fact, I.1-2 makes room for an escape route from
the second branch of Kappa's dilemma: the one (and, analogously, being) is universal
precisely by being necessarily predicated of everything that is a τόδε τι. In this sense, its
universality does not imply that it is the substance of all things, but only that it is a necessary
attribute.291 As a result, Kappa and Iota would seem to exclude each other.292 One could
hypothesise that Kappa has at least one point of contact with Iota, namely convertibility
(K.3, 1061a10-8); however, that reference surely depends on Gamma, whose arguments are
summarised in K.3-6.293
4.3.5. The theological book
Λ) Iota's connection with Lambda is indirect. I.1-2's general argument not only suggests
that there is a ‘one’ also in the case of substances, but allows for a metaphysically acceptable
sense in which there can be such a one, namely as the compositionally basic substance—to
be contrasted with a Platonising one itself. Specifically, just before introducing the prime
291 This also suggests that, although Kappa borrows Zeta's criterion for substantiality in the first branch of the
dilemma, it understands this criterion in a superficial sense, at least prima facie.
292For reasons in favour and against the authenticity of Kappa, see respectively Décarie 1983 and Aubenque 1983.
293 A similar consideration would apply to Kappa's reference to a study of the contraries (1061a15), which is
mentioned not only at I.3, 1054a30 but also at Γ.2, 1004a1.
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mover, Λ.7 contains a parenthetical remark which bears a strong resemblance to I.1's
name/thing distinction. At 1072a32-4, Aristotle observes that the one and the simple (τὸ
ἁπλοῦν) are not the same thing, because while ‘one’ means ‘measure’, the simple signifies a
characteristic of a thing (πῶς ἔχον αὐτό).294
4.3.6. The final books
M) Iota has no clear connection with Mu; however, both Iota and MN are interested in the
nature of mathematical objects and criticise previous theories of Platonic and Pythagorean
inspiration. One striking feature of Mu is that its chapters 4 and 5 reproduce sections of A.6
almost verbatim. What can be safely affirmed regarding the relationship between A and M is,
first, that they—at the very least—depend on some common source; second, that they can
hardly have been written as parts of one and the same work.295 Scholarly consensus has it
that Aristotle first sketched his criticism of forms in Alpha Meizon and then returned to it at
the end of the Metaphysics in order to strengthen his attacks. However, if we assume that
Aristotle himself copied stretches of his own text, it is more economical to imagine him
selecting the relevant sections of an existing longer discussion to adapt them to a different
context. Indeed, it is hard to see how Mu's discussion can fit into Aristotle's overall
metaphysical inquiry, unless we read it within the historical framework offered by Alpha
Meizon. Moreover, on the reading of the Metaphysics which was suggested in chapters 1 and
2, Aristotle's harsh critique of Platonism is manifestly carried out from the perspective of an
insider. This might provide an explanation of Aristotle's use of the first-person plural—and
not the third—in Alpha Meizon.296 One important difficulty for this suggestion is that, at
294Berti 1979 emphasises the connection between this passage and Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic one. One
could also notice that I.10 discusses the difference perishable/imperishable, perhaps preparing the ground for
Aristotle's discussion of imperishable substances which will lead up to the unmoved mover.
295By this, I do not intend to deny that Mu represents a fundamental piece of Aristotelian metaphysics; rather, I
limit myself to raising some doubts on whether Mu and Alpha can be regarded as part of one and the same
piece of writing.
296In particular, contra Primavesi 2012a, 413 this interpretative perspective can reopen the possibility that Aristotle
himself would have replaced the 3rd person with the 1st in order to present his own inquiry as a continuation
(and improvement) of the metaphysical enterprise undertaken in the Academy.
201
1086b15-6, M.10 also refers to Beta, which would imply that Mu comes after the series AB.
However, on the one hand, the dilemma reported by Mu is slightly different from its
corresponding aporia in B.4, for it seems to merge two aporiai which Aristotle there
discusses separately.297 Hence, the logical anteriority of Beta's aporiai is compatible with the
hypothesis that Beta itself, as a book, may represent a stage of redaction later than both Mu
and an embryonic list of difficulties.298 On the other hand, since Mu and Alpha Meizon
exclude each other, and since Beta is well-connected with Alpha Meizon, we are faced with a
choice between M and AB. If we do accept the idea that Mu is older, then it could be
regarded as a sort of draft which Alpha Meizon distilled and reframed within a more specific
discussion. On this account, the relationship between M and AB would be partially
analogous to that between Gamma and Iota, both of which deal with convertibility, but at
different lengths and within different discussions.
N) Iota has no clear connection with Nu; however, chapters 2 and 3 have shown more
than one affinity between the two books, both of which study the causal role of Academic
principles and numbers. There is one more specific parallel which deserves some attention;
it consists in N.1's discussion of μέτρον. At 1087b33-4, Aristotle affirms that it is clear (φανερόν)
that ‘one’ means ‘unit of measurement’. Then, after listing some examples, he adds that, since
a unit of measurement is always indivisible (whether in form or according to perception),
the one is not a substance. As such, this passage too looks like a compact repetition of I.1-2;
notice, however, that, in this form, the passage is also reminiscent of Δ.6, 1016b17-24. In fact,
as a reference to Iota, Nu says too little, insofar as the argument at 1087b26-33 would require
more detail to be appreciated fully. In contrast, as a reference to Delta, it says too much,
insofar as it draws a conclusion which is only at home in a polemical context. Note also that
I.1 starts from Delta's per se understandings of τὸ ἕν and ends with the nominal definition of
the one; instead, N.1 seems to follow the reverse path, from the definition of the one to its
being indivisible in any kind of things whatsoever. In this respect N.1 is rather similar to
Aristotle's argument against the Pythagoreans in I.2, where, as we saw, Aristotle grants them
that there is a ‘one’ in all kinds of things but rejects the implication that the substance of all
297These seem to be aporiai 6 (995b27-29), 12 (996a12-15) and, to a lesser extent, 14 (996a9-11), cf. Annas 1976, 188–9
and especially Menn in progress, Iγ3.
298Cf. Annas 1976, 84.
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things is ‘one’. Accordingly, there are some good reasons to read N.1-2 not as referring back to
Iota but rather as doing at least in part Iota's own job. This may suggest that Nu and Iota
exclude each other as part of a unitary work. An advantage of this suggestion is that it would
confirm Iota's tendency to draw upon earlier material and adapt its content to its own
investigation. The crucial difference with other cases would then be that, here, Iota would
not mention a book within the Metaphysics, but reorganise into a new form the content of
an earlier piece of metaphysical investigation.
4.3.7. Overview
As a result of this survey, the study of the eleventh aporia not only connects I.1-2 with
Aristotle's main line of investigation; it also provides us with a possible thread to read the
Metaphysics as a unitary work. The connections that I suggested above are schematised in
the following graph, where each arrow connects a book to a subsequent book in the work.
Although they are not included in the graph, Κ, Μ and Ν also contribute to reading the
Metaphysics as one work, but via negativa. As a result of my tentative considerations in 4.3.4
and 4.3.6, if we consider Iota as part of the Metaphysics, we should exclude both Kappa and
Nu, which—in different ways—ignore I.1-2's study of the one. Furthermore, the overlap of
M.4-5 and A.6 suggests that A and M are not intended as parts of one and the same work.
Thus, considering that A rules out α as an introduction to the Metaphysics and that the
central books are commonly regarded as a unit, this dissertation provides some grounds for
considering Aristotle's Metaphysics as consisting of the series ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘΙΛ.
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To conclude, as the second-highest peak of Aristotle's Metaphysics after Zeta, Iota is
perhaps the best viewpoint from which to appreciate Zeta's height as well as Aristotle's new
beginning in the study of being and the one. As such, the eleventh aporia is a privileged
panoramic point on ancient metaphysics.
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